United Nations

Military Staff Officers Specialised Training Materials

for United Nations Peace Operations

UNSO STM 2024

United Nations Department of Peace Operations

The United Nations Military Staff Officers Specialised Training Materials (UNSO STM) for United Nations Peace Operations has been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).

This version has been released for use by Member States in their pre-deployment training for United Nations Peace Operations. The Specialised Training Materials (STM) will be regularly updated so that it is fully responsive to the needs on the ground. Therefore, we strongly suggest that you check for updated versions before a training program is conducted.

The latest STM versions can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website: https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be located in the resource hub at the same location.

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Integrated Training Service

Department of Peace Operations

United Nations

New York, NY, 10017, USA

Preface

Background

The primacy of the United Nations in peacekeeping keeps increasing with the growing number of complex crises that pose threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, the United Nations continuous to improve its multi-dimensional approach to peace operations which has also come with new challenges including performance standards of military staff officers at the Force and Sector Headquarters and elsewhere in integrated functions within the missions. Many United Nations staff members' End of Assignment reports have also ascribed part of the problem to inadequate pre-deployment training of many staff officers to UN missions. Considering the crucial interfacing roles of staff officers between strategic, operational and tactical levels, they need to be proficient in performing their duties to ensure effective mandate implementation.

The revision of this Specialised Training Material (STM) was initiated by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) to address the evolving operating environment, new requirements on skill sets and competencies, as well as to improve peacekeeping performance in the field. Specifically, this project was led by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and supported by the Department of Operational Support (DOS), the Office of Military Affairs (OMA)/DPO, the Policy and Best Practices Section (PBPS)/DPO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Member States.

It is noteworthy that this STM has been developed based on the presumption that deploying military staff officers would have at least completed their national basic staff courses as part of their career progression. This serves as the starting point for this STM. The STM is thus a generic training material that builds on this starting point by orienting military staff officers on the UN DPO approach to peace operations.

In effect, this STM is not intended to substitute national training doctrines of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) but to provide guidance to the trainers of military staff officers' courses in order to harmonise the different doctrinal perspectives and also to establish a baseline standard for pre-deployment training for military staff officers at Force and Sector Headquarters in UN peace operations.

In conducting training with this STM, it is essential to begin with the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) which are intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel (military, police and civilian) with a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines, and policies of UN peace operations to ensure coherence in United Nations mandate implementation.

Aim

The aim of the Specialised Training Material for Military Staff Officers is to support the pre-deployment training efforts of Troop Contributing Countries by providing UN DPO training standards to ensure a common approach to the work of Military Staff Officers at Force and Sector levels, and within integrated entities, in UN peace operations.

Target Audience

This STM targets all military personnel selected by Member States to be deployed as Military Staff Officers in UN peace operations. Military Staff Officers are required to have at least completed their national basic military staff course.

Training Objectives

The training objectives of the STM for Military Staff Officers are to generally prepare the participants for duties in a peacekeeping operation so they can:

- Contribute efficiently to implement military aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates in accordance with DPO principles and guidelines;
- Perform their military staff functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner;
- Demonstrate the core values and competencies of the United Nations; and
- Apply the knowledge of national military planning process doctrines in a UN environment, using the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP).

Acknowledgements

The Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peace Operations (ITS/DPO) would like to thank the subject matter experts from across the UN system, Member States and other regional and international organizations who contributed to the development/revision during the drafting process, and the numerous training personnel from national peacekeeping training institutions and field missions who participated in the development workshops. Specifically, the contributions of the following Member States to the UNSO STM development is acknowledged:

People's Republic of **Bangladesh**
Federative Republic of **Brazil**
Canada
People's Republic of **China**
Kingdom of **Denmark**
Arab Republic of **Egypt**
Republic of **France**
Federal Republic of **Germany**
Republic of **Ghana**
Republic of **India**
Republic of **Indonesia**
Japan
Republic of **Kenya**
Mongolia
Kingdom of **Morocco**
Nepal
Federal Republic of **Nigeria**
Islamic Republic of **Pakistan**
Republic of **Senegal**
Republic of **Serbia**
Kingdom of **Sweden**
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States of America

Special recognition goes to the **Führungsakademie Der Bundeswehr** (German Armed Forces Command and Staff College) of the Federal Republic of **Germany**, who supported the review of the CARANA country study, used in the Scenario Based Exercise.

Contact

For any proposal of update or improvement of this package, or any questions pertaining to the UNSO STM, please contact ITS/DPET/DPO at peacekeeping-training@un.org.

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (Functional - Peacekeeping Resource Hub - Peacekeeping Resource Hub at Department of Peace Operations (DPO)). Instructors are encouraged to check the website regularly.

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Instructor Guidance

General Considerations for Instructors

This package is not a course, but rather a compendium of critical training contents for military staff officers in UN peace operations. No training material can cover the entire breadth of staff officer duties, with all its challenges and activities. The UNSO STM should therefore be viewed as the baseline to underpin all UN SO-related training efforts for military peacekeepers. When designing a particular course, trainers need to be prepared to adapt these materials to the needs of their audience. As a result, the duration of training courses delivered based on the UNSO STM may vary. **A suggested training schedule plan for a two-week course is available at the end of this training package.**

Concerning necessary competencies for participants to benefit from this training package, it is recommended that personnel receiving this training be proficient on their national basic staff officer courses. As such, it is expected that a staff officer be capable to perform regular staff officer duties before receiving a training based on the UNSO STM package. It is also critical for all participants to have received the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) as a pre-requisite for this training. The CPTM contains fundamental principles, concepts and ideas to UN peacekeeping, which should be well grasped by trainees before participating in a UNSO course.

The CPTM can be downloaded from the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website: https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/

Instructor Profile

This training package is best presented by instructors who have mastered the CPTM and their national basic staff courses, and have previous experience working in a UN peace operation in a staff officer role at the Force or Sector Headquarters. Ideally, the instructor will be able to harmonise the national and peacekeeping doctrinal perspectives to provide the baseline standard for this pre-deployment training.

Knowledge on the particular mission where trainees are to be deployed is advisable, so as to be able to deliver a targeted course based on real experience. Support of recently returned MSOs is strongly encouraged to reinforce messages on a peer-to-peer level.

Finally, instructors should be familiar and comfortable with facilitating scenario-based exercises.

Training Characteristics

Training will vary for different units in different Troop Contributing Countries, based on priorities and resources. However, some fundamental training characteristics should be respected when delivering a UNSO course:

- Training should be interactive and encourage the participation of trainees;
- Training should be mission-specific; where possible, it is advisable for trainers to bring in examples from the mission that trainees will be deployed to; and
- Training methodology should be based on practice.

Symbols Legend

	Training Tips for Facilitators to engage the participants
	Note to the instructor to highlight aspects of the materials or point towards additional materials

Module
1

Organisational/Structural Framework

Module 1 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to provide staff officers with the necessary knowledge to understand the UN Secretariat's structure and the roles and responsibilities of various departments that UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) may encounter during their deployment in field missions.

It delves into detailed lessons on the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Operational Support (DOS), which are the primary departments involved in Peace Operations.

Additionally, the module provides a thorough examination of the Integrated Mission Structure, outlining the roles and responsibilities of its main elements, along with a lesson on Authority, Command, and Control.

Furthermore, Module 1 includes a lesson on Military Staff Branches and their responsibilities within the military component of field missions.

Relevance

All military Staff officers in the FHQ or SHQ of a UN mission need to have an understanding of the structure of the UNHQ and the functions of different departments for effective communication, coordination, and collaboration within the UN system. By gaining familiarity with these topics, MSOs can effectively fulfil their roles and responsibilities in supporting Peace Operations.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this Module, participants will be able to:

- Explain the general organisation and roles of the main departments of the UN Secretariat involved in Peace Operations
- Describe the general structure of an Integrated Peacekeeping Mission
- Describe the UN Military Component structures in different types of missions
- Explain the UN Military Staff branches and functions at the Field Level

Overview

Module 1: Organisational/Structural Framework comprises of seven lessons that are organised to help achieve the learning objectives:

- Lesson 1.1: UN Secretariat Structure
- Lesson 1.2: Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
- Lesson 1.3: Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
- Lesson 1.4: Department of Operational Support (DOS)
- Lesson 1.5: Integrated Mission Structures
- Lesson 1.6: Authority, Command and Control
- Lesson 1.7: Integrated Organisations and Staff Functions

Module 1 - Introduction

Slide 1

Key Message: Module 1 offers an overview of the UN Secretariat's structure and the roles and responsibilities of various departments that UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) may encounter during their deployment in field missions. It delves into detailed lessons on the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Operational Support (DOS), which are the primary departments involved in Peace Operations. Additionally, the module provides a thorough examination of the Integrated Mission Structure, outlining the roles and responsibilities of its main elements, along with a lesson on Authority, Command, and Control. Furthermore, Module 1 includes a lesson on Military Staff Branches and their responsibilities within the military component of field missions.

Understanding the structure of the UNHQ and the functions of different departments is crucial for effective communication, coordination, and collaboration within the UN system. By gaining familiarity with these topics, MSOs can effectively fulfil their roles and responsibilities in supporting Peace Operations.

Slide 2

Key Message: These are the Lessons we will cover in this Module.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the general organisation and roles of the main departments of the UN Secretariat involved in Peace Operations
- Describe the general structure of an Integrated Peacekeeping Mission
- Describe the UN Military Component structures in different types of missions
- Explain the UN Military Staff branches and functions at the Field Level

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Lesson
1.1

UN Secretariat Structure

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.1 provides an overview of the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and the various departments with which UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) at field missions may interact during their deployment.

Relevance

As peacekeeping personnel, MSO represent the UN in the country to which they are deployed. Despite potentially never visiting UN Headquarters in New York, they play a crucial role in executing decisions made there.

Understanding the decision-making process and identifying key decision-makers is essential for MSO. Furthermore, comprehending the Secretariat's structure and the functions of its different departments is vital for fostering effective communication, coordination, and collaboration within the UN system.

By familiarizing themselves with these aspects, MSOs can adeptly navigate their roles and responsibilities, thereby enhancing their support for mission mandate implementation.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the general organisation and roles of the UN Secretariat
- Explain the main responsibilities of the Departments of the UN Secretariat
- Identify key Departments for interaction while deployed in a field mission

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
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Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.1 provides an overview of the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and the various departments with which UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) in field missions may interact during their deployment.

As peacekeeping personnel, MSOs represent the UN in the country to which they are deployed. Despite potentially never visiting UN Headquarters in New York, they play a crucial role in executing decisions made there.

Understanding the decision-making process and identifying key decision-makers is essential for MSOs. Furthermore, comprehending the Secretariat's structure and the functions of its different departments is vital for fostering effective communication, coordination and collaboration within the UN system.

By familiarising themselves with these aspects, MSOs can adeptly navigate their roles and responsibilities, thereby enhancing their support for mission mandate implementation.

Slide 2

Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson. It is worth noting that DPPA, DPO, and DOS will be covered in standalone lessons since they are the primary departments involved in Peace Operations.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the general organisation and roles of the UN Secretariat
- Describe the main responsibilities of the Departments of the UN Secretariat
- Identify key Departments for interaction while deployed in a field mission

Please take a moment to study the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Key Message: The six main organs of the UN created under the UN Charter are: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and **the Secretariat.**

- The General Assembly is where all Member States meet and vote on decisions. The principle of equality means each Member State has one vote.
- The SC has lead responsibility under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The Council has 15 members, including 5 permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The GA elects the other 10 rotating members for two-year terms, ensuring geographical representation.
- The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the central body coordinating the economic and social work of the UN.
- The Trusteeship Council supervised Trust Territories, which were former colonies or dependent territories, as they made progress towards self-governance or independence. The Trusteeship Council suspended operation in 1994, with the independence of the last trust territory.
- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is in The Hague, Netherlands. The Court settles legal disputes only between nations and not between individuals, following international laws.
- **The Secretariat refers to the departments and offices with international staff to carry out the day-to-day work of the Organisation.** Let's delve further into the structure of the Secretariat.

Slide 5

Key Message: The Secretariat, established under the United Nations Charter in June 1945, is one of the main organs of the United Nations. Chapter XV of the UN Charter addresses the establishment and tasks of the UN Secretariat.

Training Tips

Discuss the Charter chapter headings to gauge participants' knowledge/retention of CPTM material.

Slide 6



Key Message: The Secretariat has four main roles or functions, which are further explained below.

Functions of the Secretariat:

• Preparation of reports and other documents containing information, analysis, historical background, research findings, and policy suggestions to facilitate deliberations and decision-making by other organs.

• Facilitation of legislative organs and their subsidiary bodies.

• Provision of meeting and secretariat services for the General Assembly (GA) and other UN organs.

• Provision of editorial, translation, and document reproduction services for the issuance of UN documents in different languages.

• Conducting studies and providing information to various Member States to address challenges in various fields.

• Preparation of statistical publications, information bulletins, and analytical work as directed by the GA.

• Organisation of conferences, expert group meetings, and seminars on topics of concern to the international community.

• Provision of technical assistance to developing countries.

• Support of missions in countries, areas, or locations as authorised by the GA or the Security Council.

Slide 7

Key Message: The Secretariat is organised along departmental lines, each with distinct areas of action and responsibility. These departments and offices are located in the UN Headquarters in New York, as well as in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and other locations worldwide.

Offices and departments coordinate to ensure cohesion in the Organization's day-to-day work.

The Secretariat, comprising departments, offices, and independent offices, is overseen by a Secretary-General, appointed by the General Assembly upon the Security Council's recommendation.

Key departments essential for Peace Operations, including Special Political Missions, will be detailed in subsequent slides.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – For a full list of Departments and Offices and to download the UN System chart in PDF format, please visit: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/secretariat

Training Tips

Consider distributing the UN System Chart to illustrate the organisation's global reach.

Slide 8



Key Message: The Secretariat encompasses departments and offices comprising international and local staff responsible for the Organisation's day-to-day operations. It offers services to other UN organs, as well as their subsidiary bodies.

The Secretary-General, serving as the "Chief Administrative Officer" of the UN and head of the Secretariat, oversees UN departments, offices, and activities, providing leadership. The Secretary-General alerts the Security Council to any threats to international peace and security. The Security Council determines significant threats and decides on potential UN actions.

Extracted from the Charter

Article 97 - The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and other key staff the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He/she shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98 - The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall provide an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99 - The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Slide 9

Key Message: The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) fall directly under the Office of the Secretary-General's purview.

OIOS acts as the internal oversight body of the United Nations. Established in 1994 by the General Assembly, OIOS assists the Secretary-General in overseeing the Organization's resources and staff. It offers audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation services.

OLA provides a unified central legal service for the Secretariat, the principal and other organs of the United Nations.

Slide 10



Key Message: Every department of the UN Secretariat contributes to the day-to-day running of UN peace operations. However, the three departments directly involved in UN peace operations are the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

The general roles are:

- Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA): Provides focused support to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts around the world.

- Department of Peace Operations (DPO): Offers political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations globally.

- Department of Operational Support (DOS): Provides operational support to all UN Secretariat entities, nearly 100 around the globe.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – These three key departments involved in peace operations will be discussed in detail in separate lessons.

Slide 11



Key Message: DMSPC provides strategic advice on management issues and develops management strategies and guidance with respect to budget, human resources management and system accountability.

In addition, the Under-Secretary-General DMSPC represents the Secretary-General on management issues before relevant expert and intergovernmental bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee, the International Civil Service Commission and inter-agency coordination mechanisms, including the High-level Committee on Management, the Chief Executives Board (CEB); and in the conduct of staff-management consultations.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Facilitators are encouraged to refer to Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance | (un.org) before conducting the lesson to verify any changes or updates.

Slide 12



Key Message: The Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) was established with three interlinked pillars: Programme Planning, Finance and Budget; Business Transformation and Accountability; and Human Resources.

- Programme Planning, Finance and Budget provides strategic policy leadership across all management areas through a clear, integrated global management strategy and policy framework.
- Business Transformation and Accountability establishes a culture conducive to innovation of business models throughout the UN Secretariat, with a strong focus on field activities.
- Human Resources champions, drives, and supports a results-oriented and risk-aware culture of continuous learning and accountability.

The Office of the Under-Secretary-General DMPSC oversees the department's overall leadership and administration, playing a key role in shaping organisational culture.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Details on the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) will be discussed later under the Department of Operational Support (DOS). OICT is a shared function with dual reporting to DOS.

Slide 13



Key Message: The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) provides security expertise to all entities within the United Nations Security Management System. It facilitates the planning and safe execution of mandates, missions, activities, and programmes of the UN system, ensuring the safety and security of personnel and UN premises and assets.

• The Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) is responsible for providing leadership, operational support, and oversight of the security management system.

• It ensures security for staff and their eligible dependents.

• UNDSS operates as a network of security coordinators and advisors deployed wherever UN programmes are implemented.

• UNDSS maintains offices in about 130 countries.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Facilitators are encouraged to refer to https://un.org/en/safety-and-security before conducting the lesson to verify any changes or updates.

Slide 14



Key Message: The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Structure.

Slide 15



Key Message: Among the Independent offices, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.

OCHA provides a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

OCHA's mission is to:

- Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.
- Advocate for the rights of people in need.
- Promote preparedness and prevention.
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – For additional and detailed information regarding OCHA, please visit: https://www.unocha.org/

Slide 16



Key Message: Among the overseas offices, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), based in Geneva, is the principal UN organisation mandated to promote and protect human rights worldwide. It focuses on three main areas: standard setting, monitoring, and implementation of Human Rights on the ground.

OHCHR serves as the lead office for the Human Rights (HR) screening policy, allowing various Secretariat Departments to gather firsthand information about potential human rights violations by candidates for high-profile UN positions.

Additionally, OHCHR acts as a secretariat for the Human Rights Council, around 40 independent UN human rights experts, and committees monitoring the implementation of core international human rights treaties.

Furthermore, OHCHR and its branches worldwide conduct inquiries into human rights violations as part of the HR screening process for candidates for senior UN positions (SG Policy on HR screening of UN Personnel, December 2012).

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – For additional and detailed information regarding OHCHR, please visit: https://www.ohchr.org/en/ohchr_homepage

Slide 17

Key Message: This slide summarises the key departmental responsibilities for Peace Operations.

Slide 18



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- The United Nations was established in 1945 under the UN Charter, with its Secretariat headquartered in New York. Additionally, it has offices and agencies worldwide, such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva.
- The Secretariat provides support to the legislative bodies of the UN.
- Led by a Secretary-General appointed by the General Assembly (GA), the Secretariat executes the decisions of the Security Council and General Assembly.

Lesson
1.2

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.2 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).

Relevance

As the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) share responsibilities for Peace Operations, it is important for deployed Staff Officers to understand the structure, organisation, roles and main responsibilities of both Departments. The DPO will be explored in the next Lesson.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Explain the role of DPPA concerning peace and security
- Describe the organisation, structure and roles of the DPPA
- Explain the role of the Regional Political Operational and shared services between DPPA and DPO

Notes to instructor

a) Facilitators are encouraged to refer to the https://dppa.un.org/en website prior to conducting the lesson to verify any changes or updates.

b) Consider distributing the DPPA and DPO organisational chart to participants, which is available at the following link: dppa-dpo-org-chart-2019.pdf (un.org)

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 12
Summary of Key Messages	13
Learning Activity	14

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.2 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the role of DPPA concerning peace and security
- Describe the structure and roles of the DPPA
- Explain the role of the Regional Political Operational and shared services between DPPA and DPO

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Key Message: The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) plays a central role in the UN's efforts to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts around the world. DPPA focuses primarily on five areas in international peace and security:

- Ensuring sound analysis and early warning
- Preventing conflict and engaging in peacemaking
- Managing political crises and violent conflicts
- Sustaining peace
- Enhancing partnerships

DPPA continuously monitors and assesses global political developments to detect potential crises before they erupt, and to develop effective responses. The Department provides support to the Secretary-General, his envoys, and UN special political missions deployed globally to help defuse crises and promote lasting conflict solutions.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - For additional and detailed information, please access: https://dppa.un.org/en/what-we-do.

Slide 5



Key Message: This is the organisational structure of DPPA. DPPA consists of one office, four divisions and one unit.

Let's examine each one of them in more detail.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Colour code:

a) Dark Blue: Office
b) Light Blue: Division
c) Light Green: Unit

Slide 6



Key Message: The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) helps to sustain peace by fostering international support for nationally owned and led peacebuilding efforts. The Office assists and supports the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), manages the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) on behalf of the Secretary-General, and works to enhance system-wide coherence and partnerships with UN and non-UN actors in support of building and sustaining peace in affected countries.

Structure of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO):

The **Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch** works to enhance UN system capacities to deliver on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. It supports UN-wide coherence and coordination across the Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding efforts and actors, including by contributing to cross-pillar and interagency coordination mechanisms and working groups that produce guidance and policy advice for the field and HQ.

The **Financing for Peacebuilding Branch** manages the Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBF is the United Nations' leading instrument to invest in prevention and peacebuilding, in partnership with the wider UN system, national and subnational authorities, civil society organizations, regional organizations and multilateral banks. The Fund supports joint UN responses to address critical peacebuilding opportunities, connecting development, humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding pillars. The core principles of the Fund are being timely, catalytic, and risk-tolerant, and facilitating inclusiveness and national ownership, integrated approaches, and cohesive UN strategies.

The **Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)** is an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in conflict-affected countries and is a key addition to the capacity of the International Community in the broader peace agenda. The PBC comprises 31 Member States, elected from the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. The top financial contributing countries and the top troop-contributing countries to the United Nations system are also members.

☞***Note to instructor*** – The DPPA organisational structure is now in cascade layout, and the box in yellow is the one in active discussion.

Slide 7



Key Message: The Security Council Affairs Division provides Secretariat functions to the Security Council, supports its subsidiary bodies, conducts research, and offers advice on the practices and procedures of the Security Council.

Structure of the Security Council Affairs Division:

The **Security Council Secretariat Branch** directly supports the daily work of the Council, especially its rotating monthly presidency, facilitates the holding of its formal and informal meetings and other activities, manages the Council's monthly and daily programme of work, provides procedural advice, and supports Council missions (*visits*) to countries and regions of concern.

The **Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch (SCSOB)** supports Security Council subsidiary bodies, including sanctions committees, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the 1540 Committee on Threats caused by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (see SCR 1540, 28 April 2004), as well as the Security Council Committee on Admission of New Members and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The Branch also assists sanctions monitoring groups, teams, and panels, providing them with logistical support and substantive guidance. In addition, the Branch provides support to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 2231 (2015) on the Iran nuclear issue.

The **Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch (SCPCRB)** is the advisory and research arm of the Security Council on practice and procedure. Among its core functions, the Branch prepares the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, which is the only official and comprehensive coverage of the Security Council's

interpretation and application of the Charter and Provisional Rules of Procedure since 1946.

Military Staff Committee Secretariat. The core functions of the Military Staff Committee Secretariat are to provide secretariat support and advice to the Military Staff Committee in preparation for, conduct of, and actions arising from the Committee's meetings.

Assess if participants are aware of the MSC and its function.

***Notes to instructor**:*

a) **The Military Staff Committee** is a United Nations Security Council subsidiary body whose role is defined by Article 47 of the UN Charter.

The role of the Committee is to "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."

Having met since the Committee's inaugural meeting in London on 4 Feb 1946, the MSC is the longest-standing subsidiary body of the Security Council. Originally consisting of Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives the MSC comprises the Military Advisors of Member States currently on the Security Council. The Committee can also invite other Member States when the efficient discharge of its responsibilities requires the participation of that Member State.

b) ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Slide 8



Key Message: The United Nations Electoral Assistance Division provides political and technical guidance to all United Nations entities involved in electoral assistance, including electoral policies and good practices. When required, the Division provides support to the Secretary-General, his envoys, and United Nations political and peacekeeping missions in preventing and mediating electoral crises. The Electoral Assistance Division also maintains electoral partnerships with, and provides capacity development support to other regional and intergovernmental organisations involved in elections.

United Nations electoral assistance is provided only at the specific request of the Member State concerned or based on a mandate from the Security Council or General Assembly. Before assistance is agreed upon and provided, the United Nations assesses the needs of the Member State to ensure it is tailored to the specific situation. As reaffirmed by the General Assembly on many occasions, **United Nations electoral assistance should be objective, impartial, neutral, and independent, with due respect for sovereignty, while recognising that the responsibility for organising elections lies with Member States.** More than 115 countries have requested and received United Nations electoral assistance since 1991, with the endorsement of the General Assembly. The institutional arrangements for United Nations electoral assistance and the entities involved have grown and evolved since 1991.

Currently, a range of United Nations entities have mandates that refer to electoral events and support or otherwise engage in electoral support activities. In this field of diverse actors, the General Assembly has repeatedly highlighted the importance of system-wide coherence and consistency and has reaffirmed the leadership role of the focal point in that respect. Accordingly, the focal point is responsible for setting electoral assistance

policies, for deciding on the parameters for United Nations electoral assistance in a particular requesting country and for maintaining the single electoral roster of experts who can be rapidly deployed when required for any United Nations assistance activity.

☞***Note to instructor:***

Examples of UN Electoral Assistance – During the 1990s, the United Nations observed, supervised or conducted landmark elections and popular consultations in Timor-Leste, South Africa, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. The Organization has also provided crucial technical and logistical assistance in milestone elections in many countries, including in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

Demand for United Nations electoral assistance is growing, as is the duration and complexity of operations. Electoral observation, once a core activity in early United Nations support, is now rare, and technical assistance has grown exponentially. Assistance is closely regulated by the UN General Assembly, and its evolution is reflected in a series of resolutions since 1991 (please refer to the latest resolutions in this regard including A/RES/76/176 of 2021 and A/RES/74/158 of 2019).

Slide 9



Key Message: The Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) is responsible for the development of policy, guidance and learning tools for conflict prevention and preventative diplomacy as well as for the provision of mediation support and advice. It also provides substantive and administrative support to the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation. The key roles of the Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) are Preventive Diplomacy, Mediation and Peacemaking. It comprises a Policy and Guidance Section and a Mediation Support and Gender Peace and Security Section.

Preventive Diplomacy refers to diplomatic actions taken to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur. While it is conducted in different forms and fora, both public and private, the most common expression of preventive diplomacy is found in the work of envoys dispatched to crisis areas to encourage dialogue, compromise, and the peaceful resolution of tensions. Preventive diplomacy can also encompass the involvement of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and other actors to discourage the use of violence at critical moments.

The work of the United Nations in conflict prevention extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of United Nations entities operating across a wide range of relevant disciplines — poverty eradication and development, human rights and the rule of law, elections and the building of democratic institutions, the control of small arms, among others.

The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) serves as the UN system-wide focal point on mediation expertise and support. The Unit, inter-alia, provides tailored operational support to peace and dialogue processes

through expert staff from the Unit and the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors (SBT). DPPA's mediation support capacity relies predominantly on funding from the Multi-Year Appeal (MYA) – including to allow for on-the-ground support to peace discussions.

DPPA anchors the UN's peacemaking efforts, monitoring global political developments and advising the Secretary-General on the prevention and management of crises, including using their diplomatic "good offices" to help parties in conflict settle disputes peacefully. The Department provides support to numerous envoys of the Secretary-General engaged in peace talks or crisis diplomacy, while overseeing field-based United Nations special political missions with mandates to help countries and regions resolve conflicts and tensions peacefully.

The **Gender, Peace and Security Team** is responsible for the development of policy and the provision of substantive and technical support on issues related to gender and to women, peace and security, in coordination with the Gender Unit in DPO.

Slide 10



Key Message: The **Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR)** provides support to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People whilst the **Decolonisation Unit** provides advice and substantive support to the Special Committee on the Situation regarding the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (commonly known as the Special Committee on Decolonization, or C-24).

The **Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR)** serves as the Secretariat of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP) and provides the following core functions:

- Organises the meetings of the Committee and its Bureau at UN Headquarters.
- Monitors political and other relevant developments.
- Organises a programme of international meetings and conferences.
- Implements a publications programme.
- Develops and maintains the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL).
- Cooperates with civil society organizations active on the issue.
- Organises the annual observance of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.
- Conducts an annual training programme at UN Headquarters and several other capacity-building activities.

The **Decolonisation Unit** provides the following functions:

- Monitors political, economic and social developments in each of the 17 remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories on the United Nations list and prepares annual working papers on each Territory.
- Provides substantive advice for the C-24 and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the General Assembly, where representatives and petitioners from the Territories speak about the concerns and aspirations of their people.
- Provides political advice for the C-24 on visiting missions to Territories, as well as for annual regional seminars held alternately in the Pacific and the Caribbean, bringing together representatives of the Territories, members of the C-24, administering Powers and other stakeholders.
- Maintains the website entitled "The United Nations and Decolonization" in the 6 official UN languages; and
- Works with the Department of Global Communications in the preparation of informational materials for the Territories, explaining the options available to them in moving forward full self-government based on the Charter of the United Nations.

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a) For additional and detailed information regarding DPR, please access: https://www.un.org/unispal/about-division-palestinian-rights/

b) For additional and detailed information regarding United Nations and Decolonization, please access: https://dppa.un.org/en/decolonization

Slide 11



Key Message: The Regional Political Operational Structure has three offices that report to both Under-Secretaries-General DPPA and DPO and are central to the implementation of the whole-of-pillar approach to addressing challenges to international peace and security. The offices are the first point of contact for field missions with UNHQ.

Each office of the Regional Political Operational Structure consists of divisions responsible for the coordination of United Nations work in early warning, prevention, peacebuilding, mediation, sustaining peace, and peace operations, in their designated geographical areas.

The divisions lead the development of integrated regional and country-specific conflict analyses and strategies and provide backstopping support for peace operations within their geographical area, providing staff from New York as required.

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations are supported by integrated operational teams (IOTs) within the divisions, which bring together political, military, rule of law, and other relevant capacities.

What is backstopping in peace operations?

Backstopping tasks for peace-keeping missions are the overall direction, assistance and guidance given by departments/offices and other units at Headquarters, to ensure the effective planning, implementation, and liquidation of operations. They consist of "core" and "non-core" functions. Core tasks are fixed costs to the Organization, funded by the regular budget. Those that fluctuate with the number and size of peace-keeping operations are variable costs, funded by the support account and often includes temporary assignment of Headquarters staff to the mission area.

Slide 12

Key Message: The Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services (ODCSS) provides a range of common management and administrative services to both DPPA and DPO.

- The Executive Office supports both departments in fulfilling their financial, personnel and general administration responsibilities.
- The Peacekeeping Situation Centre (SITCEN) - is the DPPA-DPO contribution to the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC).
- The Leadership Support Section monitors leadership requirements in peace operations and supports decision-making on senior leadership appointments, including through the maintenance of a database of qualified individuals, development of post profiles and short lists and supporting newly appointed senior leaders.
- The Strategic Communications Section provides advice to senior departmental leadership, manages media relations, publicity, outreach, external relations, corporate messaging, digital and online platforms, and campaigns and supports public information units in peace operations.
- The Focal Point for Security provides policy and strategic advice on safety and security measures related to peace operations as well as organizational resilience programmes.
- Information Management Unit supports senior management responding to challenges where internal information issues intersect with digital processes; coordinates and supports whole of department and field responses to information, and technology related activities including 'going digital' the cloud, data analytics, and contributes to the system-wide UN Innovation Network.
- The Registry function is to maintain, service, and control correspondences, manage records and archives in accordance with UN data management guidelines.

Slide 13

Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- DPPA plays a central role in UN efforts to prevent deadly conflict and build sustainable peace.
- Monitors and assesses global political developments to detect potential crises and devise effective responses.
- Provides support to the SG and appointed envoys in their peace initiatives, as well as to UN political missions.
- Cooperates with regional organisations on the frontlines of conflicts.

Slide 14



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate eight (8) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- A member of each group should brief on the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the group, emphasising important functions/responsibilities of the offices and the type of coordination expected from staff officers in field missions.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
1.3

Department of Peace Operations (DPO)

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.3 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).

Relevance

As the primary headquarters department responsible for Peacekeeping Operations, it is important you understand DPO's organisation and functions.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Explain the structure and responsibilities of DPO
- Explain the structure and responsibilities of the DPO's main offices and services
- Describe DPPA / DPO shared functions

Notes to instructor

a) Facilitators are encouraged to refer to the https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations website prior to conducting the lesson to verify any changes or updates.

b) Consider distributing the DPPA and DPO organisational chart to participants, which is available at the following link: dppa-dpo-org-chart-2019.pdf (un.org)

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 24
Summary of Key Messages	25
Learning Activity	26

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.3 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).

As the primary headquarters department responsible for Peacekeeping Operations, it is important for you to understand DPO's organisation and functions.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the structure and responsibilities of DPO
- Explain the structure and responsibilities of the DPO's main offices and services
- Describe DPPA / DPO shared functions

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Key Message: The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is dedicated to assisting the Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. DPO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop, police and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates.

Peacekeeping is political and its ultimate success depends on active and sustainable political processes or the real prospect of a peace process. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations.

DPO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.

DPO traces its roots to 1948 with the creation of the first UN peacekeeping operations: UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Up to the late 1980s, peacekeeping operations were operated through the UN Office of Special Political Affairs. DPO was formally created in 1992 as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and became DPO in 2019.

Slide 5



Key Message: This is the overall organisational structure of DPO. In addition to the office of the USG, DPO consists of three main offices and one division.

The DPO, headed by an Under Secretary General, is responsible for political and executive direction of all peace operations by delegation of the Secretary-General.

DPO consists of three main Offices headed by Assistant Secretaries-General (ASGs) and a division (DPET) headed by a director:

- The Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (OPSP)
- The Office of Military Affairs (OMA)
- The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)
- The Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET)

Let's examine each one of them in more detail.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Colour Code:

- Dark Blue: Office

- Light Blue: Division

- Light Green: Unit and Teams

Slide 6



Key Message: The Office of the USG DPO, also known as the Executive Office, contains the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), the Integrated Assessment and Planning Unit, as well as the Gender Unit.

The Executive Office assists the head of the department, programme managers and staff members, in carrying out the financial and human resources management and general administrative responsibilities delegated by the USG DPO.

Let's proceed to a brief description of the roles and functions of the Office of the USG DPO.

Slide 7



Key Message: In general, the Office assists the USG DPO with:

- Providing policy guidance on regulations and rules related to UN staffing, finance, delegation of authority, and cross-cutting matters
- Ensuring an integrated approach to planning, directing, managing, and supporting Peace Operations
- Promoting the implementation of gender equality and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) mandates across UN PKO

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – IOT will be explored in more detail during this lesson.

Slide 8



Key Message: The Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships is responsible for strengthening peacekeeping partnership by assisting in identifying gaps which impact the delivery of mandates by UN peacekeeping missions.

Let's proceed to a brief description of the roles and functions of the Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships in the following slide.

Slide 9



Key Message: The Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership (OPSP) was established in 2013 to strengthen peacekeeping partnerships. It identifies gaps that have an impact on the delivery of mandates by UN PKOs and making recommendations on systemic issues. The office makes recommendations to ensure the safety, security, and welfare of uniformed contingent personnel and the provision of adequate support services. OPSP works closely with T/PCCs and senior leadership, both in the field and at HQ, and makes recommendations to incorporate lessons learned and best practices from peacekeeping missions into peacekeeping operations.

The OPSP reviews the ability of uniformed contingent personnel of UN field missions to deliver their mandates, as well as the performance of enabling structures, guidance, and capacities at the Headquarters and in the field that guide and support peacekeepers in the performance of their duties.

In addition, OPSP also undertakes special investigations as required. One of its responsibilities is to coordinate, oversee, and drive the implementation of the action plan to improve the security of UN peacekeepers in response to the Santos Cruz report, across Headquarters' entities and high-risk missions.

OPSP also works in partnership with peacekeeping stakeholders, including HQ entities, UN PKOs, and T/PCCs to train and equip donors, and Member States to support UN peacekeepers on the front lines of increasingly complex and dangerous operations.

Slide 10



Key Message: The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) focuses on deploying the most suitable and efficient military capabilities in peacekeeping missions.

Now, let's delve into a concise overview of the roles and functions of the Office of Military Affairs in the upcoming slides.

Slide 11



Key Message: The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is headed by the Military Adviser (MILAD), in the DPO. OMA works to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions and comprises 3 services and 2 teams.

The MILAD is responsible for providing technical military advice to the USG DPO when requested, through them to the USGs DPPA and DOS, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The MILAD also provides advice and support to heads of offices and divisions within the DPO, the DOS on operations with military components led by DPO and missions with military advisory functions led by DPPA.

OMA is staffed with about 114 personnel, about 100 of them being active-duty military officers seconded by their countries.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Colour Code:

- Light Gray: Service

- Light Blue: Team

Slide 12



Key Message: The Military Planning Service (MPS) provides military strategic planning advice to the Military Advisor, develops, and monitors military plans, specifies force or operational requirements, produces military guidance documents, and provides technical advice and guidance.

The MPS main functions are:

- Providing military-strategic planning advice to the Military Adviser.
- Conducting military-strategic planning for emerging and existing Department-led operations.
- Producing foundational military guidance documents, including the command directive, military rules of engagement, military-strategic concepts of operation, and Statement of Unit Requirements (the last three documents are essential to the TCCs).
- Monitoring the military plans to reduce the time required to plan for major changes, including mission termination.
- Specifying the force or operational requirements for individual military personnel, military-formed units and unit equipment in new or revised concepts of operation and contingency plans.

The Service also prepares the overall Force Requirement for a new mission, and statements of unit requirement (SUR) for every military unit in UN PKOs. MPS personnel operate in three different teams, coordinating operational issues with mission military components. The Service also has specialist military planners for aviation and maritime operations and works in coordination with DOS, DPPA, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and other components as appropriate.

For established missions, MPS will carry out those functions in coordination with the deployed staff officers and headquarters.

MPS also conducts Military Capability Studies. These are tools in the process of identification and deployment of military capabilities in a peacekeeping operation, in relation to the military component's assigned tasks and are technical field assessments and/or desk assessments which analyse the current capabilities against current and future anticipated tasks. The MCS addresses all deployed military personnel and units in a mission, including Military Observers and other experts on mission, in summary, the force.

Slide 13

Key Message: The Current Military Operations Service (CMOS) reviews all day-to-day reporting from deployed military components and, after analysis, provides update briefs to the MILAD and DPO leadership.

CMOS provides both short and long-term military operational oversight to the missions, including maintaining frequent contact with the field missions through periodic and ad-hoc written/verbal reports. In addition to regular field visits, CMOS ensures synergy of efforts between HQs staff for smooth execution of Mission mandate.

CMOS is comprised of three geographically based teams whose core functions include:

- Providing advice to the heads of the military components of DPO-led missions on technical aspects of military operations, such as contingency planning, force rotations and operational reporting, in coordination with the integrated operational teams, to ensure that military aspects are properly integrated or coordinated. CMOS also interacts with permanent missions of Member States on all military technical operational issues, significant incidents, accidents, injuries, deaths, repatriations and other current issues.
- Providing the MILAD and, through the USG-DPO, senior leadership at UN Headquarters with military information and analysis related to current events.
- Coordinating visits by Member States, the military and police advisers community, and senior military staff from Headquarters to peacekeeping operations, briefing visiting military individuals, groups or delegations and coordinating the briefing and debriefing process for senior military officials in peacekeeping operations.
- Coordinating responses by OMA to disciplinary issues involving military personnel in DPPA and DPO led missions – in coordination with the Conduct and Discipline Unit in DMSPC.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Force Generation Service (FGS) is the principal military point of contact for troop-contributing countries (TCCs), and Member States concerning military contingents and individuals participating in UN missions. It is comprised of a force generation team, a military personnel team, and a Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) team.

The FGS main functions are:

- Acting as the principal military point of contact with TCCs conducting the force generation process, including the generation and rotation of all military contingents and individuals, and supporting the selection process for senior UN military appointments.
- Participating, in the contingent-owned equipment negotiation process, concluding memorandums of understanding for the timely deployment of troops and, when necessary, for the force adjustment, and providing technical advice on contingent-owned equipment claims by Member States, as required.
- Initiating and maintaining records of service and performance for individuals and statistics and country profiles for all UN military deployments.
- Developing, in collaboration with the DOS, generic guidelines for TCCs and mission-specific military guidelines related to force requirements.
- Coordinating reconnaissance visits for troop-contributing countries providing contingents to peacekeeping operations.
- Maintaining and updating records of pledges made by Member States in the PCRS for the provision of troops, equipment and services to peacekeeping operations.

Slide 15



Key Message: The Assessment Team's core function is to deliver proactive, timely, accurate, and detailed analysis of the strategic military and threat situation in current and potential UN peacekeeping operations.

The Assessment Team (AT) analyses regional military and threat information and supports senior decision-making processes by providing independent mid-to-long-term strategic and operational military analytical information.

It provides operational and strategic military and threat and response information to OMA leadership and supports mission-related threat assessments, trend analyses and planning processes.

It also works with the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) and the threat and risk assessment service of the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) to provide a common understanding and early warning of developing trends. The Team further contributes to UNOCC and facilitates the delivery of time-sensitive information when events pose a direct threat(s) to UN personnel, property and operations, and engages proactively with the IOTs of DPO, and other actors involved in crisis management or planning processes.

Mission desk officers in the assessment team provide continuity for the high turnover of staff in intelligence branches (U2) in missions, provide feedback on mission products, and share regional assessments with the various U2 branches of the military component in the missions.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Some information used by the AT for their analysis are obtained from routine reports from the mission.

Slide 16

Key Message: The Policy and Doctrine Team develops and manages UN military policy and doctrine, works on capability development, and establishes and manages strategic partnerships with military elements of international and regional organisations, including civil-military coordination with humanitarian and other UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes.

PDT, in addition to managing military policy and doctrine, initiates the performance improvement cycle of military components in UN PKOs and military personnel in SPMs. It also develops policies, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and doctrine specific to the military component of UN field missions; and supports the performance of military components in field missions through the development, refinement, and revision of policies, SOPs, and doctrine guiding the delivery of field mission's mandated tasks, TCC pre-deployment training, and tasks-conditions-standards.

The Team also works in close coordination with DPET to support the development and implementation of PDT materials to ensure the inclusion of OMA's military policy and doctrine.

The Team is the OMA entry point for external liaisons and partnership/coordination with regional organisations and multilateral organisations (e.g., NATO, AU, EU), UN entities, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It also serves as OMA focal point for UN civil-military coordination (CIMIC), gender policy and guidance, and other cross-cutting thematic tasks such as environmental management, protection of civilians (POC), conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and child protection (CP).

Slide 17



Key Message: The Military Performance and Evaluation Team (MPET) validates performance standards, designs and implements evaluation processes and guidelines, as well as collects and analyses performance data of individual military officers and units.

The MPET oversees and analyses the performance of military personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, and makes recommendations to DPO, DPPA, DOS, and TCCs on furthering the development of UN military performance standards. It also conducts operational assessments, advisory visits and enhanced pre-deployment visits to verify self-certification and readiness of TCCs and conduct military capability studies.

Slide 18



Key Message: The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) oversees the judicial and police components of the peacekeeping operations, providing operational and advisory support on the rule of law, security sector institutions, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and mines action.

Let's proceed to a brief description of the roles and functions of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the following slide.

Slide 19



Key Message: The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is the largest provider of police, justice, and corrections specialists globally, with expertise in various areas including security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. OROLSI deploys civilian and uniformed personnel to assist conflict-affected countries in re-establishing rule of law and security institutions necessary to build and sustain peace and sustainably, reduce the threats posed by armed groups and explosive devices. It serves as a UN system-wide service provider for conflict prevention and sustaining peace efforts, overseeing activities related to stabilisation and support of peace processes.

OROLSI collaborates with key partners, both within and outside the UN, to implement its mandate. It consists of five components:

- **United Nations Police Division (PD):** Provides support to national law enforcement services, strengthens police relationships with communities, and addresses transnational organised crime. It is responsible for generating and deploying all UN police officers and Formed Police Units.

- **Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU):** Serves as the UN system-wide focal point on SSR. It provides advice to Member States, peace operations, UN country teams, and other partners on the political and technical aspects of security sector reform and supports the implementation of SSR strategies. SSRU conducts security sector assessments and advises on national SSR strategies, planning frameworks, and international SSR coordination mechanisms, including on defence sector reform. The primary objective of the SSRU is to ensure that people are safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions.

- **Justice and Corrections Service (JCS):** Supports the work of justice and corrections components in UN PKOs and SPMs, as well as other UN entities, to implement the rule of law aspects of their respective mandates. JCS coordinates strategic and operational support on mandate delivery, strengthening Member State support, leveraging partnerships, and setting policy priorities.

- **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section (DDRS):** Supports DDR activities of UN PKOs, SPMs, and the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in non-mission settings. The DDRS develops and updates relevant policies and guidance, including the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), in collaboration with the inter-agency working group on DDR. It also provides support to field practitioners by planning new DDR programmes and providing operational advice and support by encouraging armed groups to disarm and return to civilian life, DDR creates space for peace consolidation and transition to recovery and development.

- **UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS):** Leads and coordinates projects and programmes to mitigate explosive ordnance threats worldwide. UNMAS provides expertise, training, and operational support in mine action, weapons and ammunition management, and improvised explosive device threat mitigation. UNMAS manages operations in the field to clear landmines and explosive remnants of war and educate communities in dealing with explosive hazards while developing the capacity of national authorities on mines action.

☞***Note to instructor*** – Staff officers in field missions, depending on the branch where deployed, may have direct/indirect technical/advisory link with the units of OROLSI.

Slide 20



Key Message: The Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division (DPET) is mandated to develop and disseminate the policy and doctrine guiding the work of Peace Operations. In addition, the division has the responsibility to evaluate, at the request of the heads of the departments, how the policies are being applied, gather lessons learned and best practices, and use that information to guide the development, coordination, and delivery of standardised training to complete the learning cycle. DPET is also responsible for developing and maintaining strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.

Let's proceed to a brief description of the roles and functions of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division in the following slide.

Slide 21



Key Message: DPET provides an integrated capacity to: a) develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; b) evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation; c) develop, coordinate, and deliver standardised training, and d) develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.

DPET consists of two main services and three teams:

- **Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS**) coordinates with best practices officers in the field, including military best practices focal points, and provides guidance on capturing lessons learned. PBPS serves as the Secretariat for the Guidance Focal Points Group and supports the Guidance Development and Learning Steering Committee, the online (intranet) Policy and Practice Database, the externally available UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, and other themed communities of practice.

- **Integrated Training Service (ITS)** develops training standards, policies, and guidance materials; develops and delivers cross-cutting peacekeeping training; and oversees peacekeeping training activities and provides related technical support. ITS develops training materials for use in generic pre-deployment training, specialized training and reinforcement training. The Service also coordinates knowledge and information management activities related to training for the benefit of peacekeeping and special political missions, Headquarters, and Member States, and hosts the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM).

Note: The Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM) aims to improve the coordination of training and capacity-building and strengthen the capacity of troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) to deploy personnel with the right mindset, capabilities, and equipment to peacekeeping missions. The LCM focuses on matching T/PCCs

registered in PCRS with Member States willing to provide support for bilateral or trilateral engagement.

- **The Evaluation Team** provides DPO and DOS with comprehensive assessments and internal evaluation mechanisms to assist in the effective management of field missions by strengthening operational effectiveness and accountability. The Team is responsible for evaluating peacekeeping, both at Headquarters and in the field, to provide DPO with objective evidence of achievements and effects of efforts and resources. These evaluations serve to strengthen requests to Member States for resources and identify lessons learned to improve practices and management. Since 2018, the Team has led the development and implementation of the comprehensive performance assessment system (CPAS) for UN peacekeeping operations. CPAS, and the involvement of deployed staff officers, will be discussed in subsequent lessons.

- **The Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell**, co-chaired with OMA, coordinates a strategic and sustained approach to the generation of uniformed capabilities and training for peacekeeping operations. The Cell's responsibilities include engaging with Member States to fill critical capability gaps and increase women's participation; supporting the requirements for rapid deployment of start-up and surge capabilities; registering, assessing, and preparing capabilities in the PCRS; and broadening the base of peacekeeping contributors through targeted and sustained engagement with new and emerging contributors to peacekeeping.

Slide 22



Key Message: The DPO/DPPA shared functions are cross-functional teams within the DPPA-DPO regional structure.

The cross-functional teams within the DPPA-DPO regional structure serve as shared functions between DPO and DPPA, providing operational guidance, including political advice, and support to peacekeeping operations. They address the need for more effective and efficient service delivery to Peace Operations constituencies by offering expertise to represent field missions with Member States and coordinating with partners to conduct mission reviews. Additionally, they make recommendations for mandates and identify and respond to operational and political challenges.

These shared functions are dispersed across various units, including the Executive Office and Human Resources Team. They encompass the management of finance and budget, administrative and information technology support, as well as providing guidance, advice, and support on conduct and discipline. Another integral component is the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs).

Slide 23



Key Message: Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) are cross-functional teams within the DPPA-DPO regional structure at Headquarters. They fulfil a range of core tasks related to integrated operational guidance, including political advice, and support for peacekeeping operations. IOTs address the need for more effective and efficient service delivery to peacekeeping constituencies amidst the wide range of tasks and increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations. Leveraging their expertise, IOTs represent field missions with Member States, coordinate with partners to conduct mission reviews, make recommendations for mandates, and identify and respond to operational and political challenges.

Let's proceed to a brief description of the roles and responsibilities of the Integrated Operational Teams in the following slide.

Slide 24



Key Message: The Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) are responsible for integrated planning and operational guidance, providing support to Department-led operations on mission-specific issues that cut across specialized functional areas. Meanwhile, specialized functional areas remain accountable for offering technical guidance across missions within their specific areas of responsibility.

The IOTs address:

- The need for more effective and efficient service delivery to peacekeeping constituencies, considering the expanding range of tasks and increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations.
- Leveraging their expertise to represent field missions with Member States.
- Coordinating with partners to conduct mission reviews.
- Making recommendations for mandates.
- Identifying and responding to operational and political challenges.
- Ensuring the resolution of operational issues and monitoring the implementation of relevant mission plans.

Moreover, IOTs serve as an essential point of contact for Troop/Police-Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), complementing the roles of OMA and PD within OROLSI. For instance, IOTs may engage in political outreach to TCCs for the safety and security of peacekeepers.

Slide 25



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- By delegation of the SG, DPO assumes the political and executive direction of all peace operations.
- DPO provides support in the military, police, judicial and mine action domains to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.
- DPO offices and services maintain contact with their counterparts deployed in peace operations.
- OMA works to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions.

Slide 26



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate eight (8) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the groups, emphasising important functions/responsibilities of the offices and the type of coordination expected from staff officers in field missions.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
1.4

Department of Operational Support (DOS)

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.4 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

Relevance

As the primary headquarters department responsible for supporting Peace Operations, it is important for you to understand DOS's organisation and functions.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Explain the role and responsibilities of DOS
- Explain the structure and responsibilities of the DOS's main offices and services

Notes to instructor

a) Facilitators are encouraged to refer to the https://operationalsupport.un.org/en website prior to conducting the lesson to verify any changes or updates.

b) Consider distributing the DOS organisational structure to participants, which is available on the same website.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 16
Summary of Key Messages	17
Learning Activity	18

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.4 provides an overview of the structure of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

As the primary headquarters department responsible for supporting Peace Operations, it is important for you to understand DOS's organisation and functions.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the role and responsibilities of DOS
- Explain the structure and responsibilities of the DOS's main offices and services

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: The Department of Operational Support (DOS) provides operational support to all UN Secretariat entities, advisory, operational and transactional support services and, where needed; delegated authority on behalf of clients. DOS supports the entire UN Secretariat, consisting of almost 100 entities located around the globe.

The Department's role is designed to fully support managers and business partners in operating entities throughout the Secretariat to respond effectively and rapidly to the changing needs of those the Organization serves.

DOS plays a key role in supporting a United Nations that is more agile, effective, transparent, accountable, efficient, pragmatic and decentralised to better support its organisational and operational activities.

Slide 5



Key Message: This slide provides a summary of the main activities and responsibilities of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

Slide 6



Key Message: This is the overall structure of DOS. DOS is headed by the Under-Secretary-General and approximately 1,200 civilian staff work in UN Operational Support at the UN Headquarters, supporting operations globally.

DOS Organisation

DOS, headed by an Under Secretary General, is responsible for the overall direction, supervision, management and administration of all DOS activities by delegation of the Secretary-General.

The Department of Operational Support consists of three offices and two divisions:

- The Office of Support Operations (OSO).
- The Office of Supply Chain Management (OSCM).
- The Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT). Note: The OICT has a dual reporting line to the DOS, as well as the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC).
- Division for Special Activities (DSA).
- Division of Administration (DOA).

Let's examine each one of them in more detail.

Slide 7



Key Message: The Office of the Under-Secretary-General consists of the Strategic Support Service, the Performance and Analytics Section, the Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Section, and the Environment Section.

The **Office of the USG (OUSG)** supports the USG DOS in the executive direction of the Department, including decision-making, strategic planning, risk and performance management, and with special activities. In addition to leadership and governance of the department, the OUSG is responsible for performance oversight, response to audits and boards of inquiry, and environmental risk.

The **Strategic Support Service** plays an important role in assisting and advising the USG-DOS in setting the executive direction and management of the Department, as well as coordinating the development and monitoring the Department's workplan. It further supports the resolution of operational support issues across Secretariat entities that require the intervention of the USG.

The **Performance and Analytics Section** oversees operational performance of all units within DOS. It also supports senior management through custom analytics, including an annual client satisfaction survey, regular reports on operational performance and support to specific initiatives such as peacekeeping reviews. Continuous improvement of business processes and operational guidance.

The **Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Section** coordinates DOS responses to reports of oversight bodies. It also follows up on the recommendations of the boards of inquiry in the field and provide administrative support to boards of inquiry convened at HQ.

The **Environment Section** supports implementation of environmental sustainability management framework in peace operations. It expands its scope to encompass the entire Secretariat.

Slide 8



Key Message: The Office of Support Operations (OSO) provides dedicated advisory, operational and transactional support services to more than 100 UN Secretariat entities globally. The ASG for Support Operations oversees three pillars covering Human Resources Services, Health-Care Management and Occupational Safety and Health, and Capacity Development and Operational Training.

The **Office of Support Operations (OSO)** provides leadership and direction to support clients across the Secretariat. They offer guidance and advisory services for the successful implementation of mandates in the areas of human resources, learning and development & capacity-building programs for staff primarily in operational areas, language and communication courses, health-care management, and occupational safety.

The **Human Resources Services Division (HRSD)** provides HR advisory and support services to managers and business partners in the UN Secretariat both at Headquarters and in the field.

The **Division of Healthcare Management and Occupational Safety and Health (DHMOSH)** offers health-related services to the UN both at Headquarters and in field missions. The Division also focuses on occupational health risks and will initiate the collection of information about occupationally incurred injury or illness, allowing for the development of baseline estimates of tangible and intangible costs.

The **Capacity Development and Operational Training Service (CDOTS)** assists clients in building and improving the capacities needed to accountably exercise delegated authority, including structures and business processes to better integrate resources, accountability, and programme delivery in line with priorities.

☞***Note to instructor*** – For additional detailed information on each Office, Division or Service, please visit the https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/organizational-structure-0 website and click on the respective box.

Slide 9



Key Message: The Office of Supply Chain Management (OSCM) focuses on building efficient, agile, responsive, and accountable end-to-end supply chain solutions for global partners and clients.

The **Office of Supply Chain Management (OSCM)** covers a wide scope of services including supply chain planning and performance management, logistical support, procurement, vendor management and supplier diversity, aviation safety, and uniformed capabilities support. In addition, the operational services and support, the office also provides advisory services and guidance to nearly 100 client entities globally, as well as to T/PCCs. Its mission is to support its clients and partners globally to fulfil their mandates by providing the goods and services they need, when they need them, where they need them, and at the best price.

The OSCM consists of the Logistics, Procurement, and Uniformed Capabilities Support Divisions, the Aviation Safety Section and the Enabling and Outreach Service.

Let´s look at them in more detail in the following slides.

Slide 10



Key Message: The Logistics Division (LD) translates strategic and operational priorities into demand plans for the right goods and services, provides supply chain solutions in collaboration with the Procurement Division, and offers technical guidance on logistics to ensure optimal and timely movement of goods.

The **Logistics Division (LD)** provides direction and advice on logistical matters, monitors and assesses the delivery of strategic transportation and support services and directs the delivery of transportation and specialist support services regarding air transport, engineering, medical and supply, inclusive of fuel, rations, general supplies, and security equipment. The LD also performs and leads global integrated supply chain planning functions to facilitate global demand, source, and delivery planning across all technical areas within its functional scope.

The Division consists of a **Supply Chain Planning Service**, a **Sourcing Support Service**, an **Air Transport Service**, and a **Movement Control Section**. The roles of the various elements are as follows:

- Supply chain planning: End-to-end supply chain planning and monitoring, including demand forecasting.
- Sourcing support: Support to operations in sourcing and delivery planning.
- Movement control: Movement of uniformed personnel and equipment; guidance and procedural support for operating entities.
- Transportation: Support for specialised and strategic transport solutions, including management of aviation assets.

Slide 11



Key Message: The Procurement Division (PD) of the UNHQ provides procurement services and business advice to UNHQ, peacekeeping missions and other UN organisations. It aims to provide best value for money in the timely delivery of goods, service(s) and capacity to enable customers to execute their missions and achieve their objectives within a fair and transparent commercial partnership provided by vendors.

Slide 12



Key Message: The Uniformed Capabilities Support Division (UCSD) serves as the single point of entry in the Secretariat on support and reimbursement issues related to military and police contingents for both Member States and counterparts within the Secretariat, including DPPA and DPO. The UCSD supports aspects of the end-to-end force generation process, including the verification and reimbursement of troops and equipment.

The UCSD supports and governs the reimbursement of personnel and equipment deployed to peace operations and coordinates the policy and application of the reimbursement framework covering both personnel and COE (personnel, equipment, self-sustainment, LOAs).

Notes to instructor:

a) Reimbursement Framework: A core responsibility of the UCSD is to coordinate the policy and application of the Reimbursement Framework covering both personnel and contingent-owned equipment (COE), which set out the rates of reimbursement paid to T/PCCs for deploying personnel, major equipment, and self–sustainment services. The reimbursement system is designed to assist T/PCCs with the costs incurred when deploying on UN peacekeeping operations. The division oversees and supports the process of reviewing, renegotiating and adjusting the rates of reimbursement on a quadrennial basis for personnel, and triennial basis for major equipment and self-sustainment. These rates are examined by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, before being approved through UN General Assembly Resolutions.

b) Memorandums of Understanding: The UCSD works closely with T/PCCs to negotiate the formal agreements known as memorandums of understanding (MoU), which set out the administrative, logistics and financial conditions applied to the personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment services deployed on missions. As these agreements provide a legal base for the financial reimbursements, they are established on a unit-by-unit basis. The MoUs are also used to specify standards in code of conduct expected from UN peacekeepers, including areas such as Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and environmental management. The agreement is signed by representatives from both the Uniformed Capabilities Division and the Permanent Mission to the UN of the relevant T/PCC.

c) Field Verification Reports: The Division engages regularly with field COE inspection units and T/PCC unit representatives to verify data on the quantity, quality and serviceability of equipment and personnel deployed on operations, and to compare the results with the relevant MoU. Field verification reports (VR's) are reviewed before being certified and processed for payment. UCSD also conducts regular analysis of T/PCC performance across personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment categories, with the aim of identifying trends, patterns and issues. These analyses are used to generate recommendations for improvements to the system, and to support decision-making at both the strategic and operational level to strengthen the overall partnership with T/PCCs.

Slide 13



Key Message: The **Enabling and Outreach Service** at UNHQ defines the UN's supply chain performance framework and enables the effective functioning of supply chain processes. The Enabling and Outreach Service produces operational guidance, manages vendor registration and supplier diversity programmes, and generates new sources of supply while supporting accessibility and inclusiveness. The Service uses a performance management framework and metrics, including baseline business intelligence, operational reporting, and key performance indicators to measure the overall health of supply chain management and serve the technical and commercial interests of the office and its clients. This includes reviewing supply chain performance to advise senior management on challenges, achievements, and the identification of further enhancements. Additionally, the Service develops operational guidance and best practices on supply chain management for all clients.

The **Aviation Safety Section** at UNHQ consists of aviation safety experts and oversees all matters related to UN aviation operations, including aircraft utilised for personnel and cargo movements and the official travel of staff. The Section provides expertise on aviation safety, covering all areas of air operations, ground handling, dispatch, emergency response, flight operations, maintenance activities, training, aviation security, and technical clearance of aviation service vendors. It also sets standards, processes, and procedures for aviation safety in line with international standards and UN requirements, monitors safety in operations, assesses safety risks, and conducts safety assurance activities. It is responsible for technical oversight for aviation safety staff in field missions and for capacity-building through training and raising awareness. As part of its responsibilities, the team supports the sourcing of UN aviation service vendors and liaises with national authorities, T/PCCs, and partner organisations.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) is responsible for defining strategic direction for ICT in the Secretariat. It provides oversight of ICT programmes, systems, applications and decision-making to ensure alignment with the Secretariat's overall ICT strategy. It has a dual reporting line to DOS and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC).

OICT provides expeditious services to all Secretariat clients, in particular field operations, through the review and implementation of updates, policies, standards, governance and tools. This provides all entities access to uniform delivery of ICT solutions and services as well as improved service delivery through global, regional, and local collaboration.

OICT works to align UN field missions with the technological and innovative capabilities of the world so that deployed peacekeepers can make fast and informed decisions to protect civilians and uniformed personnel by remaining connected. It also works to improve the readiness of military communications personnel prior to their deployment to UN field missions.

OICT supports UN PKOs to ensure that UN peacekeepers deployed in remote and high-risk locations have specialised and high-performing signals and ICT capabilities, which form the backbone of Command and Control. Adequate training for military signals and police ICT specialists is critical to ensure that personnel have the requisite knowledge and skills to provide technology solutions that respond and adapt to missions' specific operational requirements and evolving mandates.

Slide 15



Key Message: The UN services centres of DOS include the global service centres located in Brindisi, Italy and Valencia, Spain; a regional service centre in Entebbe, Uganda; as well as a Joint Support Office in Kuwait (KSJO).

The centres perform location-independent functions, i.e., services that can be provided on a shared basis and/or provided from anywhere. The global service centre mainly focuses on delivering operational support to missions regarding supply chain, engineering, environmental management, as well as information and communication technology. In Entebbe and Kuwait, transactional and administrative support in the areas of HR and finance are provided to UN field missions.

The Global Procurement Support Section (GPSS) based in Entebbe, Uganda is part of the Procurement Division/DOS that supports streamlined procurement services to UN field missions and offices in central and eastern African regions and beyond through joint regional acquisition planning and development of a regional procurement strategy.

The Kuwait Joint Support Office (KJSO) is a back-office arrangement currently serving 18 UN missions (8 full client missions and 10 Payroll & Education Grant client missions) focusing on the service delivery pillars of Human Resources, Finance, Payroll, and Travel.

The UN Global Service Centre (UNGSC) and Regional Support Centre Entebbe (RSCE) will be covered in the next slide.

Slide 16

Key Message: The UN Global Service Centre (UNGSC) provides critical logistics, geospatial, information, and telecommunications technologies services to all Secretariat entities, peacekeeping, and special political missions. It also provides support to Agencies, Funds, and Programmes of the UN system worldwide on a cost-recovery basis. The services of UNGSC comprise three core areas: the Supply Chain Service; the Service for Geospatial, Information and Telecommunications Technologies (SGITT); and the Central Service.

The Regional Support Centre Entebbe (RSCE) provides shared services to participating field missions in service delivery pillars covering transactional, non-location-dependent administrative functions to the Centre from field missions. In addition to its key finance and human resources functions, it supports multimodal movement and control, personnel and cargo transport, and information and communications technology (ICT) support to client missions. Centralising these functions means that they can be carried out more effectively because of process integration, specialisation, standardisation, and re-engineering. RSCE also provides services in the completion of residual administrative services in human resources and finance areas for client entities that have been drawn down or ended their mandate. The RSCE's functions also include the Transportation and Movements Integrated Centre (TMICC), the Regional Field Technology Services (RFTS), and the Regional Training and Conference Centre (RTCC).

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – **Uniformed Personnel Service Line at RSCE**: The Uniformed Personnel Service Line (UPSL) processes benefits and entitlements for uniformed personnel joining UN peacekeeping missions supported by RSCE. The services include IUP HR processes, deployment and repatriation travel requests, shipment requests, deployment and repatriation travel expense reports, Check-in/Check-out, the

processing of Uniform Personnel Allowance payments, including Initial Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) Advance, MSA, Daily Allowance (DA), and Recreation Leave Allowance (RLA) and Final Payments.

Slide 17



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- DOS provides operational support to the HQ and field missions in logistic, financial, communications, ICT and HR domains.
- Several DOS services are directly connected to the T/PCCs.

Slide 18



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate eight (8) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the group, emphasising important functions/responsibilities of the offices and the type of coordination expected from staff officers in field missions.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
1.5

Integrated Missions Structures

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.5 provides an overview of the Integrated Mission Structures.

Relevance

Only fifty percent of deployed MSOs are employed in the Force or Sector Headquarters of the Military Component, with the remainder employed in the Integrated Mission Entities, so it is important for all Staff Officers to understand all components of the mission.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the structure of an integrated mission
- Describe the entities where MSOs are likely to be present and understand their roles

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 28
Summary of Key Messages	29
Learning Activity	30

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.5 provides an overview of the Integrated Mission Structures.

Only fifty percent of deployed MSOs are employed in the Force or Sector Headquarters of the Military Component, with the remainder employed in the Integrated Mission Entities, so it is important for all Staff Officers to understand all components of the mission.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the structure of an integrated mission
- Describe the entities where MSOs are likely to be present and understand their roles

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: The mandate for a Peace Operation, as established by the UN Security Council (UNSC), is the starting point for defining a mission's responsibilities and will guide the mission's structure. As each mandate is different, each mission's structure will be tailored to the mandate; therefore, the structure of each mission will differ.

This image depicts a generic mission structure for a multidimensional mission.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Reference: United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, 2023.

Training Tips

Ask participants what they think 'integration' means concerning peace operations. Who is being integrated? At what levels does this take place?

Answers should include - *Integration happens between the peacekeeping mission and the UNCT behind one overarching strategy under the leadership of the SRSG. Integration arrangements and structures vary according to context, phase of the mission and the situation on the ground and should be at all levels.*

Slide 5



Key Message: In a simple generic structure overview of a multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Mission, in addition to the Mission Leadership, there are generally five main components or pillars of a multidimensional Mission:

- Political
- Humanitarian/Development
- Military
- Police
- Mission Support

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - List of Acronyms:

- SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- DSRSG - Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- HOM - Head of Mission
- RC – Resident Coordinator
- HC – Humanitarian Coordinator
- FC – Force Commander
- HoMC - Head of Military Component
- PC – Police Commissioner

- HoPC – Head of Police Component
- DMS – Director Mission Support
- CMS – Chief Mission Support

Slide 6



Key Message: The Head of Mission (HOM) is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the UN in the mission area. He/she represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement, and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area.

The HOM:

• Represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the UN within the mission area;

• Provides mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in the event of competing priorities;

• Is responsible for the conduct and discipline of all personnel in the mission; and

• Leads and directs all the mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission;

• Delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of the components in the mission and provides direction to mission components through their respective heads.

Responsibility for implementation of the mission mandate and authority for managing the resources of the mission are vested in the HOM. To this end, the HOM leads and directs the MLT and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area.

Slide 7



Key Message: The Chief of Staff (COS) reports to the HOM and is responsible to him/her for ensuring coherence across all organisational units of the mission in executing the directives of the HOM.

The COS is responsible for the coordinated and efficient running of the integration and control structures within mission HQ (and Field Offices, where relevant) and may establish and convene other coordination mechanisms, as required. The COS's core focus is on mission management and specific functions and structures that allow the MLT and senior leadership to understand the situation, develop and consult on options, make their intent known, execute decisions and adapt operations to circumstances. The COS supports the accomplishment of the HOM's management and control functions; this includes planning, organizing, and resourcing (in consultation with D/CMS) to accomplish mission mandated objectives and tasks.

The integration and control structures under the responsibility of the COS include the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism, Mission Planning Unit (MPU), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Conduct and Discipline Unit and Policy and Best Practices Officer. The Heads of Field Offices could report to the HOM either through the COS, or through a DSRSG. The HOM decides whether the Senior Legal Advisor/Legal Advisor reports directly to him/her or through the COS.

The COS is responsible for the implementation of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS), Enterprise Risk Management and Organizational Resilience Management System (ORMS) and ensures the mission-wide coherence of all contingency plans.

Slide 8



Key Message: The function of the Office of the SRSG applies to all missions but those shown are generic structures which may not all exist in a mission based on differing mandates and organisations.

The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Security Council, appoints the head of peacekeeping operations in a mission area. He/she determines the further delegation of authority in the field on behalf of the Secretary-General.

An SRSG supported by political and mediation staff conducts diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

The roles and responsibilities of the Office of the SRSG include:

- Acting as the senior UN Representative with overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area.
- Representing the Secretary-General, leading UN political engagement, and speaking on behalf of the United Nations within the mission area.
- Leading and directing the heads of all mission components and ensuring unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission.
- Providing political guidance for mandate implementation and setting mission-wide operational direction, including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities.

- Delegating the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission and providing direction to those components through the component heads.

Slide 9

Key Message: DSRSG Political exercises managerial authority over those components that have been assigned to him/her. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations generally have at least one Deputy SRSG to support the Head of Mission in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission.

Most multidimensional peacekeeping missions have two DSRSGs. One Deputy is often termed the Principal DSRSG, responsible for political, operational, and rule of law aspects of the mission. The Principal DSRSG is the second in command and becomes Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the mission when the HOM/SRSG travels. The HOM/SRSG may delegate management of mission operations to this DSRSG.

The second DSRSG often serves as Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), which will be presented in the next slide.

Slide 10



Key Message: The DSRSG Humanitarian/Development, or "RC/HC" – meaning Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator - is often the head of the UN Country Team and coordinates the mission's activities with UN agencies, funds, and programmes, operating in the mission area.

The second DSRSG may also be appointed as:

- UN Resident Coordinator (RC).
- Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). He/she may be "multi-hatted".

The HC leads the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and coordinates emergency and humanitarian response operations.

The RC leads the Development Country Team (DCT) and coordinates reconstruction and development operations.

The DSRSG/RC/HC is Officer in Charge (OIC) when the two other senior leaders are away from a mission (SRSG and Principal DSRSG).

Slide 11



Key Message: Whenever there are UN-formed units, a Force Commander (FC) is appointed to head the UN military component. In missions where there are no forces and only observers or liaison officers, a Chief Military Observer (CMO) or chief liaison officer is appointed to head the military component.

The military component may consist of individual military personnel and contingents/troops (Formed Military Units).

The FC provides leadership and exercises command over UN military forces.

The responsibilities of the FC include:

- Commanding the military component.
- Advising the head of mission on all military issues. (In some operations where no political appointee exists as SRSG, the force commander may be designated head of mission.)
- Executing the military aspects of the mandate.
- Supervising military bodies that are part of the peace process.
- Serving as the chief interlocutor with the military high command of the warring parties.
- Being responsible for the discipline and conduct of all United Nations military personnel.

The FC is assisted by a chief of staff and a military staff. Staff officers are provided to the military force headquarters normally by the troop-contributing countries.

Slide 12



Key Message: The military component may include Formed Military Units, Staff Officers (MSO) and Experts on Mission: United Nations Military Observers (UNMO), Liaison Officers (MLO) and Military Advisers (MA).

Formed units make up the bulk of the military component. Depending on the mandate of the mission, formed units may be lightly or heavily armed and supported by a variety of units.

Military units may include:

- Infantry units.
- Force headquarters company.
- Engineers units, for camp and road maintenance and construction.
- Mine clearance units.
- Medical units.
- Logistics units.
- Transport units (land, sea or air).
- Communications and signals units.

Slide 13

Key Message: The primary function of the Military Component (MC) in most UNPKOs is to provide a safe and secure environment, thereby contributing to the conditions necessary for the implementation of other elements of the mandate, like the monitoring of human rights, the protection of civilians, national reconciliation, Security Sector Reform, and institution building. In all peacekeeping operations, but particularly in multidimensional operations, the MC should understand the roles and expertise of non-military components and should share information and collaborate with them to the greatest extent possible.

The UN has been deploying military personnel for service in peace operations since 1948 when the Security Council authorised the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, the military involvement has grown, further developed and the military community is called, depending on the mandate of the mission, to:

- Provide a safe and secure environment across a conflict zone.
- Monitor a disputed border.
- Monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas.
- Protect civilians.
- Assist in-country military personnel with training and support. *
- Assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed.

☞***Note to instructor*** – Military Components increasingly operate in conjunction with security forces from external entities, such as regional organisations, international military coalitions, expeditionary forces, and host nation security forces. UN cooperation with these forces must conform with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces. For more information, please refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, 2023.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Head of Police Component (HoPC)/Police Commissioner (PC) reports to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component.

The PC is responsible for all personnel issues relating to the police component, including conduct and discipline. He or she advises the SRSG and other senior mission managers on law enforcement matters. If a DSRSG for the rule of law and governance is appointed, the police commissioner reports to him or her.

The HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Police Adviser at UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM.

Slide 15



Key Message: The police component may consist of Individual Police Officers (IPO) and Formed Police Units (FPU).

The police component may consist of:

- Individual Police Officers (IPO) deployed as experts to advise, mentor, monitor and train local law enforcement officials.
- Formed Police Units (FPU) that are deployed as a cohesive unit to undertake specialised tasks, such as crowd and riot control or a canine unit.

Slide 16



Key Message: United Nations Police Component (PC) play an increasingly important role in the Organization's peace operations. The PC complements the activities of the military component in establishing security and stability. The PC tasks include strengthening law enforcement. Together with the human rights component and the rule of law unit, they promote respect for the rule of law.

United Nations Police may or may not be armed, depending on the mandate of the peace operation.

In achieving its mandate, the PC must work closely with all components of the mission, notably those concerned with the rule of law which would include the human rights component, rule-of-law unit, corrections officers, child protection advisers and gender affairs unit. Their work in community policing makes them natural partners with the civil affairs component that may be building local capacity for public administration and community reconciliation.

At certain stages of the peace process, the United Nations may be called upon to assist in DDR tasks, helping to create a secure and non-threatening environment in which the parties can disarm with confidence. They could also be tasked to assist in creating a secure environment for an electoral process.

Slide 17

Key Message: Different management structures exist to help the SRSG/HOM manage mission work. The key management structure in a PKO is the "Mission Leadership Team". This structure exists at the mission headquarters level.

Mission Leadership Team: The senior leadership group, as determined at the discretion of the HOM and typically comprised of the following: Head of Mission/SRSG, DSRSG, DRSG/HC/RC, Mission Chief of Staff, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Director Mission Support, and others as required, such as Chief Security Advisor, Senior Legal Advisor, among others.

The HOM shall establish an MLT to set strategies and policy priorities and communicate intent throughout the mission. The MLT facilitates coordination and decision-making and provides direction, oversight and monitoring of sectoral and thematic strategies, or other priorities determined by the mission mandate. The MLT should meet regularly and be chaired by the HOM and, in their absence, the Officer-in-Charge. The MLT may include members who attend to provide briefings. The need for inclusive decision-making should be balanced against the need for a restricted group for sensitive decisions and the efficiency of the decision-making process.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Reference: Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2019.

Slide 18



Key Message: To enhance support for the Mission Leadership Team and ensure seamless mission integration, additional "Integrated Elements" may be incorporated into the mission structure. The inclusion of these elements is tailored to the specific mandate, tasks, and scale/complexity of the mission.

Integrated elements in a multi-dimensional PK Mission could consist of:

- Strategic Planning and Coordination Unit.
- Security Systems Management System.
- Joint Operations Centre (JOC).
- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC).
- Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC).
- Mission Support Centre (MSC).
- Service Delivery (SD) Section.
- UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Section/Office.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – A significant number of Military Staff Officers will be allocated to these entities. While deployed as military personnel, they operate under the directive authority of civilian supervisors/chiefs for their daily functions and tasks.

Slide 19



Key Message: The Head of Mission will execute integrated tasks through a Mission Leadership Team (MLT) or Senior Leadership Team, which is supported by an Integrated Mission Structure.

The MLT is supported by the following integrated structures:

- The Security Management Team (SMT) is a security management forum, in which the mission and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) meet to share security information, receive risk assessments, and plan their programmes and activities accordingly.
- The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) provides integrated analysis of all sources of information to assess medium- and long-term threats to the mandate, and to support leadership team decision-making.
- The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) collates situation reports and operational information to provide current situational awareness for the mission and acts as a crisis coordination hub.
- The Integrated Mission Planning Team/Mission Planning Unit (MPU) is responsible for initiating, organising and leading mission-wide planning processes.
- The Mission Support Centre (MSC) supports/coordinates the provision of logistical support in accordance with leadership team priorities.

Slide 20



Key Message: Mission JOCs are integrated entities established to support the decision-making of the MLT and UNHQ by providing integrated situational awareness, facilitating integrated operational coordination and planning within the mission; and supporting mission crisis management.

Mission JOCs are integrated entities established to support the decision-making of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) and UNHQ by providing integrated situational awareness through routine and special incident reporting. JOCs are also responsible for facilitating integrated operational coordination and planning so as to ensure that the operational activity of mission components and that of the UN Country Team (UNCT) (as well as the Humanitarian Country Team, if applicable) are complementary and coherent, and that available assets are shared and efficiently and effectively utilised. JOCs also play a critical role in supporting mission crisis management through the increased-tempo provision of situational awareness and support to the CMT.

Structure and staffing of JOC

Mission JOCs are integrated entities and shall comprise civilian and uniformed (military and police) personnel. The staffing framework of the JOC must reflect the multidimensional composition of the mission and its operational tempo and requirements.

The staffing requirement for a typical JOC as outlined in the JOC Policy includes:

- One Chief JOC/senior operations officer (P5).
- One Deputy Chief JOC/operations officer (P4).
- Three to five reporting/operations officers (P4/P3/P2/UNV/military or police personnel assigned to JOC). The exact number and profiles of these staff members will depend on

mission circumstances and on the functions attributed to the JOC, namely the extent of its responsibilities for integrated operational coordination and planning.

- JOC shall be adequately staffed and equipped with capabilities to carry out its mandated activities. At least six duty officers as a minimum are necessary to maintain 24/7 JOC watch capacities, subject to the mission's rest and recuperation cycle. This requirement can be filled through seconded uniformed personnel and, resources permitting, with civilian posts (P3/P2/UNV). JOC duty officers should work alongside the duty officers from the MOC, POC and SOC or their equivalents where applicable.
- At least one administrative support staff.
- One dedicated information management officer.
- GIS staff pending mission requirements.

Mission JOCs should be adequately staffed and equipped with capabilities to undertake integrated situational awareness, operational coordination, operational planning, and crisis management functions. Such a structure also affords the potential of career progression within the JOC and Field Offices.

Functions

Mission JOCs shall fulfil the following functions:

- Provide integrated situational awareness within the mission and to UNHQ.
- Facilitate integrated operational coordination and planning within the mission.
- Support mission crisis management.

The focus of JOC work should be on current operational activities, with a time horizon of up to several days. JOCs and JMACs shall align their activities to avoid any gaps in the provision of situational awareness and analysis support to mission leadership.

***Notes to instructor**:*

a) Reference: Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (JOC), Reference 2019.21, 1 Nov 2019.

b) For further details on JOC, its establishment and governance, refer to UN Policy on Authority, Command and Control in PKO (2019).

Slide 21



Key Message: The JOC shall serve as the mission's 24/7 integrated information hub to provide integrated Situational Awareness (SA), facilitate integrated operations coordination and planning, and support crisis management.

Specifically, the JOC shall:

- Monitor the situation in the mission area.
- Receive and collate daily situational reports and ad hoc alerts from all mission components (and the UNCT, as appropriate).
- Verify and deconflict the information received.
- Manage requisite distribution lists and disseminate daily integrated situational awareness summaries, reports and special incident ('flash') reports to the MLT and to other mission and UNCT personnel as directed.
- Transmit the mission's daily integrated situation report to UNHQ once approved by the mission COS.
- Transmit 'flash' reports to UNHQ as appropriate.
- Provide regular situational awareness briefings at MLT meetings.
- Ensure that an officer is on duty in the JOC on a 24/7 basis to address information or point of contact requests and that's during silent hours the Chief, Deputy Chief or senior reporting officer is on call to respond to operational response matters.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – For further details on JOC, its establishment and governance, refer to the Policy on Joint Operations Centres (JOC), Reference 2019.20, 1 Nov 2019.

Slide 22



Key Message: Mission JMACs are integrated entities established to ensure that missions have in place an entity capable of collecting and analysing multi-source information to produce integrated analysis and forward-looking assessments in support of mission planning and decision-making.

Mission JMACs are the mission organisational unit that provide integrated analysis and assessments of threats and opportunities of events, incidents, developments, patterns and trends that can impact the mandate implementation. JMACs play important roles throughout missions' life cycle, including mission start-up, steady state, transition, drawdown and withdrawal. JMACs also play a critical role in fulfilling the requirements under the DPO Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy. The work of JMACs also supports strategic, operational, and tactical planning and decision-making, as well as provides the support to the Comprehensive Performance and Assessment System (CPAS) when applicable. The JMAC contributes also to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and support.

Structure and Staffing

JMACs shall be comprised of civilian and uniformed personnel. The structure and staffing of the JMAC will vary from mission to mission depending on mandate, size, composition, operational requirements, context and available partner organisations.

At a minimum, the JMAC shall have a Chief, a Deputy Chief and a range between 7 to 28 posts or as required, that can be filled by civilian and uniformed personnel. In addition, at least one information management specialist and one administrative support officer shall be recruited to attend to JMAC-specific requirements as well as those related to

JMAC's role in the implementation of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy. Specialty skills should be sought if the mission context requires, either through the temporary assignment of personnel from other mission components or through the recruitment of dedicated staff or consultants.

The Chief JMAC position shall be filled through a civilian recruitment process. Generally, the post of Deputy Chief JMAC shall also be filled by a civilian. Depending on the nature of the mission, a military or police Deputy Chief JMAC may be envisaged.

All staff recruited to the JMAC shall have the requisite skills, as outlined in relevant generic job profiles and openings for JMAC staff. Military and police personnel assigned to the JMAC shall meet specified job descriptions issued by the Force Generation Service and Police Division in UNHQ respectively in close collaboration with UNOCC. Uniformed personnel assigned to the JMAC should be deployed for a minimum period of 12 months and ideally for two to three years.

Functions

The JMAC shall fulfil its functions in accordance with mission-wide information priorities identified by the HoM and MLT. It may also support individual mission components in their decision-making processes.

The JMAC shall be responsible for:

- Managing information requirements from the HoM and MLT, including through the development of an information Acquisition Plan (AP) to support mission leadership decision-making.
- Acquiring and analysing multi-source information, including peacekeeping intelligence-related information, to prepare integrated analysis and forward-looking assessments that are timely, accurate, comprehensive, structured data and relevant to support decision-making; mission strategic, operational planning; and crisis management.
- Identifying threats, challenges and opportunities to mandate implementation.

In a crisis, the JMAC has a role to:

- Anticipate potential and emerging crises.
- Identify possible outcomes and implications.
- Contribute to a mission's early warning efforts through predictive analysis.

Notes to instructor:

a) Reference: Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) reference 2020.06, 01 May 2020.

b) For further details on JMAC, its establishment and governance, refer to UN Policy on Authority, Command and Control in PKO (2019) and Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence (2019).

Slide 23



Key Message: JOCs and JMACs jointly support the spectrum of Situational Awareness (SA) and understanding of a mission. Hence, a close coordination and complementary relationship between the JMAC and the JOC is essential, while maintaining the distinction of their respective functions.

Peacekeeping missions conduct a wide range of mandated activities in fluid and demanding environments. Comprehensive situational awareness and understanding supports the ability of senior mission leadership to identify, prevent, mitigate and/or respond to threats and opportunities to mandate implementation.

Together, JOCs and JMACs support the spectrum of situational awareness, understanding and forecasting in peacekeeping operations. Whereas JOCs focus on day-to-day situational awareness, the JMAC generates integrated analysis and forward-looking assessments, providing the HoM and the MLT with an incisive understanding of issues, trends and threats and their implications for strategic and operational decisions that may impact mandate implementation and the security of UN personnel, assets and premises.

Chiefs JMAC and JOC should consult regularly on the sharing of information and explore the synergies between the JOC's monitoring of day-to-day events and the analytical products of JMAC. Both entities could explore sharing information management platforms and resources.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Reference: Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) reference 2020.06, 01 May 2020.

Slide 24



Key Message: Under the guidance of the HOM or COS and in line with relevant DPO and mission-specific guidance on reporting, JOC and JMAC shall establish procedures for the regular exchange of information and interaction with UNOCC/UNHQ, mission components, in particular the Military and Police Operations Centres, military intelligence cells (U2), and the UNCT.

JOC Information Flow

The JOC shall maintain a relationship with the UNOCC to inform the Situational Awareness (SA) of senior UNHQ staff and of the broader UN leadership through UNOCC reporting. The JOC shall serve as the main entry point for UNHQ queries on the situation in the mission's area of operations.

All mission components, heads of field offices and regional JOCs are required to provide daily situational reports and ad hoc alerts to the JOC in a timely manner. The provision of information to the JOC by mission components and the production and distribution of integrated situational awareness products shall be guided by a reporting directive, to be issued by the HOM or COS, in accordance with the DPO SOP on Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ (Ref.2019.10), including through the use of the Unite Aware platform for entering, storing, verifying and validating information in mission where the tool is deployed.

Information received by JOCs and being disseminated out of JOCs should have a geospatial component added to it (e.g. place names, GPS coordinates) to facilitate analysis of spatial and temporal relationships, integration in geospatial applications, and mapping. JOCs should rely on mission FTS for GIS capabilities for information collection

(geospatial data, aerial and/or satellite imagery), analysis (image, terrain, traffic, trend and spatial analysis) and dissemination (mapping products, geospatial applications) through the Unite Aware suite.

The JOC must be able to provide to the mission leadership and UNHQ, routinely or on demand, a written or verbal overview of the 'integrated operational picture'. These include:

- Integrated situation reports for daily and/or weekly dissemination within the mission.
- Integrated situation reports for daily and/or weekly dissemination to UNHQ.
- Flash reports for dissemination within the mission and to UNHQ.
- Oral/visual briefings to regular (at least weekly) MLT meetings utilizing tools developed by the DPO-DOS Situational Awareness Programme (recently rebranded as Unite Aware).

JMAC Information Flow

The JMAC is responsible for collecting and analysing multi-source information, including peacekeeping-intelligence related material to produce integrated analysis and predictive assessments in support of MLT decision-making, contingency planning and crisis management.

The Chief JMAC, in consultation with the HOM and the MLT, shall establish mission information requirements to guide JMAC tasking, analysis and reporting. The HOM and COS are responsible for ensuring that critical information on risk and threats is passed in a timely manner to all mission organisational units.

JMAC products can be shared (with the SRSG's and CoS's approvals) with the UNOCC and other relevant United Nations Headquarters analysis capacities to support situational awareness and analysis requirements of United Nations leadership at Headquarters.

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a) References:

- UN Policy on Authority, Command and Control in PKO (2019).

- Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (JOC), Reference 2019.21, 1 Nov 2019.

- Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), Reference 2020.06, 01 May 2020.

- Joint Mission Analysis Centre Field Handbook (declassified on 21 Oct 2022).

b) Unite Aware will be discussed in detail in Module 3.

Slide 25



Key Message: The Mission Support Centre (MSC) is a joint civilian/uniformed unit within the pillar of the Mission Support Division (MSD) and provides an interface for integrated and logistical support to the mission, involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, and feedback.

The MSC provides all mission components, other UN and non-UN entities with a single point of coordination for all aspects of logistic support in the mission area.

The Chief MSC manages the tasking and coordination of all requests for logistics and support on behalf of the Director/Chief Mission Support (DMS/CMS). All logistics and support requests must be submitted to the MSC for appropriate action.

The MSC is jointly staffed by military, police, and civilian staff. In addition, logistics staff from the advance and/or rear parties of the military contingents may be deployed temporarily to the MSC to coordinate deployment and repatriation respectively.

Mission enabling assets are considered "whole of mission" assets because their capabilities are required by all mission organizational units and consolidated tasking allows maximum utilisation. The DMS/CMS, as delegated by HOM, is responsible and accountable for the effective utilisation and tasking of all United Nations commercial and military enabling assets. The MSC is responsible for mission integration with control mechanisms and for ensuring coordinated implementation of mission priority tasks, including necessary resources.

Slide 26



Key Message: The Mission Planning Unit (MPU) is responsible for initiating, organising and leading mission-wide planning processes under the guidance of the HOM and COS.

The tasks of MPU may include:

- Strategic and programmatic level mission planning including the development, coordination, and implementation of a Mission Plan. The Mission Plan translates the strategic guidance in the Mission Concept into an operational plan spanning all priority areas of the mission's work.
- Political guidance for mandate implementation and mission-wide direction set by the HOM.
- United Nations system-wide assessment and planning frameworks, such as the ISF (or equivalent) or Humanitarian Response Plan, as appropriate.
- Coordination of mission-wide contingency plans.
- Development and coordination of the results-based budget framework associated with mission budget development to ensure that substantive objectives are supported by resources.
- Implementation of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) within the mission.
- Coordination or support to the peacekeeping-intelligence planning process.

In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, MPUs are integrated entities and shall comprise civilian and uniformed (military and police) personnel.

A Military Planning Officer will be assigned to the MPU on a permanent basis (depending on the mission setup this position can be "double-hatted" together with a U-5 Planning Officer position in the FHQ). A detailed list of the tasks, roles and responsibilities of this Military Planning Officer is provided in the Policy on MPUs.

The Military Planning Officer must remain in close contact with the FHQ U-5 Branch to ensure that military operations are aligned with the operations, activities, and engagements conducted by other mission entities.

Slide 27



Key Message: The UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) mechanism is a key element for humanitarian agencies and organisations deployed in the mission area to establish and maintain an independent and distinct humanitarian operation, making clear the fundamental civilian character of humanitarian action.

Maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the political, peacekeeping, and military operation is a key factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Integrated civil-military coordination mechanisms may be established to coordinate activities across a mission area.

The coordination mechanisms can also facilitate information sharing, mutual support, joint assessments, integrated planning, and common strategies that are particularly useful during times of crisis. This coordination mechanism can be implemented at the regional and sectoral level.

In most operations, the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) deploys UN-CMCoord officers to establish such coordination platforms where UNPKOs are represented.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Further details can be found in the 2018 OCHA-UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, (V 2.0), Section 6.4 and the 2022 DPO's UN-CIMIC Policy.

b) NOT to be confused with UN-CIMIC whose activities are conducted in support of military activities. UN-CMCoord aims to protect and promote humanitarian principles. UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of a UN mission, and potentially also humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, taking into consideration other existing coordination mechanisms like the UN-CMCoord.

Slide 28



Key Message: Depending on the mission or its mandate, there may be various additional integrated structures like an Integrated Training Centre, Strategic Planning and Coordination Cell (SPCC), Service Delivery Division (SDD), Security Information and Operations Centre (SIOC) and Security Information Coordination Unit (SICU) or a Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) or various other joint structures.

Slide 29



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- The HOM/SRSG has overall authority over all UN personnel in the mission area.
- The HOMC and the HOPC exercise operational control over all military and police personnel assigned to their components, in the mission area.
- The DMS/CMS is responsible for the provision of administrative and logistic support to all components and for the effective utilisation and tasking of enabling assets.
- JOC & JMAC support the spectrum of Situational Awareness, understanding and forecasting in PKO.

Slide 30



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate ten (10) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to ensure participants cover the important information of each Integrated Mission Element.
- Participants are expected to explain the main responsibilities of MLT, JOC and JMAC.
- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
1.6

Authority, Command and Control

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.6 provides an overview of the Authority, Command and Control (AC2) while deployed in a field mission.

Relevance

It is important for all UN Staff Officers to understand the AC2 arrangements at both HQ and Mission levels, which applies to all personnel involved in the planning and implementation of mission mandates.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Explain AC2 concerns in UN Peacekeeping
- Define UN AC2 terminology
- Explain the AC2 management and integrating mechanisms in a UN mission

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 22
Summary of Key Messages	23
Learning Activities	24 - 25

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.6 provides an overview of the Authority, Command and Control (AC2) while deployed in a field mission.

It is important for all Staff Officers to understand the AC2 arrangements at both HQ and Mission levels, which applies to all personnel involved in the planning and implementation of mission mandates.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain AC2 concerns in UN Peacekeeping
- Define UN AC2 terminology
- Explain the AC2 management and integrating mechanisms in a UN mission

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: The 2019.23 Policy on AC2 is a crucial UN Policy for Peacekeeping Operations. It specifies the AC2 arrangements at both HQ and Mission levels, applying to all personnel involved in the planning and implementation of mission mandates.

The Policy on AC2:

- Applies to all personnel involved in the planning of UN peacekeeping missions and in the implementation of their mandates.
- Defines and describes the AC2 arrangements at the HQ and mission levels; the responsibilities of the Head of Mission (HOM) and other senior mission leadership, and mission integration and control arrangements.
- Specifies the responsibilities retained by Member States over their military and police contingents and units serving in UN peacekeeping missions.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Reference: DPO Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2019.23)

Slide 5



Key Message: This diagram depicts the levels of planning for PKOs, as well as during the implementation of mission mandates. A UN Peace Operations operates at three distinct levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.

The system of AC2 in UNPKOs derives from the UN Charter. The Security Council establishes peacekeeping missions, provides their mandates, specifies the high-level political objectives of each mission, and entrusts the Secretary-General with the responsibility for implementing mission mandates. The General Assembly provides the required annual appropriations necessary to fund mission operations.

To ensure the effective and accountable implementation of the decisions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Secretary-General confers responsibility and delegates authority for mission management to the HOM.

These authorities are governed by the AC2 framework at three distinct but overlapping levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Most of the strategic level authority and responsibilities are vested in the senior leadership in UNHQ and mission headquarters (mission HQ), namely the HOM and other members of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT). The operational level encompasses both mission HQ and the sub-national level, where most missions have Field Offices and/or military sector/regional HQ(s). The Heads of the Military and Police Components exercise "UN operational command and control" over the Military and Police Components respectively.

The decentralised nature of the AC2 framework in UNPKOs cascades authority downwards and ensures that senior UN personnel at different levels within the mission have

responsibility for decision-making on strategic, operational, and tactical issues within their areas of responsibility, under the strategic guidance of the HOM and MLT.

This means that certain strategic responsibilities also rest with senior UN personnel deployed in Field Offices and/or military sector HQ(s) who oversee significant numbers of personnel and resources, in accordance with their respective terms of reference. Managing authorities, roles, and responsibilities at these different levels and across different mission components are essential to the effective functioning of AC2 in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Slide 6



Key Message: The Security Council establishes peacekeeping missions and entrusts the Secretary-General for implementing mission mandates. The USG DPO is responsible for providing guidance and strategic direction to the PKOs. The USG DOS is responsible for the operational support. TCCs retain overall command of their forces, but detailed arrangements for them are to be placed under the operational control of the Head of the Military Component.

The USG DPO is responsible for providing political and policy guidance and strategic direction to the DPO and peacekeeping operations. The USG DPO also directs policy development and approves guidance materials related to the planning and conduct of peacekeeping missions based on Security Council mandates and General Assembly resolutions.

The USG DOS is responsible for operational support to UN Secretariat entities globally, including peace operations. This support includes advisory, operational, and transactional support services in the areas of administration, supply chain, logistics, healthcare management, personnel, and information and communications technology.

Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) retain overall command of their forces, but detailed arrangements for them are to eventually be placed under the operational control of the Head of the Military Component, via the MOU, which will be explored in more detail in the following slides.

In addition, a single political-operational regional structure under Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities with dual reporting lines to the USGs DPPA and DPO, is responsible for the entire range of political and operational engagements on peace

and security issues, including the provision of strategic, political, and operational guidance, analysis, and direction. The respective regional areas are organised by regional divisions and further organised into integrated teams, tailored to the specific context, political, and operational needs of field presences.

☞***Note to instructor*** – Two other UN departments are also involved:

- Department of Management Strategy and Policy Compliance (DMSPC) – is responsible for managing the administrative framework of the Organisation – including the regulations, rules, and administrative policies – as well as monitoring compliance with the framework.

- Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) – is accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the UNSMS and for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and their recognised dependents both at UNHQ and in the field, in accordance with the Framework of Accountability of the UNSMS.

Slide 7



Key Message: In United Nations peacekeeping missions, responsibility for mandate implementation and authority for managing resources are both vested by the Secretary-General in the Head of Mission (HOM).

Each mission has an MLT that supports the HOM in the execution of their functions and in ensuring coordination and consultative decision-making on strategic and operational issues. While MLT composition is specific to each mission, members of the MLT typically include:

- Head of Mission (HOM).
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC).
- Chief of Staff (COS).
- Head of Military Component (HOMC) and/or Deputy Head of Military Component (DHOMC).
- Head of Police Component (HOPC) and/or Deputy Head of Police Component (DHOPC).
- Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS).
- Principal/Chief/Security Advisor (P/C/SA).
- The Senior Legal Advisor (SLA).
- Other senior heads and advisors of the civilian organizational units including the Head of the Human Rights Component, Senior Gender Advisor and Senior Protection of Civilians Advisor.

Depending on the size and scope of the mission, senior mission leaders should establish and maintain integration and control structures, that allow them to develop and disseminate their intent, take, and implement decisions, and adjust operations and align the use of resources to reflect changing circumstances and priorities.

Slide 8



Key Message: Let´s explore these key UN AC2 Definitions in the following slides.

Slide 9



Key Message: UN Operational authority is the authority transferred by the Member States to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, FPUs, and individual military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. United Nations Operational Authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General and through him in the head of a specific mission, under the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General exercises that authority under the overall authority of the Security Council.

United Nations Operational Authority involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the following limits:

- Of a specific mandate of the Security Council.
- An agreed period, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification.
- A specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

Slide 10



Key Message: UN Operational Command and Control is the authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander for the direction, coordination and control of uniform personnel under their command. Operational command and control includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives and give direction to individual uniformed personnel, units and sub-units necessary to accomplish the mission.

The HOMC exercises "UN operational command and control" over all military units and individually deployed military experts (i.e. military observers, staff officers or military liaison officers) assigned by Member States to the mission. "UN operational command and control" allows the HOMC to assign tasks to individually deployed military experts, units and sub-units within the military component, in consultation with the National Contingent Commander (NCC), as appropriate. The HOMC may delegate "UN operational command and control" to subordinate command levels, as defined within the military component's "Field Command Framework".

The HOMC is responsible to the HOM for ensuring the maintenance of discipline and good order among contributed military personnel within the mission area, including in the prevention and reporting of misconduct, in accordance with United Nations standards of conduct and the relevant policies, administrative issuances and guidance on conduct and discipline.

Uniformed personnel assigned to serve under "UN operational command and control" must not act on national direction or instruction. As such, they are not under national operational control. If uniformed personnel receive instructions from national authorities, they must immediately inform their UN chain of command. If such instructions are contrary

to UN orders, instructions, directions or policies, the mission will report them immediately to UNHQ who will take the issue up, as required, with the contributing Member State.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – **Conduct and Discipline**

The HOM is accountable to the Secretary-General for the good conduct of all mission personnel. The HOMC, in turn, is accountable to the HOM for the good conduct of all members of the military component.

While the contributing country retains the right to conduct the investigation and while it remains responsible for sanctioning, as applicable, its military personnel contributed under a TCC MOU with the UN, the UN may conduct a preliminary investigation of allegations of misconduct against military personnel contributed under a TCC MOU with the UN.

The UN also conduct its own investigation of the alleged misconduct of military personnel contributed under a TCC MOU, if the contributing country fails to initiate the national investigation in the applicable timeline.

The UN may take measures for the early repatriation of contributed military personnel, including on grounds of conduct and discipline.

The exercise of the disciplinary authority by TCCs over its personnel contributed to the UN under a TCC MOU shall also not preclude or interfere with the requirement that the UN conducts its own inquiries in instances involving loss of life or serious injuries to UN personnel or third parties, in instances of loss or damages to United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE), COE, or third-party property or in other applicable circumstances, as spelled out in the Standard Operating Procedure on Boards of Inquiry (Ref.2016.05 or its successor).

Slide 11



Key Message: UN Tactical Command and Control is the authority delegated to a Military or Police Commander to assign specific tasks to forces under his or her command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by a higher authority.

Tactical control is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks. It may be delegated to and exercised at the level of subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

Slide 12



Key Message: Administrative Control is the authority over subordinate or other organisations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, and services. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in a peacekeeping mission.

The Contributing Member State retains "administrative control" over non-operational administrative issues (such as benefits and salaries) of deployed uniformed contingent personnel and units. Administrative control over uniformed contingents and units is exercised by an NCC deployed within the mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of United Nations operations within a mission area.

Slide 13



Key Message: This slide indicates the division of responsibilities between the Troop Contributing Country and the UN.

Note that logistics fall between the two as, for example, the TCC provides the kitchen but then orders the food from Mission Support in the Mission who then delivers to the unit.

The UN has operational authority and operational command and control over the units, while the TCC retains 'administrative control' over the units for administration.

Slide 14



Key Message: Enabling Units are military units generated to support the mission as a whole, not just the military component.

Mission enabling assets are considered "whole of mission" assets because their capabilities are required by all mission organizational units and consolidated tasking allows maximum utilisation.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - The HOMC retains UN operational control of military elements which are not in their direct chain of command, such as enabling units under the tasking authority of the DMS/CMS and military staff assigned to integrated/joint structures. These units and staff shall be responsible to, and report to, the heads of offices of those structures irrespective of whether these are civilian or military personnel. Reference: United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM, 2020).

Slide 15



Key Message: The HOM, through the HOMC and HOPC, is responsible for ensuring that command and control arrangements are developed between the uniformed components at mission start-up. As a rule, the personnel, units and sub-units from one uniformed component should not be placed under direct supervision, or tactical control of a different uniformed component. However, during crises or critical incidents a uniformed unit, or sub-unit, of one uniformed component may be placed temporarily under the operational command of the other uniformed component. The tactical control over any personnel, units and sub-units so placed will be exercised through the chain of command of the other uniformed component at the site of an incident.

Under specific conditions and with the approval of the HOM, United Nations police and military personnel may serve together in a task force under a unified and centralized structure commanded by a senior United Nations police officer designated by the HOPC, or a senior United Nations military officer designated by the HOMC. The task force commander will be responsible for leading the joint task force's daily operations and operational control in the specified area of an operational box. This type of command structure may only be initiated with the approval of the HOM and would not apply to the operational control of police or military personnel outside the specified operational box.

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a) The main (but not the only) scenarios envisaged in United Nations peacekeeping missions that may require such transfer of operational command between the police and military are situations of escalating public disorder, the protection of civilians and the security of United Nations bases, where the threat, exposure and necessity assessment of the situation is beyond the capabilities and capacities of the particular uniformed component.

b) For further details on AC2 in Combined Military-Police Operations, refer to DPO Guidelines on Combined Military and Police Coordination Mechanisms in Peace Operations (2019).

Slide 16



Key Message: Tasking Authority is the authority vested in specified senior mission leaders (HOMC, HOPC, or D/CMS) to assign tasks to mission enabling assets and deploy, redeploy, and employ all or part of an enabling asset to achieve the mission's mandate.

The tasking of mission enabling assets should be guided by an integrated approach to planning and resource allocation, informed by mandate priorities determined by the HOM and mission-wide priorities informed by the mission resource allocation structure. It is the responsibility of the HOM to ensure an accountable and cooperative approach to tasking and resource allocation in the mission.

The D/CMS, as delegated by the HOM, is responsible and accountable for the effective utilisation and tasking of all United Nations commercial/military mission enabling assets. The MSC (or equivalent section/office in MSD) is the mission integration and control mechanism responsible for ensuring the coordinated implementation of mission priority tasks, including the necessary resources.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - While the Head of the Military Component exercises operational command and control over military personnel and units, the DMS has tasking authority over the military logistics and enabling units.

Slide 17



Key Message: The HOMC shall establish the military operational chain of command, as follows and as needed: HOMC; Sector Command (Brigade Command); Battalion Command and sub-units.

As previously mentioned, the HOMC exercises "UN operational command and control" over all military units and individually deployed military experts. The HOMC may delegate UN operational command and control to subordinate command levels, as defined within the military component's "Field Command Framework".

The TCC retains "administrative control" over non-operational administrative issues. The administrative control over uniformed contingents and units is exercised by an NCC deployed within the mission area.

Under the direction of the DMS/CMS, the Chief Service Delivery (CSD) provides supervision over the mission's civilian, commercial, police and military logistics support resources. On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CSD exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat/field engineers), transportation and movement units, including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping mission.

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a) The NCC is a Senior National Officer (SNO) of a contributed uniformed contingent or unit within the mission area. The NCC is responsible for matters such as personnel management, supply services and other non-operational tasks on behalf of uniformed contingent personnel and units.

b) While the Head of the Military Component exercises operational command and control over military personnel and units, the Director of Mission Support has tasking authority over the military logistic and enabling units, as discussed in the previous slide.

Slide 18



Key Message: The HOPC shall establish the police operational chain of command, as follows and as needed: HOPC; Regional Command, Sub-regional Command, FPUs and sub-units.

The HOPC exercises "UN operational command and control" over police personnel and FPUs contributed by Member States to serve in a mission. "UN operational command and control" allows the HOPC to assign IPOs, specialised police teams, and FPUs (and/or its individual units) within the police component to operational tasks within the mission area, in consultation with the National Contingent Commander (NCC), as appropriate.

The HOPC may delegate "UN operational command and control" to subordinate command levels as defined within the police component's "Field Command Framework".

The HOPC may further assign police personnel and units to a specific subordinate commander (for example, at the tactical level). These subordinate commanders will exercise "UN tactical command and control" over assigned IPOs and units as designated by the HOPC.

The Contributing Member State retains 'administrative control' over non-operational administrative issues over deployed police personnel and formed police units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national police officer within a mission area.

Operational control is often delegated to the level of the chief/deputy-chief operations, sometimes at the FPU or regional command level depending on the organisation of the component.

Slide 19



Key Message: All component elements report through their head of component to Mission leadership, who in turn report for the entire mission to UNHQ.

Slide 20



Key Message: A secondary reporting line for informational and technical purposes on matters not relating to the command and control of operations, or to national administrative control. It is an informational and technical advisory communication link that should in no case circumvent the primary reporting line and command/supervisory relationships, through which formal direction and tasking is issued. Technical reporting lines must be transparent and formalised in approved documentation (e.g. Secretary-General's Bulletins, Inter-organizational agreements, etc.).

Numerous UN agencies and elements in theatre have formal reporting links to the strategic level. For example, the head of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the mission area provides development reports to UNDP HQ in New York.

The HOMC and the HOPC maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Military Adviser and the DPO Police Adviser, respectively. This technical reporting link must not bypass or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions made by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

It should be noted that both components – police and military – are under the direct command and control of the SRSG, who holds the UN authority in the field.

Slide 21



Key Message: This slide summarises the chain of command and reporting at HQ and Mission Levels, as well as the role of the Military and Police Advisers.

In NY, at UNHQ level, the SC, SG and USG DPO at the Strategic level.

In the field, the HOM/SRSG with the components under his/her command.

We find again the same three levels of command we studied before: Strategic in the UNHQ, Operational at the mission level as well as Tactical at the component level.

- Now, what are the roles of these actors in the command function?

- The Security Council decides.
- The Secretary-General implements decisions with the help of the Secretariat.
- The USG DPO has delegated authority over the field missions.
- The Regional Offices coordinate the actions of the various actors.
- And finally, the SRSG, as the representative for the SG, is the UN authority in the field.

- Now, what are the role of the Military Adviser and Police Adviser?

- At the strategic level, the MA and PA have an advisory role, primarily to the USG DPO, but also upon request to the SG and SC.
- Regarding their respective components in the field, both MA and PA have primarily a technical relationship: recruiting and deploying (overseeing the deployment) of formed units and individuals, organizing the rotations, providing guidance and policies, etc.

- The HOMC and the HOPC maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the DPO Military Adviser and the DPO Police Adviser respectively. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.
- Both advisers have oversight responsibilities, ensuring that the military and police components operate in respect of the extant policies, decisions, and regulations.

☞***Notes to instructor*** – Neither the Military Adviser nor the Police adviser belong to the chain of command: they do not exert superior command over their respective components: the chain of command goes clearly through the civilian channel: USG DPO – HOM.

Slide 22



Key Message: The complex nature of a multidimensional mission is compounded by the presence of multinational contingents, each with their own national command and control doctrine. This makes for a cumbersome military environment with a broad level of participation, a variety of national perspectives, lack of standardised communication means, and no multinational peacekeeping doctrine to unite them all.

Decision-making in multinational settings is inherently slow. It is constrained by UN mandates or national concerns; issues of safety of national forces; national political agendas; and new situations, typically new difficult situations — that cannot be handled with speed.

Consensus building will normally be required. This takes time, and time may not always be available. Units use different languages internally, have different equipment, have received different peacekeeping training and view issues differently because of their cultural perspectives.

In the UN view of things, command is something that needs a strong national link — something inappropriate for work in the UN.

The UN AC2 system needs to consider all these complexities.

Considering all those challenges in a peacekeeping situation, you must understand the mission mandate and guidance from UN DPO, specifically from the SRSG which is very critical. Also, as missions and situations are very dynamic in nature, the commander or a head of mission must remain actively involved in the communications process to influence and guide all subordinates and components in the mission.

Slide 23



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- AC2 in UN derives from the UN Charter and is adapted to each specific Mission.
- Once a TCC comes under the Operational authority of the UN, its operational effort is no longer guided nationally.
- Authority vested in specified senior mission leaders to deploy, redeploy and employ all or part of an enabling asset.
- Building effective communication structures is critical to success.

Slide 24



- Instructions:

1. Participants will pair up.

2. Each pair will have five (5) minutes to discuss and complete the "mix and match" learning activity.

3. The facilitator(s) should ensure that participants compare and discuss with their neighbouring partner.

4. In the plenary session, the facilitator will explain one concept at a time, and participants will explain the differences.

5. Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Slide 25



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate ten (10) minutes for participants to discuss and write down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to ensure participants cover the important information for each question.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Questions and possible answers for discussion:

1. What are the similarities between the command and control in your national armed forces and that in the UN peacekeeping missions?

Possible answers:

- Both require absolute execution of military orders.

- Both need unity of command.

- Both require a clear division of labour, responsibilities, and obligations.

- Both need clear reporting lines.

- Both require accountability for actions taken.

- Both require a clear coordination structure with horizontal units.

2. What are the differences?

Possible answers:

- Uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions have two reporting lines with their home countries and with their commanders in mission.

- Lack of punishment or motivational mechanisms to control subordinates in the mission, since the commander has no control of personnel, finance, promotion, and discipline in the mission.

- Commanders in mission cannot select the personnel under their command.

- Commanders must report to a civilian chief, SRSG, with closer coordination with civilian counterparts.

- Logistics are not controlled by commanders in mission.

- The control over force enablers is much more limited.

- Performance management is very different.

3. What are the challenges?

Possible answers:

- National caveats.

- Hesitation to carry out orders if there are clashes between the orders of the home country and the orders of the commander in mission.

- Commanders need to tolerate and accommodate staff officers and units that do not follow orders.

- Commanders often find logistic support cannot match operational demands.

4. What does it mean to staff officers?

Possible answers:

- Staff officers need to advise commanders on how to overcome those challenges.

- Strategically, there should be better coordination with member states, the Security Council, and the General Assembly. Better policy guidance is needed.

- Operationally, there should be better planning, coordination, and diplomacy.

- Tactically, there should be better training, leadership skills, effective communication, teamwork spirit, and innovative means for performance management and motivation mechanisms.

Lesson
1.7

Military Headquarters and Field Staff Functions

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 1.7 offers an overview of the Military Staff Branches and their functions within Force or Sector HQs.

Relevance

It is essential for all deployed UN Staff Officers to possess a comprehensive understanding of the staff system and the possible interactions within and between them to ensure effective integration in a peace operation.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe Military Component (MC) structures in different types of missions
- Explain staff branches and functions

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 20
Summary of Key Messages	21
Learning Activity	22

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 1.7 offers an overview of the Military Staff Branches and their functions within Force or Sector HQs.

It is essential for all deployed Staff Officers to possess a comprehensive understanding of the staff system and the possible interactions within and between them to ensure effective integration in a peace operation.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe Military Component (MC) structures in different types of missions
- Explain staff branches and functions

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: Despite a certain degree of standardization, the FHQ structure will differ among missions, even if they are the same type of mission. Their structure will also evolve, depending on the type and size of the mission and the changing circumstances in the mission area.

The FHQ is responsible in implementing tasks given and authorized by the Force Commander (FC) and is in charge for planning and conducting all military operations for all military capabilities provided to the mission.

Each UNPKO is unique by nature, the objectives of the mission, given through the mandate of the UNSC differ for each mission. Therefore, the configuration of a FHQ will be based on the peculiar mission's characteristics and the mandated objectives and the tasks derived.

Generally, when setting up an FHQ, various factors need to be considered. A UN Military Observer Mission can be small without a heavy staff structure, whereas multidimensional missions with more than 10.000 soldiers deployed will need a larger FHQ structure, supported by Sector HQs. All FHQs will be organised by a United Nations Staff structure (U-Staff), but the functional structure varies, depending on the size and tasks of the mission. As each mission has specific mandate and operational environment, there is no "one-fits-all" HQ structure.

Slide 5



Key Message: The HQ staff of a classic UN Military Observer Mission without an armed military component except maybe for Force Protection or Close Protection duties is generally organised in accordance with the basic U-structure, but depending on the size of the mission, a full-scale staffing might not be necessary, and numbers of functional units or branches can be reduced, if a function is not obliged in the mandate.

The staff functions can be put together under combined branches. As mentioned, there is usually no armed military component deployed to an Observer Mission, and therefore no FC; the Chief Military Observer (CMO) will function as the HOMC.

Within a classical UN Military Observer Mission, the branches U-8 (Engineering) and U9 (UN-CIMIC) are usually not used. U-3 and U-5 can be combined to an Operations Cell, as well as U-4 and U-6 to a Support Cell. The number of advisers may be reduced by double-hatting the functions, nevertheless all the functions themself need to be covered.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – The list of Acronyms is after slide 7.

Slide 6



Key Message: The basic structure of a small/medium size mission is depicted in this slide.

Smaller Missions will most likely not consist of so many different staff positions and the structures may vary from just one or two Deputy Force Chief of Staff (DFCOS Operations and DFCOS Support) even down to skipping the DFCOS structure and have all branches being guided directly by the Force Chief of Staff (FCOS).

The number of advisers can be reduced in smaller missions by double-hatting the functions and skipping the coordinating function of the CGAD, nevertheless, all advisory functions need to be covered.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – The list of Acronyms is after slide 7.

Slide 7



Key Message: The basic structure of a large-scale mission's FHQ, consists of three main entities: Operations; Operations Support; and Personnel, Evaluation and Training, each headed by a Deputy Force Chief of Staff (DFCOS).

The size and organisation of these entities vary depending on the requirements; the functions of an FHQ should be arranged and regrouped to provide optimal responses to mandated tasks. Most advisory functions to the HOMC/FC can be administered through the Chief General Adviser (CGAD) to organise access to information from the FC to the different advisory positions.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – List of Acronyms of Slides 5, 6 and 7:

- FC – Force Commander
- DFC – Deputy Force Commander
- CMO – Chief Military Observer
- DCMO – Deputy Chief Military Observer
- FCOS – Force Chief Of Staff
- FLegAd – Force Legal Advisor
- FPM – Force Provost Marshall
- MGA – Military Gender Adviser

- MPA – Military Political Adviser
- FMO – Force Medical Officer
- CGAD – Chief General Adviser
- DFCOS PET – Deputy Force Chief of Staff for Personnel, Evaluation and Training
- DFCOS Ops – Deputy Force Chief of Staff for Operations
- DFCOS Spt – Deputy Force Chief of Staff for Support
- MPIO – Military Public Information Officer
- BPO – Best Practice Officer
- MOC – Military Operations Centre
- UN MPK-I – UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence

Slide 8



Key Message: The Force/Sector Chief of Staff (F/S COS) is the Commander's principal assistant for directing, coordinating, supervising, and training the staff of the F/S HQ. The F/S COS is responsible to advice the FC/SC on military operational matters in the mission area. The F/S COS should endeavour to understand the 'commander's intent' to free the Commander from routine activities. The F/S COS directs staff tasks, conducts staff coordination, manages staff processes, and ensures that the staff works efficiently.

Tasks and responsibilities for the F/S COS are (list is not limited):

- Directing (coordinating) and supervising all planning processes.
- Organizing the preparation, coordination, authentication, publishing, and distributing the OPORDs, FRAGOs, and WARNORDs to which other Staff Branches contribute.
- Establishing the operational rhythm, tempo and outputs of the staff.
- Reviewing plans and orders for the SHQs or for subordinate units.
- Managing the commander's priority requirements.
- Organizing and conducting staff training.
- Supervising tasks assigned to the staff.
- Ensuring the staff integrates and coordinates its activities.
- Ensuring resources allocation and organisational management.

Slide 9



Key Message: Military Staff Officers (MSOs) are responsible for collating information and analysing the implications and consequences for the mission and operations. MSOs must provide timely and accurate recommendations to the FC/SC via chain of command to support the best possible decisions. They further assist the FC/SC in exercising "UN command and control" of all military contributions, in coordinating and supervising the execution of plans, operations, and activities.

The authority of MSOs is limited to their functional branch. MSOs advise, plan, coordinate, and integrate activities and personnel resources of the respective functional unit.

Some of the common staff activities include, but are not limited to:

- Advising and providing information to the FC/SC. Provide timely and continuous information to the commander to keep the FC/SC aware of the situation.
- Preparing, updating, and maintaining estimates. Develop options or courses of action (COA) to assist the commander in decision-making based on facts, events, conclusions and recommendations.
- Preparing plans and orders. Prepare and issue plans and orders to carry out the commander's decisions.
- Gathering, processing, analysing, and disseminating Information. Collect, collate, analyse, process, and disseminate information that flows continuously into the headquarters.
- Conducting training. Assess training requirements in respective functional area.

- Performing staff assistance visits. Visit subordinate units to obtain information, observe execution of orders/instructions, advise/assist on implementation measures and keep the commander informed.

- Monitoring Execution of Decisions. Ensure that decisions reach the subordinate units and carry out the commander's decisions.

Often forgotten is that staff do not have authority over subordinate units. Their role is to support and advise the commander for them to make an informed decision.

In general, staff officers are organised into branches. These functional branches are assigned a letter/number to specify a role. Numbers are assigned according to function and not hierarchy.

Slide 10



Key Message: A FHQ is structured with different branches to assign and coordinate the mandated tasks accordingly. Each branch has its own function and responsibilities, thus maintaining its own structure.

The general staff system used by various militaries around the world does vary; however, most will have a similar structure to the UN's:

- U1 – Personnel and Administration
- U2 - Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence
- U3 – Operations
- U4 – Logistics
- U5 – Plans and Policy
- U6 - Communications
- U7 – Military Training
- U8 – Military Engineering
- U9 – UN Civil-Military-Coordination

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** In many national armies, the General Staff (Land Component) is preceded by a "G" (G1, G2, G3, etc.), the Air Force by an "A" (A1, A2, A3, etc.), and the Navy by an "N" (N1, N2, N3, etc.). Within United Nations Peace Operations, the majority of the Force Headquarters adopts "U" for their staff (U1, U2, U3, etc.), sectors use "G" (G1, G2, G3, etc.), and units use "S" (S1, S2, S3, etc.).

Slide 11

Key Message: The U-1 Staff Branch deals with all matters concerning human resources, including personnel readiness/services, and HQ management. The Chief U-1 is also acting as Chief Military Personnel Officer (CMPO) in missions without a DFCOS PET.

U-1 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Monitor unit strength status and reporting monthly military strength to UNHQ.
- Manage personnel replacement (receive, account, process, and deliver personnel, request and allocate individual replacements).
- Coordinate and integrate personnel plans and procedures for local civilian staff support to FHQ.
- Ensure casualty reporting through the chain of command and maintain casualty data in coordination with Force Medical Officer.
- Arrange and coordinate UN Medal Awards for FHQ staff and TCC with Protocol Section.
- Arrange Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander hand-over/take-over.
- Staff planning and supervising, this includes morale support activities, including recreational and fitness activities.
- Ensure the timely preparation and submission of performance evaluations for designated individuals in accordance with the established UN guidelines.
- Postal operations (operational and technical control).
- Responsible, in coordination with the mission's Conduct and Discipline Team, for conduct and discipline arrangements of all military personnel including aspects of prevention and response to alleged misconduct.
- Management (recommending manpower allocation).
- Act as lead for implementing Screening and Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

Slide 12



Key Message: The U-2 Staff Branch deals with all matters concerning UN MPK-I and military security operations within the FHQ. The U-2 Branch plans and coordinates the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle. It also provides accurate and comprehensive situational awareness to the HOMC/FC on all matters which could affect the fulfilment of the Mission/Force Objectives.

U-2 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Support HOMC/FC with short/medium/long-term UN MPK-I for the accomplishment of military objectives in the mission.
- Manage the UN MPK-I Cycle through the direction, acquisition, analysis and dissemination phases. This is to ensure that the Force Commander's decision-making process is fully supported with timely, succinct, and relevant peacekeeping-intelligence products.
- Ensure that its information acquisition activities are conducted in support of mission and force Priority Information Requirements (PIR) and other Information Requirements (IRs).
- Prepare and update the Intelligence Collection Plan/IAP and Intelligence Preparation of Area.
- Ensure that all incoming information is collated on a central database, and available to the relevant personnel.
- Give early warning of all threats to mandate implementation, with a special emphasis on force protection, the protection of civilians.
- Identify relevant trends.
- Ensure that the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimate is complete and up-to-date.
- Support all operations with a Short Peacekeeping-Intelligence Estimate.

- Conduct a full Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) and Actor Analysis for the entire Area Of Responsibility (AOR).
- Ensure that all relevant information and peacekeeping-intelligence are provided to higher and subordinate HQs in a timely fashion.
- Coordinate all peacekeeping-intelligence-related activities in the AOR including coordination with JMAC, UNPOL and other stakeholders.

Slide 13



Key Message: The U-3 Military Operations Branch deals with all matters concerning operations and force deployment and is composed of different cells: MOC, Current Operations, U-3/5, Air Operations, and – if applicable – Maritime Operations and Information Operations. All cells are headed by separate chiefs.

U-3 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Prepare, coordinate, authenticate, publish, and distribute the FHQ SOP, FRAGOs and WARNORDs – in close coordination with U-5.
- Coordinate with U-2 on the operation of ISR assets and provide information requirements to U-2 if the mission is operating these assets.
- Plan troop movements, including route selection, priority of movement, timing, providing of security, quartering, staging, and preparation of the movement orders.
- Establish a 24/7 Military Operations Centre (MOC).
- Coordinate and direct terrain management and pay attention to environmental restrictions (overall ground manager).
- Recommend the general locations of command posts and Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs).
- Recommend task organisation and assign missions to subordinate military elements as per approved plans.
- Force protection.
- Information operations.
- Coordinate support to humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, if requested by humanitarian leadership.
- Coordinate POC activities with Police Component and other entities as required.

- Coordinate with the DDR team (if part of the mission).
- Coordinate with the Human Rights component. Monitor and report Human Rights Violations.
- Operate 24-hour Situation Centre or provide duty officers to JOC.
- Air Ops: If it is not an independent branch, synchronize Air Operations with Operations Staff Branch and Coordinate with U-2 or the Information and Communication Centre to operate the reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
- Maritime Ops: If it is not an independent branch, synchronize and coordinate maritime operations with Operations Staff Branch.

Slide 14



Key Message: The U-4 Staff Branch is the principal adviser to the HOMC/FC on the overall logistics that affect military operations and works closely with the Mission Support Division (MSD) in the fulfilment of the logistics requirements of the force.

U-4 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Advise the FC on all matters pertaining to logistics support of the mission's forces.
- Work in conjunction with U-5 and MSD to facilitate a smooth and efficient troop rotation.
- Plan, coordinate and facilitate logistics support in conjunction with MSD.
- Ensure close logistics support to Military Component during crisis situations.
- In close consultation with DMS/CMS, provide logistics policy and procedural guidance for the MC.
- Serve as the FHQ focal point for coordination of logistics support.
- Inform the FHQ of logistics support impacting mission accomplishment.
- Monitor and synchronise logistics support through liaison with MSD to exchange information and resolve problems at the lowest practical level.
- Act as the coordination interface between the FHQ and MSD.
- Plan logistics support to humanitarian assistance/disaster response, as required and requested by humanitarian leadership.
- Participate in all planning operations with U-5, U-3/5 and U-3 to ensure logistics considerations and needs of the force are included in all tasking from the FHQ.

Slide 15



Key Message: The U-5 Staff Branch is responsible for conducting future planning and the provision of advice to the FC on military plans and policy issues. These are guided by existing higher direction (Mandate, CONOPS, ROE, SOFA, Mission Plan, etc..), specific guidance from FC/DFC/FCOS, operational environment and anticipated future challenges.

U-5 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Perform long-term planning with MHQ, follow-on phase planning, and contingency planning.
- Perform intermission planning in close coordination with other UN PKOs.
- Prepare FHQ OPORDs, OPLANs and CONPLANs, Military Coordination Order with support of U3 or U-3/5), U-2 and others.
- Responsible for Military Operations Assessment including MOAWG/B with other staff inputs.
- Manages the OPLAN including Reviews/ revisions.
- Integrate appropriate staff/component involvement into plans and maintain oversight of the entire planning process within the FHQ.
- Coordinate strategic and operational planning issues and guidance.
- Develop, coordinate, and implement FHQ policy issues.
- Review HOMC/FC's operational plans for adequacy and ensure compliance with FHQ guidance and policies.
- Advise the HOMC/FC on political-military aspects of operations.

- Coordinate with the Human Rights component to integrate Human Rights and IHL advice and analysis into military planning. Foresee the potential Human Rights implications of an operation and plan for preventive measures.
- Coordinate for the provision of potential support to humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, as required.
- Act as military lead in integrated planning process and support missions SPCC (Strategic Planning and Coordination Cell).
- Coordinate with Civilian Component (substantive sections) and Police Component
- Act as lead staff branch for interaction with OMA.
- Act as lead for preparation of Military Component Work Plan.
- Act as military lead in support of mission's Protection of Civilian implementation plans.

Slide 16



Key Message: The U-6 Staff Branch is responsible for all matters concerning military communications and Information Technology (IT).

U-6 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Advise the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on communications requirements, operations and network priorities.
- Prepare, maintain and update command, control, communications, and computer operations, operation estimates, plans, and orders.
- Prepare a Communication Plan in line with the Mission OPLAN.
- Coordinate, plan, and manage EM spectrum within the area of responsibility.
- Develop, produce, change/update, and distribute signals operating instructions and SOPs for command posts to ensure effective and reliable communications.
- Establish communications policies and procedures for the use and management of information tools and resources.
- In conjunction with Field Technology Service (FTS), plan and coordinate with higher and lower headquarters regarding information systems integration, upgrades, replacement and elimination.
- Coordinate, plan and direct all information architecture activities and communications operations vulnerability and risk assessments.
- Coordinate with a variety of external agencies to develop the information and communications plans, manage the information network, obtain required services, and support Mission requirements.
- Facilitate the distribution of communications equipment (including mobile phones for staff) and collection of non-operational equipment.

Slide 17



Key Message: The U7 is responsible for military induction training, in-mission training, establishing the training needs of military contingents and supporting the IMTC in the delivery of training to the Military Component.

U7 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Implement and monitor Force annual training programme.
- Plan, coordinate, and where appropriate supervise troop exercises.
- Prepare training guidance for the HOMC/FC approval.
- Identify training requirements, based on the Mandate, situation, and training status.
- Ensure that training requirements reflect the conditions and standards of UN guidance.
- Determine the requirements for and allocation of training resources.
- Plan and conduct operational readiness confirmations and evaluations required.
- Compile training records and reports as appropriate.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct periodic training for Sector Commanders and/or Battalion Commanders/selected officers with emphasis on following aspects:
    - Mission mandate(s).
    - ROEs.
    - CONOPS.
    - Mission Plan.
    - SOFA.
    - Essential operational orders.
    - Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law aspects.

Slide 18



Key Message: The primary responsibility of U-8 Branch is to plan, coordinate and implement the assigned engineer tasks (field/combat and construction) in accordance with mission priorities. This cell may be attached to U-3 depending on the operational requirement.

In a peacekeeping operation, engineers may be engaged in humanitarian and non-military activities. Often, peacekeeping engineer units are required to support the rebuilding infrastructure of host countries. This entails supporting civilian construction projects that are deemed crucial to implementing the UN mandate.

U-8 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Advise HOMC/FC, Force HQ Staff, Chief Integrated Support Services and Chief Engineer on military engineering resources, capabilities and employment.
- Develop Force Engineer support plans and programmes.
- Assess mine, IED and Explosive Ordnance threats and develop counter EO/IED SOPs and measures (with United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), if deployed).
- Plan, coordinate, implement and monitor counter IED, de-mining and EOD tasks under military domain.
- Coordinate, liaise and assist mission EOD/de-mining resources and other UN partners in the planning of EOD and de-mining operations.
- Provide Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) advice, if necessary, to the HOMC/FC.
- Maintain close liaison with Mission Engineer Section and other relevant offices for daily operation and management of engineering works/projects.
- Monitor and supervise the utilization of Military Engineering resources.

- Vet all engineering task orders for accuracy, relevance, and correctness and disseminate once approved.
- Ensure timely, accountable and cost-effective delivery of engineering support by Military Engineering Contingents.
- Identify military engineering shortfalls and advise Force leadership on alternative resources and solutions.
- Coordinate humanitarian and non-military activities assigned to military engineers.
- Assess, coordinate and assist mission response to severe weather impacts and natural/man-made disasters.
- Assist environmental protection programme managers to ensure that all projects are carried out in accordance with UN environmental policies and guidance.
- Prepare project concepts including design specifications, engineering plan and estimation of all construction and maintenance projects under Military Engineers domain.
- Prepare and submit Project Status Reports periodically.
- Develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive Quality Control Program to assure that all engineering, construction, equipment and workmanship provided for assigned projects are in compliance with required standards and sound engineering and construction practices.
- Develop methodologies and tools to enable full development and control of military engineering equipment.
- Coordinate explosive hazards awareness training of Military Component and local population (in coordination of UNMAS if in situ).
- Flood and other natural disasters management and mitigation measures.
- Technical and financial approval of UN-CIMIC Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).
- Coordinator for the UN-CIMIC QIPs.

Slide 19



Key Message: The U-9 facilitates the interaction between the Military Component and other entities in the mission area, such as UN humanitarian and developmental actors, host country civilian authorities and population, women's groups, governmental and regional organisations, IOs, NGOs, etc.

In most areas of operation, OCHA has established dedicated UN-CMCoord coordination platforms to allow for the continuous dialogue between humanitarian and military entities. Effective participation in these platforms will help inform the mission's UN-CIMIC policy and mitigate the risk of negatively impacting the civilian populations and humanitarian assistance programs. They are a key platform intended to facilitate the sharing of information thereby contributing to a common situational awareness.

U-9 Staff Branch Responsibilities:

- Coordinate the military UN-CIMIC operations with other UN agencies; and non-governmental, private voluntary, and international organisations in the area of operations throughout established UN-CMCoord coordination mechanisms as and where relevant.
- Plan positive and continuous community relations programs to gain and maintain host nation support and goodwill, and to support military operations in consultation with humanitarian and development actors through established coordination mechanisms.
- Provide the U-2 operational information gained from civilians in the area of operations.
- Coordinate with the U-3 on trends in public opinion.
- Coordinate with the Military Public Information and the U-3 to ensure that the disseminated information is not contradictory.
- Provide guidance to TCC units in identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support the civilian populations and strengthen the host nation development in

consultation with humanitarian and development actors through established coordination mechanisms.

- Assist the U-3 with inputs for Information Operations.
- Coordinate with the Engagement Platoons of the UN Infantry Battalions to give guidance for engagement with local community.
- Coordinate with humanitarian civil assistance and disaster relief (emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians) through established UN-CMCoord coordination mechanisms as and where relevant.
- Coordinate with mission civil affairs section.
- Facilitate information sharing and planning for the provision of support to humanitarian assistance operations with other staff units, as required.
- Represent the mission/force in UN-CMCoord coordination platforms and, if requested, the humanitarian Protection Cluster (led by UNHCR).
- Act as the Force's focal point for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

Slide 20



Key Message: In addition to the staff branches under the coordination of the FCOS, there are certain specific positions directly connected to the HQ's leadership that do not fit into any branch.

Firstly, the HOMC/FC, the DFC (or Deputy HOMC), and the FCOS require personal assistants to organise schedules and office work. Depending on the mission's size and structure, there may be one or more Military Assistant(s) (MA), Personal Assistants (PA), or even a group of assistants.

Secondly, there are designated positions for direct advisers to the HQ's leadership. Due to the mandated tasks and responsibilities for UN PKOs, the number of advisers needed has significantly increased. Depending on the mission mandate, its structure, and HQ's size, it might be necessary to establish a special "General Advisory Group".

Depending on the mission's size and structure, as well as the mandated tasks, it might not be necessary to have designated positions for each of those advisers, and some might have dual roles. However, it must be ensured that the functions and responsibilities of each adviser-position are fully covered.

These advisers usually include the Force Legal Adviser, Force Medical Officer, Force Provost Marshall, Military Gender Adviser, etc.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – For detailed information on the main responsibilities for each adviser, refer to the UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook (2023).

Slide 21



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- Multidimensional integrated missions are structured to ensure optimum command, control and coordination between all actors.
- Missions are configured as per their relative strength and complexity.
- All staff officers need to understand their own roles and responsibilities and be aware of those of other departments to ensure proper coordination.

Slide 22



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Distribute copies of the charts illustrating MHQ structures of different types of missions to all groups.

- Allocate ten (10) minutes for participants to discuss and write down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class

- Facilitator Notes:

- Ensure participants focus on the major responsibilities of each Military staff branch.

- Encourage participants to explain the potential coordination required among different staff branches.
- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Module

2

Legal Framework

Module 2 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to provide staff officers with the key legal framework governing mission-specific and cross-cutting thematic mandates in UN Peace Operations and identify its main instruments and content.

At the end of this module, you should understand what this legal framework enables/obliges peacekeepers to do as well as what it prevents them from doing according to this comprehensive legal framework.

Relevance

Module 2 explains the legal framework for UN Peace Operations. It presents an overview of international human rights, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law principles relevant to Staff Officers. It also sets out the UN peacekeeping policies that implement these principles. In addition, it explains privileges and immunities that legally protect military components, without allowing peacekeepers impunity for actual wrongdoing.

This module relates to and expands upon the information presented in the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) on the Legal Basis of UN Peacekeeping.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this Module, participants will be able to:

- Identify the key international law obligations and protections guiding UN missions and their military
- Identify typical violations of international human rights law, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law
- Describe a course of action to be followed in line with UN obligations
- Explain how peacekeeping mission-specific legal framework guides and protects the work

Overview

Module 2: Legal Framework comprises of two lessons that are structured to help achieve the learning objectives:

- Lesson 2.1: International Law for MSOs in Field Missions
- Lesson 2.2: Peace Operations-specific International Law

Module 2 - Introduction

Slide 1

Key Message: Module 2 explains the legal framework for UN peace operations. It presents an overview of international human rights, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law principles relevant to Staff Officers. It also sets out the UN peacekeeping policies that implement these principles. In addition, it explains privileges and immunities that legally protect military components, without allowing peacekeepers impunity for intentional wrongdoing.

This module relates to and expands upon the information presented in the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) on the Legal Basis of UN Peacekeeping.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the Lessons we will cover in this Module.

Slide 3

Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Identify the key international law obligations and protections guiding UN missions and their military
- Identify typical violations of international human rights law, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law
- Describe a course of action to be followed in line with UN obligations
- Explain how peacekeeping mission-specific legal framework guides and protects the work

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Lesson
2.1

International Law for MSOs in Field Missions

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 2.1 explains the international human rights, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law principles relevant for UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs). It also sets out the UN peacekeeping policies that implement these principles.

Relevance

The objective of this Lesson is to ensure that MSOs support the authority, command and control of the UN military component and its operations in line with international law and the UN policies based on it.

To fulfil peacekeeping mandates effectively and legitimately, the UN military must be organised, commanded and controlled in line with international law and the United Nations policies based on it.

Notes:

a) The term 'International Law' commonly refers to a body of laws that govern the legal relations between or among States and international organisations. These training materials look at international law as a combination of binding law ("hard law") and non-binding law ("soft law"). Binding law refers to rules that are legally binding and that States must therefore apply, such as treaty law (i.e. conventions, agreements and protocols), as well as customary law. Treaties ultimately become binding through a process of negotiation, adoption and signature, followed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

b) The components of international law most relevant for the work of peacekeepers, including MSOs, are International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law and International Criminal Law.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Identify the key international law obligations and protections guiding UN missions and their military
- Identify typical violations of international human rights law, humanitarian, refugee, and criminal law
- Explain the course of action to be followed in line with UN obligations

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	4
Lesson Content	5
Learning Outcomes	6
The Lesson	7 - 35
Summary of Key Messages	36
Learning Activities	Throughout the Lesson

Slide 4

Key Message: Lesson 2.1 explains the international human rights, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law principles relevant for UN Military Staff Officers. It also sets out the UN peacekeeping policies that implement these principles.

The objective of this Lesson is to ensure that UN staff officers support the authority, command and control of the UN military component and its operations in line with international law and United Nations related policies.

To fulfil peacekeeping mandates effectively and legitimately, the UN military must be organised, commanded and controlled in line with international law and United Nations related policies.

Slide 5



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 6



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Identify the key international law obligations and protections guiding UN missions and their military
- Identify typical violations of international human rights law, humanitarian, refugee, and criminal law
- Explain the course of action to be followed in line with UN obligations

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 7



Key message: UN military components are subject to binding legal rules, beginning with those outlined in the Charter of the United Nations.

At the top of the hierarchy of norms depicted in this slide is the UN Charter (often referred to as the "UN's constitution") and fundamental norms of general international law. All, including the Security Council must respect these norms, as evidenced by its practice. For instance, a peacekeeping mission cannot be mandated to attack civilians or push back refugees to places where their lives are at risk, as doing so would constitute breaches of fundamental norms of international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law.

Slide 8



Key Message: The Charter of the UN, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, serves as the foundational document for all UN work.

The Charter grants the UN Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In fulfilling this duty, the Security Council may take various measures, including authorising the establishment of UN peacekeeping operations.

The legal basis for such actions is found in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter. Chapter VI addresses the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," Chapter VII contains provisions regarding "Action with Respect to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," and Chapter VIII pertains to "Regional Arrangements".

Slide 9



Key Message: Peacekeepers must respect international law and actively protect human beings against violations.

In addition to ensuring peace and security and promoting development, the UN Charter commits the UN to promote and encourage respect for human rights. Therefore, all peace mission personnel must respect human rights; they cannot violate them, such as by inhumanely treating detainees.

Moreover, missions must promote and protect human rights. Most of the large modern missions have special mandates to promote and protect human rights that all peacekeepers must work toward as an "all of mission responsibility." Furthermore, the UN Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations requires all missions to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandate, even if they do not have an explicit human rights mandate or human rights component. For example, UN blue helmets developing a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme under the mission's mandate should strive to ensure non-discrimination between women and men, allowing women and girls associated with armed groups to benefit from the DDR program.

Established by international law and founded to uphold an international order based on law, the UN and its peacekeepers also have a special responsibility to respect, promote and protect international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the "law of armed conflict"), international refugee law, and international criminal law.

Slide 10

Key Message: Human rights underpin all UN peacekeeping work.

Briefly recall the key features of IHRL, as covered in greater detail in the CPTM:

- Human rights are universal.
- Everyone is entitled to the same fundamental rights.
- There are some groups, who may have specific needs or are particularly at risk of discrimination and rights violations. These have been given specific rights protections (e.g., children, women, indigenous people, persons with disabilities).
- IHRL always applies, including during armed conflict and other national emergencies (because that is when human rights are mostly under threat).

First and foremost, states must respect human rights and protect their population from threats by private actors (e.g., by diligently arresting and prosecuting perpetrators for rape). Furthermore, it is widely accepted today that armed groups with effective control over territory also have human rights obligations. In any case, UN practice considers armed groups committing atrocities, such as summary executions, rape, torture, or looting, to engage in human rights abuses.

UN policy (also summarized in the UN Blue Helmet Code of Conduct) also accepts that UN missions and personnel must uphold human rights in their work. Example: The UN would not be allowed to discriminate on the basis of religion in its hiring practices or use excessive force in violation of the right to life.

Reminder – violation (actors/signatories) vs abuse (non-signatories).

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Ask participants who is entitled to human rights, and whose responsibility it is to protect them? Answers should include that every human being enjoys human rights, and that state authorities are primarily responsible for upholding them.
b) The Facilitator can explain the image on the slide. UN Photo shows the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where member states join to advance and protect human rights.

Slide 11



The information provided by the boy points to the following violations:

- If the militia shot at civilians, this constitutes an intentional attack directed against civilians, amounting to a war crime, a violation of IHL, and a violation of the right to life.
- If the attackers shot randomly at both enemy fighters and civilians, this would be an indiscriminate attack, which is a war crime violating both IHL and human rights.
- The villagers are victims of arbitrary displacement. If systematic or widespread, this can be considered a crime against humanity. Being forced to flee from their homes also violates their right to housing and their freedom of movement, which includes the right not to be forced to move.
- The theft of the cattle entails the war crime and IHL violations of pillaging. This endangers the villagers' human rights to food and livelihoods. Because they have to survive in the swamps, their right to clean water and health is also seriously threatened. In practice, the denial of clean water and healthcare might even result in more civilian deaths than the initial attack itself.
- If UN Staff Officers receive such reports, they must diligently share this information with the human rights component and the protection of civilians coordination structure. Humanitarian actors must also be informed so they can provide support and follow-up. The name and contact details of the witness(es) must be treated with confidentially, notably by not including it in any reports that are widely shared in the mission.

☞***Note to instructor*** – The UN Photo shows a boy in South Sudan, where the civilian population has often fled to vast swamp wetlands to protect themselves from violations by parties to armed conflict.

Slide 12



The following points should come out of the case study discussion:

- There is a risk that the United Nations will appear to be linked to the war crimes of the private military company if it carries out a joint operation with the host state army and the private military company partakes in the same operation. It does not matter whether the war crimes have been proven in a court of law or not; the reputation of the United Nations may be stained based on the reported violations of the private military company alone. Perhaps even more importantly, UN resources (for instance, fuel provided to the host state army) may be diverted to the private company and assist its war crimes.
- It is typical that joint operations with host state forces and other armed actors in peacekeeping settings create human rights risks and related reputational risks for the United Nations. These risks have to be carefully assessed and mitigated before commencing cooperation with other armed actors. In this situation, for instance, the United Nations might insist that the private military company be excluded from any operations carried out jointly with the United Nations, certainly as long as reported cases of war crimes have not yet been properly investigated and prosecuted by state authorities.

For dealing with such difficult cases, the United Nations Secretary-General has promulgated the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-UN Security Forces, with which every Staff Officer should be familiar. The basic features of the HRDDP and its implementation are set out in the following slides.

Slide 13

Key Message: By preventing undue linkages between the UN and human rights abusing non-UN security forces, the HRDDP protects the United Nations from legal liabilities and reputational risks, while allowing it to promote human rights.

According to the HRDDP, support to non-UN security forces cannot be provided:

- where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights, or refugee law,
- and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures.

The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is binding for the entire United Nations (not just peacekeepers). It was established by the Secretary-General and the Security Council has repeatedly endorsed it.

All UN entities that plan to provide support to non-UN security forces must therefore conduct an assessment of the risks involved in providing or not providing such support. The assessment needs to consider the risk of the recipients committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law. Furthermore, the UN has to consider whether there are any mitigation measures that can reduce the risk of violations (e.g., by increasing training or excluding problematic units from support).

The HRDDP serves to ensure that the UN does not support or collaborate with host state elements that are involved in grave violations of human rights, IHL or refugee law. The

policy serves to protect the United Nations from aiding legal liability for inadvertently aiding violations committed by others.

Distancing the UN from state forces involved in grave violations also protects the UN's reputation and impartiality.

☞***Note to instructor -*** UN Photo shows MONUC providing transport to national army units in the Democratic Republic of Congo. When the UN found that some national army units who received UN support were violating human rights, the Security Council made further MONUC support conditional on compliance with human rights. The HRDDP was established against the backdrop of MONUC's conditionality policy.

Slide 14

Key message: The HRDDP is a tool to mitigate risks and engage with security force partners. First, it should be attempted to mitigate assessed risks (see following slide), and raise concerns with partners. Support can be suspended or withdrawn as a measure of last resort.

Any support provided by the UN to non-UN security forces must follow the HRDDP. Relevant support provided by peace operations may include; conduct of joint operations, planning support, sharing of intelligence, training, capacity building, mentoring, technical cooperation, and financial support. Certain areas are exempted:

- Training and engagement on IHL and human rights.
- Mediation-related support (e.g., transporting officers to peace negotiations).
- Medical evacuation.

The HRDDP also covers support provided to regional organisations, for instance, support to African Union peace and security operations.

Missions have established task forces and standard operating procedures to help assess risks, coordinate engagement with supported entities and devise measures to mitigate the risks. Staff officers working with host state forces should be familiar with the mission-specific arrangements.

The mission will work with host state partners to bring the risk of violations down to an acceptable level. However, where support recipients continue to commit grave violations, the mission may have to temporarily suspend or altogether withdraw its support to them.

☞***Note to instructor -*** The UN Photo shows a UN police officer providing training to the Haitian National Police, which would be subject to a prior HRDDP risk assessment.

Slide 15

Key message: Joint operations with host state forces often involve human rights risks but mitigating measures can be taken to reduce the risk and leverage UN support to improve host state forces compliance with international law.

In joint security operations, the risk of the UN being seen as associated with violations committed by other forces is particularly high. Missions can take common and precautionary measures to mitigate the risks of violations:

- A joint operation involving UN and host state military should always be based on joint planning that also covers unexpected contingencies.
- After any operation there should be a joint After-Action Review to learn from the operation and review how to further reduce the risk of violations in future operations.
- It should be established prior to the operation, exactly which national commanders and units are taking part in the joint operation. Based on background checks (usually done with the support of human rights components) units and commanders with a problematic human rights/IHL compliance record should be excluded.
- If despite all measures, some national forces engaged in grave violations, the mission must insist that the individuals concerned are investigated and prosecuted so as to deter violations in future operations and re-establish trust in the eyes of the local population.

Slide 16

Key message: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) must be respected by parties to armed conflict and, for as long as they engage in military hostilities, military peacekeepers.

States forces engaged in an international armed conflict must respect IHL. In a non-international armed conflict (the more typical case for a contemporary peace mission setting), the state military forces, and the non-state armed groups involved must abide by IHL.

Since impartiality is a central principle of peacekeeping, UN military forces are generally not a party to the conflict. However, IHL may apply temporarily to them for as long as they engage as combatants in armed conflict. Example: a peacekeeping force carries out an offensive operation against an armed group that poses a grave threat to civilians.

IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities. Example: Requiring parties to minimize as far as possible the harm to civilians not participating in the hostilities. It also outlaws certain means of war to reduce unnecessary suffering by civilians or combatants. Example: prohibition of the use of any chemical or poisonous weapons in warfare.

Parties must respect IHL themselves and they must ensure that others respect it as well. Example: In accordance with its obligation to ensure respect for IHL, a state has a duty to prosecute and punish non-state armed group members who commit serious violations of IHL amounting to war crimes.

☞ ***Note:*** The slide shows the emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which initiated the development of humanitarian law in the 19th century. The ICRC remains the neutral and credible guardian of IHL in conflict areas across the world.

Slide 17



Key Message: Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), civilians, unless confirmed as members of armed forces or groups, are entitled to protection, even if they possess arms for self-defence or protection of property. Additionally, individuals hors de combat, including wounded or sick combatants, must be treated humanely, while prisoners of war (POWs) and detained fighters enjoy special protections. Peacekeepers, regardless of their role, are safeguarded under international law, making attacks against them potentially constituting a war crime.

Under IHL, any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. In case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and accorded the protection owed to civilians until determined otherwise. Civilians may be in the possession of arms, without necessarily being combatants. Under international humanitarian law, civilians who are in possession of arms, for example, for the purpose of self-defence and the protection of their property but who have not been or are not currently engaged in hostilities are entitled to protection.

Members of armed forces or armed groups that are hors de combat ('out of battle") also enjoy protection under international humanitarian law. Notably, those who can no longer engage in combat because they are wounded and sick must not be attacked but collected and medically cared for.

Prisoners of war (POWs) and interned/detained armed group fighters enjoy special protection. They must be treated humanely in all circumstances and not be subjected to any humiliating and degrading treatment. Unlike regular soldiers who become POWs, captured rebel fighters may be prosecuted for their participation in the armed conflict.

However, this must be done before "a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" (see Common Art. 3 Geneva Conventions).

Peacekeepers, regardless of whether they are military, police or civilians, are protected under international law. Directing attacks against them may amount to a war crime.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Ask participants whom they consider a civilian in the two pictures. The armed herder on the right may well be a civilian who is only armed to protect himself and his cattle from marauders. In many mission settings, armed civilians are a common sight and carrying weapons like assault rifles does not necessarily mean that they are participants in hostilities between militarily organized parties to conflict.

Slide 18



Discuss the case in plenary or through group discussions. The debriefing should bring out the following key points:

- IHL also protects combatants who can no longer take part in hostilities, notably because they are incapacitated (hors de combat), injured, have surrendered, or are detained.
- Wounded persons such as the injured fighter, in this case, must receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. No distinction shall be made among the wounded on any grounds other than medical ones, i.e., the host state army must provide this detainee with the same level of medical attention that it would give to its own forces.
- Medical attention must not be withheld to extract information since this would violate the obligation to treat all detainees humanely that can be found in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Given that the fighter's grave suffering is used as leverage to obtain information, withholding medical aid contrary to the UN's obligations would also constitute a form of cruel treatment and torture, which is prohibited under IHL (and human rights law). It does not matter that the fighter may be able to reveal crucial information about explosives that may harm the mission. The prohibition of torture under international law is absolute and may not be breached even to extract life-saving information. From an operational perspective, it is also highly unlikely that the fighter would provide accurate information under the circumstances because torture most often leads to faulty intelligence.
- The patrol should record the case and pass on the information to the local human rights section. If the context allows for a peer-to-peer dialogue, it should advise the camp's military commander that IHL requires them to give immediate treatment to the

injured fighter and that withholding it to extract information may amount to the war crime of torture.

The United Nations embraces a standard approach of non-coercive interviewing, which is detailed in the 2023 The UN Manual on Investigative Interviewing for Criminal Investigation. UN personnel engaged in any interviews (interrogations) of detainees or others should familiarize themselves with this very effective approach and apply it.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) The 2023 UN Manual on Investigative Interviewing for Criminal Investigation aims to provide a comprehensive framework for conducting non-coercive interviews and is based on growing evidence-based research, normative legal frameworks that prohibit torture, and the Principles on Effective Interviewing for Investigation and Information Gathering, also known as the Méndez Principles.

b) You may wish to use slide 27 for the debriefing.

Slide 19



Key message: The wounded, medical personnel and facilities enjoy special protection in armed conflict.

Conflict parties must provide the wounded and sick with medical care. This medical care has to be provided promptly and without distinction. The injured must be prioritized based on medical need, i.e., a conflict party cannot treat its own soldiers first and only later those of the adversary party.

Civilian and military personnel, facilities and transports exclusively assigned to medical duties are protected in all circumstances. Attacks on them are war crimes. Conflict parties can still detain injured soldiers of the adversary that fall into their hands (e.g., where they capture an area containing a military hospital) but they then assume a responsibility to provide those soldiers with continued medical care.

It is prohibited to improperly use the Red Cross' distinctive emblems, especially for military purposes. The photo shows the different emblems that may be used depending on the cultural and religious context where the conflict takes place.

Notes to instructor:

Ask the participants - Can a military medic, wearing the Red Cross emblem, carry a weapon? Is this an improper use of the Emblem.

Answer: Yes, they can, and they can use the weapon to defend themselves and those they are entrusted to care for and protect under the same Mission ROE. They should not however, be engaging in offensive operations while wearing the emblem.

Slide 20



Key message: During the conduct of hostilities, conflict parties must respect the basic principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality.

Distinction: To ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, parties to the conflict at all times have to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian and military objects. Operations must only be directed against military objects. Indiscriminate attacks that do not distinguish between civilians and combatants are prohibited. Example of violation:

- Shelling an entire village with heavy artillery without trying to distinguish between military targets and civilian homes.

Precaution: In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Examples of violations:

- Before launching an assault, no effort is made to verify that the target is actually a military target.
- Soldiers take their position too close to civilians, placing them at risk of getting in the crossfire.

Proportionality: Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. This means that when considering a target, the damage to civilians and their property cannot be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained.

Proportionality is not an issue if the target is purely military, and no civilians are nearby. Example of violation:

- Bombing a private home housing dozens of civilians to kill one ordinary soldier who took shelter there.

Slide 21



A plenary or group discussion should bring out the following key points related to precaution and proportionality:

- The UN can defend itself against the military-level attack with full military force but has to respect the basic principles of IHL.
- The mortar has been placed by the armed group in a densely populated civilian area (the village), in clear violation of international humanitarian law, which requires to keep military targets away from civilian populations.
- Notwithstanding the armed group's illegal conduct, the United Nations must still take precautions to minimize incidental civilian losses in its response and not cause disproportional civilian harm. In particular, shelling the armed group position may lead to disproportional civilian losses among the children. Depending on the exact circumstances of the situation, a more appropriate defensive action might be to lead an infantry assault to destroy the mortar.
- The case indicates a potential serious planning error on the part of the United Nations, because of siting its compound in the immediate vicinity of a densely populated area. United Nations peacekeeping bases should always be constructed away from civilian objects and guarantees should be sought from the host state that no such civilian objects are later build next to UN peacekeeping bases. Staff officers should take this into consideration when involved in the planning of new compounds.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** You may use slide 31 for the debriefing.

Slide 22



Key message: In fulfilling its mandate, the mission may use force. While they should strive to minimize force, military peacekeepers can escalate force to full combat level to the extent necessary to protect the mission or civilians against threats of a military nature.

Guidance as to when and how the mission may use force can be found in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that apply to the military component and the Directives on the Force (DUF) for the police component. ROE and DUF provide mission-specific guidance that builds on the mission's Security Council mandate, international human rights and humanitarian law as well as DPO policy guidelines on the use of force.

ROE/DUFs not only cover force in the narrow sense of the word (i.e., kinetic force) but also forcible measures such as detention or searches and seizures of material.

ROE/DUF set out when the mission has authority to use force. This authority will always include the use of force in self-defence. The use of force beyond self-defence depends on the mandate of the operation. Multidimensional missions may be authorized to use force in defence of the mandate, including to assert their freedom of movement. Furthermore, they regularly are mandated to use all necessary means to protect civilians against physical violence. In some cases, the mandate may further expand the authority to use force. For instance, MONUSCO and its Force Intervention Brigade have the mandate and authority to use force to neutralize armed groups in support of the host state.

ROE/DUF also establish limits on the use of force. Police components must always use force within the limits of international law enforcement and human rights standards. Similarly, ROE for the military component usually restrain the use of force. However, the

military component may escalate to combat-level military force where necessary to effectively implement mandates involving use of force authority. In such situations, military peacekeepers are bound primarily by the rules of IHL on the conduct of hostilities.

Missions and their military components have a responsibility to make full use of authority to use force to the extent appropriate and necessary to effectively implement their mandate. UN military or police personnel who refuse to comply with a lawful order from their commander to use force may be held accountable for insubordination. At the same time, UN uniformed components may be held accountable if they use excessive force beyond what international human rights or humanitarian law permit. In practice, findings of excessive force have rarely, if ever been made against military peacekeepers. In contrast, missions have been criticised for failing to use appropriate force to effectively protect civilians.

Slide 23



Key message: While some incidental civilian loss may occur during military hostilities, the principles of precaution and proportionality require the parties to keep such losses to a minimum and not disproportional vis-à-vis the military advantage sought by their operation.

Staff officers should ensure during operational planning that all feasible precautions are taken to avoid or minimize incidental civilian losses or damage to civilian objects, including by making appropriate choices regarding the means and methods of warfare used in the operation.

Under no circumstances must anticipated incidental civilian losses be excessive in comparison to the anticipated concrete and military advantage sought by the operation.

Precaution also requires conflict parties not to place military objects in densely populated civilian areas ("use of human shields").

Slide 24



Key message: According to the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance of IHL, the United Nations force shall make a clear distinction at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.

Military operations shall be directed only against combatants and military objectives. Attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited. However, non-military threats can still be subject to defensive force, in particular their apprehension (capture).

In exercise of its right to self-defence, the United Nations military may lawfully use military force against attacks by:

- Members of state armed forces.
- Armed group members in a continuous combat function (individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities).
- Civilians for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Civilians not directly participating in hostilities are protected persons under IHL and not lawful military targets. Among such protected civilians may still be individuals who engage in violence or criminal conduct against the United Nations, including:

- Civilian rioters.
- Bandits and other ordinary criminals.
- Civilians giving indirect support to armed group attacks (discussed in greater detail below).

United Nations personnel may still defend itself against such persons, but only within the limits of self-defence against non-military threats discussed above (slides 16-20). In particular, the mission can apprehend and temporarily detain such individuals with a view to handing them over to the host state authorities for prosecution.

Slide 25



Key message: Persons who support armed group attacks only indirectly are not lawful military targets. But they may still be captured with a view to having them prosecuted by host-state authorities. Self-defence may be exercised if they resist capture.

Only those who directly participate in hostilities are lawful military targets and can be engaged within the parameters established mainly by IHL. Three cumulative requirements determine whether someone directly participates in hostilities:

1. Threshold of harm

The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations / capacity of a party to the conflict; or

The act must be likely to inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.

Example: A look out informs his armed colleagues, when a convoy passes so that they can detonate IEDs at the right moment. Both the look out and the IED operators are lawful targets.

2. Direct causation

There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result (the harm must be brought about in one causal step). An act which is an integral part of a coordinated military operation leading to harm will suffice.

Example: A person plants mines, which explode once civilians or enemy combatants step on them.

3. Belligerent nexus

The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required harm in support of one party to the conflict, to the detriment of another.

Example of no belligerent nexus: A criminal group steal fuel from one party to sell it on the black market. The thieves are not military targets, but they may be apprehended based on law enforcement standards and prosecuted for their crimes.

Slide 26

Discuss the case in plenary or through group discussions. The debriefing should bring out the following key points:

- Not everyone who somehow contributes to the IED attacks against the UN and civilians is a military target. Instead, it needs to be carefully assessed whether the man directly participate in hostilities based on the three cumulative requirements set out in slide 34. The permissible rules of engagement will change depending on who is a lawful military target and who is not.
- Financing an armed group or purchasing weapons for the group is criminal behaviour that can lead to apprehension and prosecution, but not direct participation in hostilities. The man may not be engaged as if he were a military target. However, the mission could carry out an operation to apprehend him and hand him over to host state authorities for prosecution. To the extent that he uses force to resist apprehension, the mission may use force, including firearms if necessary to protect against death or serious injury.

Slide 27



Key message: Persons who support armed group attacks only indirectly are not lawful military targets. But they may still be captured with a view to having them prosecuted by host-state authorities. Self-defence may be exercised if they resist capture.

Slide 28



The following points should come out of the case study discussion:

- A decision to suspend quick impact projects must have a valid reason and not discriminate against a particular ethnic group. For instance, if the UN units implementing them would be attacked during delivery. However, this is not the case here. Instead, the Staff Officer proposes a form of collective punishment/reprisal that targets all (ethnic minority) inhabitants and fails to respect human rights.
- The UN mission should take the matter up with the responsible local authorities who are obligated under the Status of Forces Agreement to protect the UN from all attacks. In addition, they may also speak to other persons holding informal authority, such as religious leaders, civil society figures or elders.
- The UN continues to have the right to self-defence. When attacked, they can apprehend the locals involved, temporarily detain them and hand them over to the state authorities for their criminal investigation and prosecution.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Initially show only the top part of the slide and invite a discussion on the case. Ideally, this and all the other small case studies that follow should be discussed first in small groups with a debriefing in plenary to follow.

Slide 29



The following key points should emerge from the discussion:

- IHL requires parties to conflict to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need. They may take or require reasonable measures to monitor distribution and prevent diversion to enemy combatants. However, they must not deny food aid altogether to a particular group of civilians by rejecting arbitrarily (for no valid reason) an offer of humanitarian aid by an impartial humanitarian agency. Even if it were true that some of the food aid is diverted to armed groups, humanitarian aid must therefore not be denied to civilians in need. The government measure also violates the human right to freedom from hunger.
- Denying journalists from reporting about the situation (and the IHL violations carried out) violates the journalists' right to freedom of expression and media. It also denies the general population freedom of information. This also since the censorship serves no legitimate purpose but seeks to cover up IHL/human rights violations.
- UN personnel must duly report this information up their chain of command and ensure that it is shared with human rights and humanitarian coordination components. An entire civilian population is at serious risk if the denial of food aid is allowed to persist. Additionally, the mission should advocate for the removal of restrictions on media coverage, particularly given its crucial role in informing donors about pressing humanitarian needs.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) The build portion of the slide (box in purple) can be used for the debriefing.

b) UN Photo shows aid distribution after Cyclone Nargis, following which one affected country initially denied humanitarian organisations access to populations in need.

Slide 30



Key message: Populations in need have a right to humanitarian assistance. Conflict parties must not divert assistance but ensure free and safe humanitarian access to populations in need.

Economic and social human rights require states to ensure that the entire population has a core minimum of humanitarian essentials: freedom from hunger, clean water and basic sanitation, basic shelter, clothing, primary education and basic healthcare. If a state does not have the means to provide these minimum essentials itself, it must promptly disclose humanitarian needs and request international humanitarian aid. Furthermore, state authorities must not arbitrarily (without good reason) reject offers of humanitarian aid provided by impartial humanitarian organisations.

Humanitarian aid is always provided impartially, without discrimination and solely on the basis of humanitarian needs. Neither state authorities nor any of the conflict parties must steal or otherwise divert it, in particular for political or military reasons (for instance to feed troops or support political supporters).

Instead, authorities and conflict parties must facilitate free and safe passage of humanitarian aid, even if it is destined for a civilian population, they consider linked to an adverse conflict party. The authorities and conflict parties must also provide guarantees that humanitarian aid can be delivered safely. It is worth noting that attacks on humanitarian personnel, facilities and transports are strictly prohibited and will regularly amount to war crimes.

☞***Note to instructor -*** The pictured emblem is from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which will take the lead on UN action relating to humanitarian access.

Slide 31

Key message: Some violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are considered so grave by the international community of states that they are regarded as international crimes, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

All states have a duty to prosecute and punish such crimes if committed within their territory. Furthermore, the international community may set up international tribunals and courts to prosecute and punish international crimes. Example: In response to international crimes, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). States also established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has jurisdiction to pursue international crimes committed in states that have accepted its jurisdiction (more than 120 countries so far) and in cases that were referred to the ICC by the Security Council (examples: Darfur and Libya).

There are three categories of international crimes that the military should know:

- **War crimes:** Violations of fundamental rules found in the Geneva Conventions or other sources of IHL also entail war crimes on the part of the individuals who commit such crimes. As the name suggests, war crimes can only be committed in armed conflict.

- **Crimes against humanity:** Where state authorities or armed groups commit inhumane acts such as murder, rape, torture in a systematic or widespread manner, this may entail crimes against humanity. Such crimes typically involve an underlying policy to commit crimes and/or an elaborate degree of planning at high levels.

- **Genocide:** In accordance with the 1948 Genocide Convention, killing or in similar ways targeting members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group may amount to genocide. The perpetrators must act with the "intent, to destroy, in whole or in part, the

group, as such." It is not enough to kill some people because of their religion or race. There must be an intent to annihilate the entire group globally or in a specific area. The historic example that gave rise to the notion of genocide is the Holocaust, in which Nazi Germany tried to annihilate the entire Jewish population of Europe.

Slide 32



A plenary or group discussion should bring out the following key points:

- The host state battalion commander is not right. Military commanders have command responsibility. They cannot wilfully close their eyes to grave violations committed by their subordinates.
- Regardless of whether they ordered such crimes, commanders will be held responsible for international crimes if their troops commit them, and they fail to act to prevent or repress such crimes.
- UN Engagement Teams (ETs) deployed within the battalions should invoke this principle during their engagement with national forces. If they find that national commanders fail to control their own troops, military professionals can explain the principle of command responsibility in a peer-to-peer dialogue. This can have an important positive impact and increase human rights and international humanitarian law compliance among national forces.

Slide 33



Key Message: As shown by case 8, command responsibility is an important concept to know for any military commander because a commander can incur criminal responsibility for international crimes simply by standing by and doing nothing, even without actively participating in such crimes.

Slide 34



Key Message: UN peacekeepers should pay particular attention to the situation and protection of displaced persons (refugees and IDPs).

When governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, individuals may suffer such serious violations of their rights that they are forced to flee their country and seek safety in another country. Since, by definition, the governments of their home countries no longer protect the basic rights of refugees, the international community must step in to ensure that their basic rights are respected.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the foundation of international refugee law. The term "refugee" under the Refugee Convention refers to persons who have fled their country due to a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Individuals suspected of crimes against humanity are excluded from refugee status.

Fleeing a country where an armed conflict is taking place qualifies a person only as a refugee if specific requirements are met (notably evidence of individual "well-founded fear of being persecuted"). However, regional instruments have expanded the scope of the refugee definition. Under the 1969 African Refugee Convention, refugees are also those who have to flee "events seriously disturbing public order" such as armed conflict.

For Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees expands the concept to also include persons who flee internal conflicts and generalised violence in their country.

Note: Refugees are generally civilians, and the mission must hence protect them under its PoC mandate. In addition, peacekeeping operations are often tasked with the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return or local integration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Slide 35



A plenary or group discussion should bring out the following key points:

One of the most fundamental principles of refugee law is the prohibition of refoulement. This means that no one may be sent back to a country where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture (including rape as a form of torture), or other grave human rights violations.

Refoulement of refugees can amount to the international crime of deportation, which exists as a crime against humanity (if widespread or systematic) and as a war crime (if committed in the context of an armed conflict).

The host state is therefore committing grave violations. The UN is not allowed to assist in such operations in any shape or form. Instead, it will raise concerns about them, usually under the leadership of UNHCR.

In line with the "One UN" principle and their role to promote respect for international law, UN Military Commanders should echo such concerns in their engagement with counterparts in the host state army. In particular, they should caution that this may affect UN support to host state security forces involved in such deportations since refoulement is a grave violation under the HRDDP on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces.

Slide 36



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- The UN Charter is the foundation and basis for all UN work across the Organization. In the area of peace and security, Security Council resolutions give important guidance to the work of peacekeeping operations.
- IHRL (and the UN's HRDDP), IRL and ICL must be observed by peacekeepers in all peace operations.
- The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of UN personnel does not mean peacekeepers can break laws with impunity.
- Commanders can incur criminal responsibility for international crimes simply by standing by and doing nothing, even without actively participating in such crimes.

Lesson
2.2

Peace Operations-specific International Law

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 2.2 provides an overview of mission-specific legal frameworks.

Relevance

The objective of this Lesson is to ensure that UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) understand the mission-specific legal frameworks to comply with and effectively contribute to the achievement of the mandate.

The UN Legal and Policy Framework is relevant for Staff Officers to understand: (i) the legal basis for the UN's deployment in a host country, and (ii) the legal regime that applies to all day-to-day activities in the host country.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Explain the key mission-specific legal framework
- Explain how peacekeeping mission-specific legal framework guides and protects the work

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 27
Summary of Key Messages	28
Learning Activities	Throughout the Lesson

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 2.2 explains the mission-specific legal frameworks.

The objective of this Lesson is to ensure that UN staff officers understand the mission-specific legal frameworks to comply with and effectively contribute to the achievement of the mandate.

The UN Legal and Policy Framework is relevant for Staff Officers to understand: (i) the legal basis for the UN's deployment in a host country, and (ii) the legal regime that applies to all day-to-day activities in the host country.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the key mission-specific legal framework
- Explain how peacekeeping mission-specific legal framework guides and protects the work

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: All staff officers should familiarise themselves with the Security Council mandate of the mission.

Every peacekeeping operation begins with the Security Council adopting a resolution that establishes the mission. The Council will seek to establish a mission with the consent of the Host State to its deployment. Depending on the mission's mandate and role, it will also seek the consent of the other parties to the conflict concerned.

The Security Council resolution sets out the mandate of the mission, i.e. the tasks assigned to it, including any explicit authorisation to use force. Mandates, or tasks, differ from mission to mission. The range of mandated tasks outlined in a mandate differs between peace operations, based on the conflict environment, the challenges on the ground and other factors. Security Council mandates may also include cross-cutting thematic tasks for missions. For example, the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence.

The Security Council resolution that authorises the deployment of a peace operation also establishes the maximum strength of the mission's uniformed components (military and police). The Security Council mandate is typically established for a fixed period (usually one year) after which the Council has to renew it. At this stage, the Council will also review the authorised strength of a mission and make adjustments to strength and mandate, as deemed necessary.

Almost always, before establishing a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report setting out the functions, tasks and parameters of the proposed operation. The Secretary-General's report is then considered by the Security Council before it adopts a resolution.

Slide 5

Key Message: Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are regularly assigned protection mandates.

Specialised civilians undertake staff work on these mandates including human rights officers, protection of civilian advisers, child protection advisers and women protection advisers. However, the mandates remain whole of mission responsibilities to which the military components must contribute. Notably, military components must identify, record and share information on violations with their civilian colleagues in the mission.

Protection mandates may overlap, as they complement and reinforce each other:

- The human rights mandate seeks to protect the entire population and the full range of human rights. The mission will use peaceful means such as reporting and other advocacy or capacity-building measures to advance this mandate.
- The protection of civilians mandate is narrower in that it is only concerned about physical violence and protects civilians only (as opposed to e.g., detained fighters). However, it goes deeper than the human rights mandate because it authorizes the mission to use force where necessary to protect civilians.
- Child protection is focused on the six grave violations against children in conflict.
- Conflict-related sexual violence requires a nexus between the sexual violence and the conflict (e.g., domestic violence would typically not be covered).

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Examples on how protection mandates overlap or differ:

- If state authorities order the closure of a newspaper for criticizing the government, this violates the human rights to freedoms of expression, media and information. However, in the absence of physical violence, the PoC mandate is not triggered.
- However, if rogue state agents proceed to physically assault the journalists, the mission may intervene under its PoC mandate, including by using force where necessary.
- If an armed group traffics underage girls for purposes of sexual exploitation, this amounts to an abuse under the human rights mandate. The mission must exercise its PoC mandate to protect the girls. Such sexual violence against children is of concern to both the child protection and CRSV mandate.

b) Once deployed, Battalion Engagement Platoons (EP) will map the demography of the human terrain in their areas of operations to further identify vulnerable areas and at-risk populations at the local level. This makes an important contribution to the implementation of missions' protection mandates.

Slide 6

Key message: Staff officers should be familiar with the contents of the SOMA/SOFA, especially to the extent it sets out privileges and immunities to protect the military component and that it establishes principles of cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing or the handover of detainees.

Before the deployment of a peace operation, the UN and the host Government sign a Status of Forces Agreement (for peacekeeping missions) or Status of Mission Agreement (for special political missions). The SOFA/SOMA establishes the legal framework that regulates the status of the mission and its members in the Host State, including privileges and immunities for UN personnel. It elaborates on protections the UN already enjoys under customary international law and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Notwithstanding their privileges and immunities, the peacekeeping operation and its members remain under an obligation to respect local laws and regulations. Peacekeepers respect and follow the national laws of the host country.

SOFA/SOMA usually guarantee that:

- UN premises in the host country are inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the UN, which controls access to all its premises.
- UN equipment and vehicles are immune from search and seizure.
- The UN has the right to un-restricted communication throughout the host country.
- The UN may disseminate information on its mandate to the public which is under its exclusive control and cannot be the subject of any form of censorship.
- Mission personnel have functional immunity for official acts (see below)

- Mission personnel enjoy freedom of movement in the country (see below).

The mission may conclude additional agreements with the host country, and UN policies actually foresee the conclusions of such special agreements. Example: In accordance with the SOP on Detention by Peacekeepers, a mission that detains persons under its mandate and wants to hand them over to the host state, must first conclude a legal agreement guaranteeing that the host state treats such persons humanely and provides the mission with access to follow up their situation.

☞ ***Notes to instructor*** – UN Photos show the signing ceremonies of the UNAMI SOMA and UNMIS SOFA.

Training Tips

Question for participants: ***What if the Host Government does not sign a SOFA/SOMA prior to the deployment of the mission?***

Answer: There is a "Model SOFA" agreed to by the General Assembly in 1990 which the Security Council has 'deemed to apply' until one is signed for the particular mission. Whilst originally intended to apply for the first thirty days in the start-up of a mission, current practice has seen these apply for months, even years.

Slide 7

Key message: SOFA/SOMA provide and reaffirm privileges and immunities to protect the work of staff officers and other UN personnel.

Beyond technical/financial issues like exemption from customs duties, the SOFA/SOMA provides a number of privileges and immunities that are very relevant for staff officers and UN personnel working with them:

- The host state cannot arrest and detain UN personnel (including national staff) or seize any of their belongings (e.g., car) in relation to any functions they carry out in their official functions. This functional immunity is discussed in the next slide.
- Their documents are inviolable, meaning the host state may not demand to see them.
- UN personnel have the right to maintain confidential communications using codes or sealed diplomatic pouches.
- They may wear their military uniform and show the United Nations flag.
- They must be allowed unhindered entry and departure from the country (e.g., they do not need an exit visa). Their personal baggage enjoys the same comprehensive protection as those of diplomatic envoys.
- As discussed above, they also enjoy freedom of movement within the mission area.

Many of the same privileges are also guaranteed by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Slide 8



The following issues should emerge from the discussion:

- The armed group impedes the UN-ETs freedom of movement throughout the country, which is guaranteed under the SOFA/SOMA. In particular, missions do not have to seek prior authorization before moving around the country as this would undermine their capacity to effectively conduct observation tasks in the mission area. In the case at hand, the UN-ETs will be unable to identify vulnerable areas and populations at risk in the armed group held area.
- In principle, the host government has a duty under the SOFA/SOMA to ensure the mission's safety, security and freedom of movement in the country. The mission might therefore insist that it takes measures to dislodge the armed group and remove the illegal roadblock.
- However, the host government may be unable or unwilling to remove the roadblock. Under its authority to use force in defence of its mandate, the mission is legally entitled to use all necessary means to force their way through the checkpoint. As a matter of legal principle, if the armed group fighters use force against mission personnel, the UN-ET can rely on its authority to use force in self-defence to protect themselves.

While the foregoing indicates what the mission is legally entitled to do under its mandate, there are strategic and political implications of pursuing a course of action involving the use of force against one of the conflict parties. The mission's rules of engagement and operational orders should therefore provide clear guidance on how mission personnel should react where their freedom of movement is denied. In cases of doubt, further guidance should be sought from the chain of command if reasonably possible under the circumstances.

Slide 9



Key message: Freedom of movement is essential for the mission's work and impediments should always be signalled to the chain of command for appropriate follow up.

SOFA/SOMAs provide that peacekeeping operations shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the territory of the host state. While the language slightly varies between SOFAs/SOMAs, the UN will not accept requirements of prior authorisation or notification for its own movements. However, there may be reasonable and limited exceptions, e.g., for movement by aircraft for air traffic control purposes.

In many situations, armed groups pose the greatest threats to the mission's freedom of movement. The SOFA/SOMA legally requires the host state authorities to ensure safety, security and freedom of movement, notably by clearing illegal roadblocks and checkpoints.

The mission may also assert freedom of movement under its authority to use force in defence of the mandate. This legal authority exists regardless of whether armed groups or rogue government officials deny freedom of movement. But as noted above, it is a different question whether the mission will take the decision to use that authority, which will have considerable political and operational implications.

Slide 10



The following issues should emerge from the discussion:

The privileges and immunities of the United Nations, as reinforced by the SOFA/SOMA, make the measures of the host government illegal under international law.

- UN officials, including national staff, enjoy functional immunity from host state legal processes such as prosecution concerning anything they say, write or do in pursuit of their official activities (see slide 48 for more details). The prosecution of the national JMAC staff is, therefore, a violation of international law. However, as a matter of good practice, the mission should not have a national staff handle such a sensitive issue since national staff and their families are the most vulnerable to government reprisals.
- UN officials enjoy the freedom of movement throughout the host country. In addition, international officials may leave and enter the host country freely, without complying with requirements such as exit visas. When they travel, their documents and bags are inviolable. The host state may not deny them the privilege to freely leave the country unless they agree to having their bags searched.
- Under diplomatic law, the host state may declare a diplomat representing another state persona non grata, at any time and without having to explain its decision, requiring that person to leave the country. However, as a matter of international law, the doctrine of persona non grata does not apply to, or in respect of, United Nations personnel. The mission enjoys the privilege to deploy whom it wishes within its mandate and staff ceiling. Although persona non-grata declarations targeting personnel occasionally happen as a matter of practice, these are not authorised by international law. The mission (and other concerned states) should protest at the highest level against this unlawful reprisal against the JMAC chief.

Slide 11



Key message: UN peacekeepers are legally protected from suffering any reprisals linked to them carrying out their work. But they do not enjoy impunity for actual serious misconduct of a criminal nature. MSOs are classified as Contingent members.

As per the SOFA, troop contingents, including staff officers, remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state. The host state has no jurisdiction to prosecute them or otherwise subject them to legal process. If they engage in misconduct of a criminal nature, their home state can prosecute them under their own rules of military justice. As a matter of fact, the United Nations, and troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) conclude legal agreements regulating the conditions of the contribution (T/PCC-MOU). Under these agreements, the contributing countries pledge to uphold discipline in case of misconduct and ensure accountability for any criminal conduct.

In cases where this member state pledge is not adhered to, the United Nations can repatriate relevant personnel or entire contingents and will continue to follow up with that Member State on the outcome of the disciplinary process relating to the incident. With regard to cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), the Security Council even obligates the United Nations to repatriate entire contingents in case they fail to investigate and prosecute SEA or do not report back to the United Nations on the steps they have taken. Note: Repatriation alone is an administrative consequence, not a disciplinary measure.

Functional immunity serves to protect the work of the United Nations from interference and reprisals. It does not guarantee impunity for actual criminal wrongdoing. In particular, the immunity of UN personnel can be waived by the Secretary-General in the interest of

justice and the United Nations. Example: UNPOL officers severely mistreat a suspected criminal until he reveals information about planned activities. By waiving their functional immunity, the Secretary-General allows their home state to prosecute them.

☞***Note to instructor -*** This is why MSOs are classified as contingent members.

Slide 12



Key Message: UN peacekeeping operations are subject to a variety of policies, guidelines, and SOPs that aim to protect human rights and promote international humanitarian law.

Compliance with these policies and guidelines are mandatory for all peacekeepers. They provide a comprehensive framework for UN peacekeepers to operate in a manner that respects international law, human rights and dignity and upholds the rule of law. By adhering to these policies, UN peacekeepers play a critical role in fulfilling peacekeeping mandates effectively and legitimately, in line with international law and the United Nations policies based on it.

Overview of relevant policies:

Relevant Secretary-General Policies and Bulletins (examples):

- Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse: This policy outlines measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN personnel, including peacekeepers. It includes provisions for training, reporting, and investigation of SEA incidents.
- Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: This bulletin outlines the obligations of UN forces under international humanitarian law (IHL). It provides guidance on how to apply IHL principles in peacekeeping operations.
- Human Rights Screening Policy: This policy outlines the process for screening UN personnel for human rights violations. It includes provisions for screening procedures, interviews, and training.

Relevant DPO-DOS Policies, Guidelines and SOPs (examples):

- Use of Force by Military Components: This guideline outlines the rules for the use of force by military components in peacekeeping operations. It includes provisions for proportionality, necessity, and the use of force only as a last resort.
- Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions: This policy outlines the procedures for investigating and adjudicating misconduct by UN personnel in field missions. It includes provisions for due process, fair hearings, and appropriate sanctions.
- Handling of Detention in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions: This SOP outlines the rules for the detention of individuals by UN peacekeepers. It includes provisions for humane treatment, respect for human dignity, and access to legal representation.
- Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions: This policy outlines the principles and practices for integrating human rights into UN peace operations and political missions. It provides guidance on how to assess human rights risks, develop human rights protection strategies, and monitor human rights violations.
- Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: This policy outlines the UN's responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflict. It provides guidance on how to prevent and respond to attacks on civilians, and how to protect civilian infrastructure.
- Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces: This policy outlines the UN's responsibility to ensure that its support to non-UN security forces does not contribute to human rights violations. It provides guidance on how to assess the human rights risks associated with supporting non-UN security forces, and how to mitigate those risks.

Slide 13



Key Message: As members of troop-contributing countries. UN peacekeepers remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their own state. The host state cannot prosecute them for any misconduct or crimes.

Peacekeepers are under United Nations chain of command. If they fail to abide by conduct and discipline standards, their home country may subject them to disciplinary action.

As stated earlier in relation to functional immunity, the United Nations and T/PCCs conclude legal agreement regulating the conditions of the contribution (T/PCC-MOU). Under these agreements, the contributing countries pledges to uphold discipline in case of misconduct and ensue accountability for any criminal conduct. Where a contributing country fails to abide by this commitment, the UN may repatriate relevant contingents. The Security Council has made such repatriation mandatory in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA): SC Resolution 2272 (2016) requires the United Nations to replace all units of a T/PCC with units from another country in case the T/PCC personnel face SEA allegations and the T/PCC in question has not taken appropriate steps to:

- investigate the allegation,
- hold the perpetrators accountable, or
- inform the Secretary-General about the progress of its action taken.

Contributing countries therefore have a strong obligation to ensure accountability so that individual wrongdoing will not undermine their contribution to peacekeeping.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Policy on Human Rights in Peace Operations establishes specific responsibilities for peacekeepers regarding violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

- UN Peacekeepers should be proactive in identifying concerns, including by reaching out to all sectors of society irrespective of gender, social background, or level of education. UN Peacekeepers have male and female personnel to ensure broad access to all parts of the community.

- Uniformed personnel must promptly record and share with the human rights component all allegations of violations they receive or observe for follow-up. Formal mechanisms such as standard operating procedures must be established to facilitate such information-sharing. Generally, mission procedures will allow sharing information promptly with other components at the level of specific sectors or team sites to ensure that information moves quickly and is not lost in the chain of command.

- Respect for the principle of confidentiality must always be maintained. In particular, names of victims and witnesses should not be included in reports with broader circulation.

- Based on established referral systems, they must also promptly refer victims to providers of medical assistance, psychosocial support, and protection.

In some cases, an ad hoc intervention, e.g., by raising an urgent concern with the party concerned, may be appropriate. In any case, protection of civilians' coordination structures must be alerted so they can initiate a concerted mission intervention.

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

Key Message: The tasks assigned by the Security Council mandate must be read together with the concept of operations and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component.

The UN 2020.13 SOP on Handling of Detention in UNPKO and SPMs is an example where the ROE/DUF need to be consulted in parallel with the specific incident instructions.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Discuss based on examples using the guidelines.

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

The following issues should emerge from the discussion:

In line with its self-defence mandate and the mission's rules of engagement, the UN military had the right to apprehend the man attacking UN installations.

However, once apprehended, the SOP on the Handling of Detention in UN Peace Operations, which guarantee due process to all detainees, must be respected.

Neither of the proposed courses of action considered by the sector commander complies with these SOPs. The UN may detain persons for a temporary period (up to 96 hours) with the intention of handing them over to host state authorities for criminal investigation and prosecution purposes. However, this handover can only take place after the UN has assessed that the individuals facing handover do not face a real risk of torture or other serious human rights violations from the host state authorities.

The discussion can also explore other practical problems related to detention, if time permits. An example is if a detainee were to die during UN detention. In such a situation, what are the necessary follow-ups from mission HQ/Staff officer in terms of accountability (responsibilities, informing family, redress), and ensuring that any systemic shortcomings are addressed to prevent recurrence.

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

Key Message: Under its self-defence and PoC mandates, UN peacekeepers may apprehend and temporarily detain persons for self-defence purposes. As soon as they establish effective control, detainees must be treated in line with international standards on humane treatment and due process.

UN peacekeepers' apprehension powers stem from their mandates on self-defence, defence of the mission, protection of civilians, and other mandated tasks (e.g., support to host authorities to establish rule of law). Rules of Engagement (for the UN military) and Directive on the Use of Force (for UNPOL) elaborate on the details.

Once they establish effective control over an individual, the mission's detention procedures must be followed. These will be based on the United Nations SOP on Detention in Peace Operations, which are in turn based on international human rights standards.

The UN detention rules apply once the UN has the target persons under its effective control, even for very short periods. In particular, UN detention rules apply even if some host state military or police officers may accompany UNPOL during operations, as long as UN personnel effectively controls the apprehension operation. Compliance with the UN detention rules cannot be evaded by reverting to evasive semantics like calling the detention "temporary holding".

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Temporary – 96 hours (48 for a child)

Slide 18



Key Message: UN peacekeepers have a responsibility to treat all detainees humanely and in accordance with international law and human rights principles. The DPO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the Handling of Detention in Peacekeeping Operations provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring that detainees are treated humanely and in a manner that respects their dignity and rights.

The DPO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the Handling of Detention in Peacekeeping Operations provide a comprehensive framework for the humane and lawful treatment of detainees by UN peacekeepers. The SOPs are based on international human rights law and humanitarian law, and they reflect the best practices for managing detention in peacekeeping operations.

The powers of UN peacekeepers to detain individuals are derived from the Security Council mandate for the peacekeeping operation, as well as the mission's Rules of Engagement (ROE). The SOPs on the Handling of Detention provide guidance on how to apply these powers in a manner that is consistent with international law and human rights principles.

UN peacekeepers have a responsibility to treat all detainees humanely. This includes providing them with adequate food, water, shelter, and medical care. Peacekeepers must also respect the detainees' dignity and prevent any arbitrary or inhumane treatment. When a UN peacekeeper detains an individual, they must immediately notify the mission's Detention Focal Point (DFP). The DFP is responsible for ensuring that the detainee is treated humanely and in accordance with the SOPs.

UN peacekeepers must inform detainees of the reasons for their detention and their rights under the SOPs. They must also conduct an inventory of all items taken from the detainee and notify the detainee's family of their detention. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must be notified of all detentions within 36 hours, and the ICRC must be granted access to the detainee. Foreign detainees may demand that their consulate be notified of their detention. The mission's DFP is responsible for ensuring that this request is promptly complied with.

Detainees can only be held for a maximum of 96 hours for an adult, 48 hours for a child. After this time, they must either be handed over to the appropriate authorities or released.

UN peacekeepers must not hand over detainees if there is a risk that they will be persecuted, tortured, ill-treated, disappeared, summarily executed, or subjected to the death penalty. The mission must conduct a thorough risk assessment before any handover, and it must monitor the situation of handed-over persons to ensure that they are not subjected to any human rights violations.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Reference: 2020.13 SOP on Handling of Detention in UNPKO and SPMs.

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

Key Message: UN peacekeepers must always adhere to international human rights law and humanitarian law when questioning detainees. This includes the right to remain silent, the right to be treated humanely, and the right to be protected from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

UN peacekeepers are allowed to question detainees in order to protect civilians and defend themselves from attack. However, peacekeepers must always adhere to international human rights law and humanitarian law when questioning detainees.

To ensure that detainees are treated fairly and that their rights are respected, peacekeepers should keep detailed records of all questioning sessions, including the date, time, and location of the questioning, the names of all UN personnel present, and the detainee's responses.

Detainees cannot be forced to answer questions against their will. Peacekeepers must inform detainees of their right to remain silent before any questioning begins.

Peacekeepers must never use torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment when questioning detainees. Peacekeepers must also refrain from using any methods of questioning that would violate international law, such as threats, coercion, or promises of leniency.

Children should only be questioned by trained Child Protection Officers. CPOs are specially trained to interview children in a way that is sensitive to their needs and rights. CPOs will also ensure that children are not subjected to any form of abuse or exploitation during questioning.

Slide 20



Key message: Apprehended persons must be informed about the reasons for their detention, receive necessary medical care and be transported in a humane manner to the place of detention.

Unless their commander decides that the apprehended individual should be immediately released, the apprehending unit must:

- Inform the detained person of the reasons for the detention and upcoming transfer to a United Nations place of detention;
- Organise the transport of the detained person as quickly as possible to a designated place of detention. The transportation shall always be carried out humanely and in a manner that ensures due consideration for the safety of both United Nations personnel and the detainee (appropriate UN vehicles can and should be used);
- Organise the transport of any items seized from the detained person and any evidence collected at the scene to the same designated place of detention;
- If the detained person is seriously injured or sick and needs medical treatment that cannot be provided at the designated place of detention, immediately organise his/her transport to a designated United Nations medical facility;
- The command must immediately notify the Joint Operations Centre or other designated office about the apprehension and whether to continue to detain the persons concerned.

Slide 21

Key message: At the UN detention facility, the responsible commander must ensure due process and humane treatment of detainees.

UN personnel at the UN detention facility must:

- Supervise a further search of the detained person. Seize any additional items found on the detained person in the course of the search, ensure that they are tagged for identification and recording purposes and register and store them.
- Ensure that a medical examination is conducted as soon as possible by qualified United Nations medical personnel. A detained person who is seriously ill or seriously injured and/or who is in need of medical treatment that cannot be provided at the designated place of detention must be transferred to a designated United Nations medical facility as soon as possible.
- Register the detained person by completing the relevant forms and transmit the information to the mission's Detention Focal Point through the Joint Operations Centre for recording purposes.
- Take possession of items seized from the detained person and those items collected at the scene at the time of his/her apprehension, ensure that they are tagged for identification and recording purposes, registered using the relevant forms, and safely stored.
- Authorize the destruction of dangerous items to avoid the risk of harm to persons or damage to property.
- Detain the person in a safe place. In line with international human rights standards, men and women and adults and children must be kept separate from one another to

protect against abuse. For the same reason, dangerous and ordinary detainees must be kept apart.

- Ensure that detainees are kept safely and be treated humanely and receive water, food, bedding, hygiene items as elaborated by the SOPs on Detention.
- Different categories of detainees must be kept apart for their own protection, especially to prevent sexual violence among detainees. Neither women and men, nor adults and children may be detained together.
- Ask the detained person if he/she wishes a family member, a lawyer or another person designated by him/her to be informed of his/her detention.
- Without prejudice to the host State's responsibility to conduct criminal investigations, conduct preliminary questioning of the detainee in particular to assess whether there are any risks for the person if handed over to host state authorities (see next slide).

☞***Note to instructor -*** Annex B of the 2020 Detention SOP gives specific guidance relating to detention of children including on Separation from adults – "In cases where a child is detained with a member of his or her family, the family unity shall be preserved in separate facilities conducive for families, and the child shall not be separated, provided it is in his/ her best interest."

Slide 22



The following points should emerge from the case study discussion:

- The United Nations' reputation is affected by choices regarding who works for the Organisation, either directly as personnel or indirectly as a contractor or supplier. In particular, UN policies commit the Organisation not to work with personnel or suppliers who have been involved in sexual exploitation and abuse or other human rights abuses.
- Despite the good intentions of wishing to hire demobilised fighters and further peace, neither Mr A nor Company C can be contracted since both are involved in sexual abuse. Additionally, Company C is also facing credible allegations of forced labour.
- Ms B does not face similar allegations. She is only a victim of sexual violence. However, UN peacekeeping policies do not allow UN peace operations to employ children (anyone under 18 years) or have them working on its premises, not least to keep children separate from military operations.

Slide 23

Key message: United Nations rules prohibit the employment of anyone involved in human rights or IHL violations. Peace operations must also not employ children.

The Secretary-General's Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel applies to the whole UN Organisation (not just peacekeeping) and is based on the UN Charter requirement that the UN employ persons of the highest integrity (see Art. 101 UN Charter).

Anyone who faces credible allegations (e.g., based on trustworthy civil society reports) of involvement in violations of international human rights or humanitarian law will be excluded from any employment or deployment with the United Nations. This principle applies to international and local staff.

For uniformed peacekeeping staff, their home states are required to screen their background and certify their non-involvement in violations. The UN Secretariat may undertake its screening measures.

In mission, Staff Officers involved in hiring should follow up, with administration and the human rights component, on any information suggesting that a candidate may have been involved in human rights or IHL violations.

Staff Officers must also be aware that the UN Child Protection Policy prohibits UN peace operations from employing anyone under 18 years or allowing underage persons to work on UN premises (for instance, for a contractor).

Slide 24



Key message: The United Nations expects its suppliers not to be complicit in human rights abuses. Special care must be taken in procurement decisions in conflict environments.

In peacekeeping environments, there are often strong connections between local businesses, conflict parties, and their commanders, including human rights violators among them. Furthermore, labour rights may not be adequately enforced by local authorities.

Where peace operations hire suppliers involved in human rights or labour rights abuses, this may further such abuses and diminish the mission's reputation. UN staff officers involved in procurement should therefore be vigilant and consider whether there is any credible information that a particular supplier violates labour or human rights or is effectively owned by someone who does.

In line with the expectations that the United Nations sets out in its UN Supplier Code of Conduct, such suppliers should not be awarded contracts.

In addition, UN rules require due diligence to ensure that suppliers or other implementing partners are not involved in any sexual exploitation & abuse. Staff officers should liaise with civilian sections or UN agencies on the process to be followed in the local UN context.

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

Key message: UN missions may acquire, analyse and share UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence (UN PK-I), subject to strict limits that emanate from international law or UN policy.

Gathering and sharing UN PK-I is subject to legal limits. Some limits follow directly from international human rights law. Others are established by the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy to protect the independence and impartiality of missions.

Clandestine activities are outside the boundaries of peacekeeping-intelligence and shall not be undertaken because they undermine the reputation of the mission and may place our personnel at risk. UN policy defines clandestine activities as "the acquisition of information or intelligence conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations". For example, United Nations staff must never break into a government building or hack into a database of a non-governmental organisation to obtain information.

However, the limitation to non-clandestine means does not require the mission to reveal its methods and sources to the host state or others. To the contrary, all mission personnel are required to apply particular care not to expose any sources or potential sources of information to harm. This will often mean that all contact with a source (and materials and information gained from the source) must remain confidential so as not to expose the source to reprisals or intimidation. The identity of the source must also remain confidential.

United Nations peacekeeping intelligence activities must be fully autonomous and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence system or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character. The mission's independence and perceived impartiality may be compromised if the mission is seen as being an intelligence arm of the host government or third states. Information may be shared with other state authorities, but subject to conditions and limits of international human rights law and the HRDDP.

Slide 26



The following points should emerge from the case study discussion:

- The mission may share intelligence with national intelligence agencies, subject to compliance with human rights law and the related HRDDP. However, its PK-I activities must remain independent, and the mission must therefore not pool its PK-I resources with the host authorities into a joint intelligence cell.
- Physically infiltrating a language assistant into an armed group is prohibited under UN rules, as it may place mission personnel at undue risk. This kind of infiltration would often involve national staff, such as the language assistant in this case, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals.
- UN PK-I rules prohibit giving money or other incentives to sources. This is because such arrangements always carry the risk of resulting in unreliable information. It also aligns PK-I activities with those of other mission components (e.g., human rights components), which have a policy never to offer payment to receive information.
- Following the UN's PK-I principles, the mission must never recruit or otherwise develop children as sources of intelligence, because they cannot give the necessary consent. Using them to gather PK-I of a military nature may also amount to the use of children in hostilities and be prohibited on that ground.

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

Key message: The UN has adopted a number of key policies on Environmental management.

The 2018 OHCHR Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment are contained in the report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment (A/HRC/37/59). It reiterates that harm to the environment is directly linked to human rights, impacting on the provision of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.

The 2019 DOS Standard Operating Procedure on Environmental Impact Assessment for UN Field Missions contains a legal framework section that also refers to the Framework Principles. Furthermore, the legal framework section highlights that:

- UN Field Missions shall respect all national laws and regulations relevant for the mitigation of negative environmental impacts resulting from implemented works/activities. Where such legislation is weak or lacking, the mission should comply with international 'best practice' standards and international treaties to which the host country is a party.

- National laws and regulations relevant to the daily operation of a mission may cover health, natural resources, wildlife conservation, forestry, freshwater, coastal area management, or toxic and hazardous substances.

There is also a 2021 DOS Environmental Management Handbook for Military Commanders which states, "the military component must remember to mitigate the negative environmental impacts of military operations and to protect the health and

safety of deployed forces, other UN staff, and local communities. While the presence of peacekeepers to perform military tasks in UN field missions, including force protection, remains a priority for the maintenance of peace and security, we must work together to reduce and manage the mission's environmental footprint."

It further advises, "It is important for commanders to have the necessary tools to incorporate environmental considerations throughout the lifecycle of the mission. Failure to integrate environmental considerations into operational and tactical level planning increases the risks to the health and safety of military personnel and civilians as well as posing a risk to the environment of the host country. The implications of underperformance are serious, particularly in light of the vulnerability of the ecosystems and societies within which these operations are deployed."

"It is the responsibility of every commander to ensure that all military personnel follow good practices and procedures that prevent undue harm to the community and the environment, and to improve our environmental performance."

The DOS Environmental Policy, updated in 2022, outlines the five principles all missions are to follow:

- Stewardship of the environment.
- Efficiency in resource use and operations.
- Continuous improvement of environmental performance.
- Stakeholder engagement at all levels.
- Adaptation and resilience.

Additionally, it states that the legal affairs office of each peacekeeping operation and special political mission can advise on relevant host country laws and regulations.

Other key documents for environmental management within Field Missions include the DPKO/DFS Waste Management Policy for UN Field Missions at the mission (2018.14) and DPKO/DFS Draft Water Guidance.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** UN Declarations, Programmes of Action and Multilateral Environmental Agreements can be found here: https://www.informea.org/

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

Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- Military Staff Officers must ensure that the UN respects International Law and UN Policy in its operations, regarding the use of force, detention, peacekeeping intelligence and the environment.
- The UN Military must be prepared to use the necessary force to protect civilians and the mission, but not more than necessary.
- The Missions privileges and immunities legally protect the mission and all its staff against reprisals and attacks, but UN personnel can always be held responsible for genuine criminal conducts.

Module

3

Operational Framework

Module 3 at a Glance

Aim

The aim of this module is to ensure that all UN Military Staff Officers (MSOs) in the FHQ and SHQ fully comprehend the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP).

Relevance

Module 3 provides an overview of the planning process in Peace Operations, encompassing the Integrated Assessment Planning (IAP) Process and detailed lessons of each step of the UN MDMP. Additionally, the module offers an overview of the concepts and practices of intelligence acquisition and processing in a complex UN peace operation environment, as well as the UN mission support system and its operations in support of field missions. Furthermore, Module 3 includes lessons on crisis management in the UNHQ and DPO-led field missions, along with an overview of the concepts related to Operational Rhythm, Staff Work, and Digital Tools in UN Peacekeeping Operations HQs.

All MSOs in the FHQ and SHQ of a UN mission need to understand the precursors to the UN MDMP, as well as the UN mission support concept for peacekeeping operations, in order to actively participate in the process. Additionally, staff officers must be conversant with the mission's crisis response to implement timely and effective plans in the event of a crisis. Successful military operations rely on commanders and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process. This is further grounded in a critical analysis of the Operational Environment, culminating in the development of effective Courses of Action.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this Module, participants will be able to:

- Explain the UN intelligence principles
- Describe UN Mission Support for uniformed personnel
- Explain the crisis response mechanism in field missions
- Explain the Operational Rhythm concept at the FHQ
- Describe the 5 steps of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

Overview

Module 3: Operational Framework comprises of five lessons that are structured to help achieve the learning objectives:

- Lesson 3.1: UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence
- Lesson 3.2: UN Mission Support
- Lesson 3.3: Crisis Management
- Lesson 3.4: Operational Rhythm, Staff Work and Digital Tools
- Lesson 3.5: UN Planning Process and UN Military Decision-Making Process
    - Lesson 3.5a: Planning in Peace Operations and Integrated Assessment Planning Process (IAP)
    - Lesson 3.5b: Overview of the UN Military Decision-Making Process
    - Lesson 3.5c: Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)
    - Lesson 3.5d: Mission Analysis
    - Lesson 3.5e: Course of Action Development
    - Lesson 3.5f: Course of Action Analysis, Comparison and Selection
    - Lesson 3.5g: Decision and Order Development

Module 3 - Introduction

Slide 1

Key Message: Module 3 provides an overview of the planning process in Peace Operations, encompassing the Integrated Assessment Planning (IAP) Process and detailed lessons of each step of the UN MDMP. Additionally, the module offers an overview of the concepts and practices of intelligence acquisition and processing in a complex UN peace operation environment, as well as the UN mission support system and its operations in support of field missions. Furthermore, Module 3 includes lessons on crisis management in the UNHQ and DPO-led field missions, along with an overview of the concepts related to Operational Rhythm, Staff Work, and Digital Tools in UN Peacekeeping Operations HQs.

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

Key Message: These are the Lessons we will cover in this Module.

- Lesson 3.1: UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence
- Lesson 3.2: UN Mission Support
- Lesson 3.3: Crisis Management
- Lesson 3.4: Operational Rhythm, Staff Work and Digital Tools
- Lesson 3.5: UN Planning Process and UN Military Decision-Making Process
    - 3.5a: Planning in Peace Operations and Integrated Assessment Planning Process (IAP)
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    - 3.5f: Course of Action Analysis, Comparison and Selection
    - 3.5g: Decision and Order Development

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Explain the UN intelligence principles
- Describe UN Mission Support for uniformed personnel
- Explain the crisis response mechanism in field missions
- Explain the Operational Rhythm concept at the FHQ
- Describe the 5 steps of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Lesson
3.1

UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.1 provides an overview of the concepts and practices of intelligence acquisition and processing in a United Nations Peace Operation environment.

Relevance

As UN Peacekeeping Missions are deployed to complex environments, with dynamic evolving situations and developments, the requirement to provide the mission leadership and its staff with timely and accurate information, to understand the operating environment and to enable the leadership to make intelligence-driven decisions gained importance. Thus, the requirement for Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) is growing and it is important for MSOs to understand its concepts and practices.

Note:

Detailed training on tasks and responsibilities for United Nations Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers (MPKIO) is available in the Reinforcement Training Package for MPKIO, accessible in the Peacekeeping Resource Hub at https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/rtp/MPKIO.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the UN peacekeeping-intelligence principles
- Identify the PK-I and MPK-I Cycle
- Identify key mechanisms for the management of UN PK-I in Missions

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 37
Summary of Key Messages	38
Learning Activity	25

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.1 provides an overview of the concepts and practices of intelligence acquisition and processing in a United Nations peace operation environment.

As UN Peacekeeping Missions are deployed to complex environments, with dynamic evolving situations and developments, the requirement to provide the mission leadership and its staff with timely and accurate information, to understand the operating environment and to enable the leadership to make intelligence-driven decisions gained importance. Thus, the requirement for Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PK-I) is growing and it is important for MSOs to understand its concepts and practices.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the UN peacekeeping-intelligence principles
- Identify the PK-I and MPK-I Cycle
- Identify key mechanisms for the management of UN PK-I in Missions

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: This is the definition of UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence as contained in the 2019 Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (Ref. 2019.08, 1 May 2019).

☞ ***Note to instructor*** – Consider discussing the following with participants:

"Why has the UN now embraced Intelligence instead of Information?"

The United Nations' embrace of intelligence over information reflects a shift towards a more proactive and strategic approach in addressing complex global challenges. Intelligence involves the analysis and synthesis of information to generate insights, predictions, and recommendations, enabling more informed decision-making. In contrast to mere data collection, intelligence emphasises understanding the underlying dynamics, motives, and implications of events.

In today's rapidly evolving world, characterised by multifaceted threats such as conflicts, terrorism, and humanitarian crises, the UN recognises the need to anticipate and respond effectively. Embracing intelligence allows the organisation to assess risks, identify trends, and develop nuanced strategies for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Intelligence-driven decision-making enhances the UN's ability to address root causes and respond promptly to emerging crises, contributing to more proactive and impactful interventions.

By incorporating intelligence into its operations, the UN aims to enhance its overall effectiveness, adaptability, and efficiency in promoting peace, security, and sustainable development globally. This strategic shift aligns with the dynamic nature of contemporary challenges, emphasising a forward-looking and comprehensive approach to international peace and security.

Slide 5



Key Message: Consistent with relevant Security Council resolutions, the fundamental purpose of peacekeeping-intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to enhance situational awareness, and the safety and security of UN personnel, and inform activities and operations-related to the protection of civilians.

Specifically, peacekeeping-intelligence is intended to:

- **Support a common operational picture:** Up-to-date, accurate peacekeeping-intelligence supports the establishment and maintenance of a coherent, real-time, operational understanding of the mission area to support planning and operations.
- **Provide early warning of imminent threats:** Peacekeeping-intelligence contributes to the early warning of; imminent threat to life, major destruction of property, significant restrictions of movement, etc., to enable the mission to act appropriately in accordance with its mandate.
- **Identify risks and opportunities:** Peacekeeping-intelligence can provide mission leadership with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape, and of associated risks and opportunities for mandate implementation, including with respect to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel, and the protection of civilians.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - More detailed information can be found in the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (Ref. 2019.08), section A. Purpose and Rationale.

Slide 6



Key Message: There are two primary sets of principles guiding the PK-I framework. One is the overarching set of principles from the UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, and the other set is a "more practical and military-focused" principles from the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPK-I) Handbook. The Handbook provides us with operating principles to help guide us in our duties.

These overarching principles shall inform all activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations at all stages of the management of peacekeeping-intelligence. All subordinate guidance, directives, plans, and operations will comply with and apply these principles.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - More detailed information can be found in the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (Ref. 2019.08), section C. Policy. 9. Principles of Peacekeeping Intelligence.

Slide 7



Key Message: All Peacekeeping-Intelligence activities will be undertaken in line with the Security Council mandates of peacekeeping operations as well as in full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Under Rules: These activities shall be consistent with the overall legal framework governing United Nations peacekeeping operations, including the basic principles of Peacekeeping and all legal and human rights standards and obligations. Peacekeeping-intelligence activities must be conducted with full respect for human rights, including the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association and with particular care not to expose any sources or potential sources of information to harm.

Slide 8



Key Message: The UNPK-I principle of non-clandestine is best described as what we cannot do as shown on this slide.

Clandestine activities, defined as the acquisition of information or intelligence conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities, because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, are outside the boundaries of peacekeeping-intelligence and shall not be undertaken by participating mission entities.

Regular training and education, including standardized pre-deployment training for all personnel involved in all aspects of peacekeeping-intelligence, as well as regular audits and oversight of the peacekeeping-intelligence workflow, will reinforce this principle.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask participants to give examples of possible clandestine activities in peacekeeping operations or conduct a short learning activity to discuss the meaning and specific examples of clandestine activities. Consider commencing a discussion by asking participants if it is appropriate to represent themselves to others as something other than what they are, for example, as individuals working for an NGO. It may also provoke debate by asking whether the UN can pay its sources.

- The response in both cases is "NO".

Slide 9



Key Message: The acquisition and management of information or intelligence by United Nations peacekeeping operations will be conducted to enhance situational awareness, and the safety and security of UN personnel, and to inform operations and activities related to the protection of civilians tasks of the Security Council mandates.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask participants if it is ever permissible to acquire information on host nation security forces.

The response here is "YES" if it relates to tasks the UN MPKI is designed to support. For example, if host nation security forces act or are about to act to undermine the security of civilians.

However, it is a very sensitive topic.

- Ask participants to list what they think is not permissible in terms of information acquisition. This is designed to promote debate. Moreover, while there may be many limitations, the permissible areas of application support most acquisition activity.

Slide 10

Key Message: A UN peacekeeping operation is deployed with the consent of the Host government. Therefore, the sovereignty of states, including the Host and neighbouring states, must always be respected.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask participants if it is permissible to acquire information using mission assets in a neighbouring country. For example, armed groups often do not respect state borders and may use neighbouring states to consolidate and prepare for attacks. Can a mission monitor these areas using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as part of its information Acquisition Plan?

The answer here is "NO", and this is not permissible unless done with the express permission of that state. However, the UN MPK-I section may acquire some information passively by engaging with refugees, for example, or by engaging in open-source research. The key point is that it cannot task organic acquisition assets to operate in other states as part of its intelligence acquisition.

- Ask participants how the attitude of a Host State can impact peacekeeping-intelligence activities and give examples, if possible. For example, some host nations have been known to restrict freedom of movement and deny access to areas where missions need to acquire information.

Slide 11



Key Message: The peacekeeping-intelligence activities of peacekeeping operations will be fully autonomous and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence system or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character. Missions may liaise with non-mission entities for the purposes of receiving intelligence and may share specific peacekeeping-intelligence with non-mission entities, including Host States, provided they do so under conditions and within the parameters described in this material and related guidance.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Generally, it is the Head of Mission's responsibility to determine the entities that the mission can share intelligence with.

Slide 12



Key Message: Those who are given the authority to make decisions regarding peacekeeping-intelligence activities must have the appropriate capabilities to execute these functions and remain accountable for the effective execution of these responsibilities within their respective chains of command to the Head of Mission and ultimately to the Secretary-General.

Within the mission, the Head of Mission (HOM) is accountable for the functioning of the peacekeeping-intelligence system. S/he is responsible for ensuring compliance with this UN PK-I Policy and associated guidance by personnel engaged with or using peacekeeping-intelligence products, through effective governance procedures, training and practices are in place.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** It is important to note that authority for the overall PK-I cycle resides with the Head of Mission. However, the HOM will often delegate such authority for UN Military PK-I to the Force Commander. DPO Guidelines for Sharing Peacekeeping-Intelligence with and Receiving Intelligence from Non-UN and Non-Mission UN Entities (Dec 2022) can be referenced.

Slide 13



Key Message: Peacekeeping-intelligence shall be stored and shared in a secure manner, while ensuring access for those who require it for decision-making and operational planning.

Based on an assessment of risk, missions will put in place procedural, technological and physical security tools in consultation with DPO and DOS to ensure secure information management and communications within the peacekeeping-intelligence system. Confidential peacekeeping-intelligence products shall be shared and disseminated on the basis of the "need to know" and "need to share" concepts, which require that peacekeeping-intelligence should be disclosed to mission personnel if and only if access to said information is required for them to carry out their official duties.

It also requires a written delegation of authority from the originator or staff member who originally applied the classification level. It implies that peacekeeping-intelligence is only disclosed to trusted individuals to ensure that it is not widely disseminated, in particular where disclosure is likely to endanger the safety or security of any individual or group, violate rights or invade privacy. In doing so, missions will seek to establish and maintain a high degree of confidence among all of their interlocutors in their ability to appropriately acquire, protect and manage peacekeeping-intelligence.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask the participants to debate the difference between 'need to know' and 'need to share'. What we are looking for here is that there is no point in producing excellent intelligence product if it does not get to the right people. There may also be problems with the over-classification of information and intelligence in the UN system.

Slide 14



Key Message: After examining the primary set of principles guiding the PK-I framework, which encompasses the overarching principles from the UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, we will now delve into the second set. This set focuses on the Military PK-I (MPK-I) principles outlined in the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook. The Handbook provides essential operating principles to assist us in our duties.

When operating within the MPK-I environment, several practical principles can enhance its effectiveness. Let's explore these principles as illustrated on this slide.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** **-** For further detailed information, refer to the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPK-I) Handbook (2019), Chapter 3: UN MPK-I Structures, Roles, and Responsibilities.

Slide 15



Key Message: Military peacekeeping-Intelligence is a centrally coordinated process that involves consolidating information inputs from decentralised entities deployed across a wide geographic area, integrating various functions and expertise.

Therefore, it is essential for a senior peacekeeping-intelligence officer not only to possess expertise in peacekeeping-intelligence but also to ensure that the MPKI structure is command-led. While the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan (ISP) can achieve this at the beginning of an operation, maintaining MPK-I leadership is an ongoing requirement.

☞ ***Notes to instructor -*** Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask participants which tool is most effective in ensuring that the process remains command-led and centralised. This should lead to a discussion about the central Information Acquisition Plan (IAP), which guides both the information acquisition process and the tasking of acquisition assets. Participants should also consider the importance of direction and the necessity for all acquired information to address the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements.

Slide 16



Key Message: It is an accepted principle that Peacekeeping-Intelligence systems thrive under centralised control with decentralised execution.

Centralised control means that both the peacekeeping-intelligence effort is explicitly linked to the commander's requirements and that the MPK-I organisation is operating as a homogenous system: maximizing capability and minimizing duplication.

Decentralised execution means that once the centralised control has been exerted, the disparate elements of the MPK-I structure should be trusted to execute their part in the peacekeeping intelligence acquisition and support plans without unnecessary interference.

☞ ***Notes to instructor*** **-** We say 'unwanted' duplication of effort because it is often advisable to have more than one acquisition platform responding to the same information requirement. This helps ensure that you have information from multiple different sources.

Slide 17



Key Message: Peacekeeping-intelligence must never be distorted to fit a preconceived idea or to conform with strongly held views of senior leadership.

The MPK-I unit must have the moral courage to report what it considers to be the most accurate assessment and avoid analytical biases such as 'group think'. Equally, analysts must not become too emotionally invested in their assessments as it may skew their judgements. Robust debate, key assumption checks, and 'red teaming' are good ways of ensuring that objectivity is maintained.

Slide 18



Key Message: Peacekeeping-intelligence is useless unless it reaches those who need to know by the time they need to know it.

There is always a requirement to protect peacekeeping-intelligence sources and conform to UN information handling protocols; however, there is also a requirement to ensure that assessments are 'written for release' and therefore are as widely available as deemed possible. Good peacekeeping-intelligence that cannot be accessed by the staff that require it, or that reaches a commander after the decision on his/her course of action has been made, is worthless. At all times remember peacekeeping-intelligence must be accessible and timely.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Consider discussing the following with participants:

Ask participants if they think that there is a tendency for MPK-I officers to over classify their intelligence products. Discuss the 'need to know' concept and the 'need to share' concept.

Slide 19



Key Message: A strong Intelligence Support Plan (ISP) with clear responsibilities, SOPs, timings, reports and returns, and battle-rhythm sets the MPK-I structure up for success.

The mission must invest time to ensure that the ISP is clear, up to date, well understood, and disseminated to those who need it. The ISP and the "operational-rhythm" provide the COGs that make the MPK-I machine work.

Notes to instructor:

- An ISP template is available at Annex B of the MPKI-Handbook.
- Participants should note that most UN missions will have several other intelligence-producing and/or information-acquiring entities such as the JMAC, UNDSS, JOC, Political and Civil Affairs units, UNPOL, etc. The activities of these units must be centrally regulated through the MICM.

Slide 20



Key Message: This slide shows and summarises the two different peacekeeping-intelligence principles.

On the left side are the overall principles for UN peacekeeping-intelligence, and

On the right are the more practical military peacekeeping-intelligence principles.

Slide 21



Key Message: The UN Peacekeeping-intelligence cycle is the process by which peacekeeping-intelligence is acquired, examined/collated, analysed, and disseminated based on clearly identified Intelligence Requirements.

Standards, tools, techniques, and procedures for the effective and efficient completion of each stage of the cycle by individual mission components are the subjects of subordinate operational guidance.

It is typically represented as a closed cyclical path of activities that takes you through the various steps of the process.

It is important to note that if any part of this cycle fails, then the process does not work. If the direction is poor, then the wrong information is acquired. If the acquisition is poor, then the information may not be acquired at all. In both those cases, even if the PK-I section has the world's best analysts, the adage 'garbage in, garbage out' applies, whereby poor information is analysed, thereby giving a poor final intelligence product. If the information is good, yet the analysis is poor, it is an issue. This will ensure the delivery of a poor final intelligence product. Finally, if dissemination practices are poor, the intelligence product – however brilliant it may be – will not reach the right customer at the right time.

Slide 22



Key Message: The 4-step cycle in the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook slightly differs in appearance from the 5-step cycle in the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy. The former incorporates examination and collation into a single step within the analysis, which is more common among military intelligence professionals.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** **-** For further detailed information, refer to the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (2019), Chapter 4: UN MPK-I Cycle, Peacekeeping-Intelligence overview and functions.

Slide 23



Key Message: Direction refers to the process of identifying questions that need to be answered, specifying outstanding "Information or Intelligence Requirements (IRs)" in relation to those questions, and seeking this information through a variety of means.

Direction ensures strong central control of the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle, tying the requirements of the Head of Mission and his/her Senior Leadership Team to the management of peacekeeping-intelligence. It provides the basis for IRs, prioritization of tasks and timeframes shall flow through the peacekeeping-intelligence management structures established in the mission.

Decisions on intelligence activities shall be taken under the authority and accountability of the Head of Mission or within the delegated authority he or she designates.

Military PK-I Direction "translates" into:

Clear direction from the Commander, at all levels, is the start point for the MPK-I Cycle. Direction outlines to the MPK-I staff what the commander wants to know and ensures that the peacekeeping-intelligence staff have a clear focus for their acquisition efforts. It is also important to understand that information acquisition and analytical capabilities are usually limited, and therefore direction should ideally include prioritisation (whether or not an IR is Mission Critical, Mission Essential, or Mission Desirable), so limited capabilities can be focussed on the highest priorities.

The direction is often taken from the following: commander's intent, the mission, the mandate, the MPK-I cell's knowledge of the Operating Environment, and Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

Often the MPK-I cell will have to present an IAP to the commander and their staff for approval, rather than being given PIRs. However, it is vital that this IAP is endorsed by the commander to give it the weight of an operations order.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) In some cases, the MSOs (peacekeeping-intelligence officers) may have to assist their local commander in drawing up their IRs. It is vital that peacekeeping-intelligence officers have a detailed knowledge of the mission, the mandate, operational tasks, the OE, and of all relevant local actors, including those that are supportive, neutral, and threatening. The type of issues that should be discussed, and questions that should be asked are as follows:

- What do you want to know?
- What do you need to know to ensure effective mandate, mission or operational task implementation relating to the protection of UN personnel and civilians?
- What specific threats to mandate or task implementation relating to the protection of UN personnel and civilians do you require MPK-I?
- What geographical areas do you require acquisition coverage?
- What are your information priorities?
- When, where, and in what format (written product or brief, for example) do you need the reporting?

b) For further detailed information, refer to the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (2019), Chapter 5: Direction.

Slide 24



Key Message: After ascertaining the requirements and according priority, the next step is the acquisition of the data or information, which is required to feed the analytical step of the cycle.

While many MPK-I acquisition resources will be the same across missions (e.g. UN Military patrols and observers), some acquisition capabilities will only be available in certain mission areas. MPK-I personnel must develop the fullest awareness of all the sources and agencies they are able to task with acquisition. It is important to note that the MPKI section will rarely have tasking authority over acquisition assets, as the operations section will normally be the tasking authority. Therefore, the MPK-I cell must work to build relationships with other units, particularly the operations section, thereby fostering mutual understanding and encouraging mutual support.

Effective acquisition greatly depends on the clarity of requirements to ensure that resources are used in the most effective manner. Experience suggests that some requirements warrant one specific type of acquisition, whereas others may require several different types of acquisition. It is important to highlight that military information acquisition can be broken down into two types, Information Requirements (IRs) and Requests for Information (RFI).

- An **Information Requirement (IR)** is where the MPK-I entity owns the capability required to acquire the information. The acquisition assets are considered organic to the organization. For example, a Battalion S2 tasking a Company patrol.

- A **Request for Information (RFI)** is made when the MPK-I entity does not own the assets required to acquire the needed information and thus must send an external request to another part of the MPK-I architecture in the form of an RFI. All RFIs must receive a response, even if it is a nil response from those asked.

- **Prioritisation**: The prioritisation of IRs is important to make the acquisition effort more efficient and focused. Prioritization is the ordering of IRs according to whether they are mission-critical, essential, or desirable. IRs can also be time-sensitive and often include a 'Not Later Than' (NLT) or 'Last Time Information is of Value' (LTIOV) label. This also helps the MPK-I cell to focus its acquisition effort. Most RFIs adhere to the same system and will always have an NLT or LTIOV label. There should also be a review process that assesses the degree of fulfilment of the requirement so that if fulfilled, it can be removed from the list.

It is important to note that Missions do not rely only on organic acquisition assets. Missions may also receive intelligence provided by Member States as well as other non-mission entities and shall establish mechanisms to facilitate the secure receipt and handling of such products. Modalities for sharing and the legal acquisition of information will be contained in the mission ISP.

☞ ***Note to instructor –*** For further detailed information, refer to the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (2019), Chapter 4: UN MPK-I Cycle, Peacekeeping-Intelligence overview and functions.

Slide 25



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate eight (8) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the group. Highlight the importance of the integrated approach.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Possible Expected outcomes:
Question 1:

- Military assets: JOC, UNMOs, UAVs, Patrols, Aviation assets, Open source.

- Other mission partners: UNDSS, UNMAS, Civil Affairs, UNCT.

Question 2:

- No one best acquisition method – depends on the situation and capabilities.

- Different means of access.

- Different requirements and focus.

Slide 26



Key Message: The key part of the MPK-I Cycle where raw, unprocessed data and/or information is converted into all-source, fused Peacekeeping-Intelligence.

This step is composed of the following stages:

- **Review:** Search the information system/database to identify already existing information/Peacekeeping-Intelligence about the IR / RFI.
- **Collation:** The grouping and recording of information in a manner that allows it to be readily accessible and traceable when required; it also enables convenient comparison, evaluation, assessment and retrieval whenever required. However, experience suggests that for better collation, all available information should be logged and then evaluated for relevance, degree of urgency, and reliability and probability. This is a result of good Information Management (IM) practices.
- **Evaluation:** This requires the review of an item of information to assess its reliability and credibility. This evaluation enables analysts to prevent unreliable information from being given too much credibility thus leading to incorrect judgments.
- **Analysis & Integration:** The methodical breaking down of information into its component parts; examination of each to find interrelationships; and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and the whole. The result should be a predictive Peacekeeping-Intelligence assessment that will enhance current understanding.
- **Interpretation:** This is the interpretation of the new Peacekeeping-Intelligence against existing knowledge and assessments. Essentially, interpreting the new Peacekeeping-Intelligence in the context of what is already understood or assessed to refine predictive assessments.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Analysis is the structured examination of all relevant information to develop knowledge, which helps to give meaning to events within an operational environment. Interpretation involves interpreting the new PK-I against existing knowledge and assessment to refine predictive assessments. Strong analysis gives advance warning of events or courses of action that could threaten effective mandate implementation relating to the protection of UN personnel and civilians.

b) For further detailed information, refer to the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook (2019), Chapter 4: UN MPK-I Cycle, Peacekeeping-Intelligence overview and functions.

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

Key Message: The final stage of the MPK-I Cycle is the process of conveying or distributing peacekeeping-intelligence to decision-makers and other relevant mission personnel, which must be done without loss of timeliness.

The dissemination of peacekeeping-intelligence products shall be done in compliance with the 'Need to Know/Need to Share' concepts as stipulated in either the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan and/or relevant SOPs. It should be noted that human rights and humanitarian law violations including trafficking, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and crimes against children have mandatory reporting requirements. Any information about these offences uncovered during the MPK-I cycle must be reported through the appropriate channels.

The experienced peacekeeping-intelligence professional will be able to ascertain where risk can be taken within the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle process - he/she doesn't always have to follow the cycle step by step. For example, while trying to follow the direction, it is possible that the organization already has all the data and information it needs to answer the question, so no acquisition is required. Accordingly, all that is required is the analysis of the data followed by dissemination. In another unusual or extreme case, once direction has been received, it is possible that the desired or required peacekeeping-intelligence already exists, and thus acquisition and analysis can be omitted while disseminating immediately, which would be the only required phase.

Some information must be communicated directly to leadership if there is no time for it to be fully processed. Examples of such information include time-sensitive data such as threats to the civilian population and/or to force protection. However, this information must be adequately caveated if it has not been processed. For example, the commander must be informed that it has not yet been corroborated or validated if this is the case, or that it is a single source.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Strong dissemination protocols must be in place to ensure that intelligence products reach leadership in a timely and secure manner.

b) The best intelligence product ever produced would still be considered a failure if it did not reach its intended audience in a timely manner.

Slide 28



Key Message: Just a short reminder regarding the dissemination of information. The information needs to be classified based on the content and what possible negative effect it might have on the UN peacekeeping mission or the United Nations if the information is addressed/obtained by the wrong recipient.

- **UN Strictly Confidential** – applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE or IMPEDE THE CONDUCT OF THE WORK of the United Nations.
- **UN Confidential** – applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause DAMAGE TO THE WORK of the United Nations.
- **UN Classified** – applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected NOT TO CAUSE DAMAGE to the work of the United Nations.

Dissemination of UN PK-I products:

- **Within the mission**: Default approach should allow for sharing of intelligence within the mission.
- **With non-mission and non-UN entities**: Documented and justified in terms of the mandate, and approved by HoM or delegated authority.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) The default approach towards the dissemination of information within missions, including peacekeeping intelligence products, should allow for sharing of information within the mission; information should be classified on an exceptional basis and only as required according to the criteria in the Secretary General's Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling (ST/SGB/2007/6).

b) The decision to share peacekeeping intelligence with non-mission (e.g. members of the United Nations Country Team) and/or non-United Nations entities (e.g. the Host State) rests with the Head of Mission, as the delegated official by the Secretary-General, in consultation with UN Headquarters as required. Should the Head of Mission elect to further delegate decision-making authority over peacekeeping-intelligence sharing to subordinate personnel, this delegation shall be documented and accompanied by guidance on principles and parameters for peacekeeping-intelligence sharing with partners.

c) In accordance with the UN Policy on the Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System, arrangements for the sharing of intelligence with other UN entities shall include cases in which peacekeeping-intelligence relates to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel, premises and assets and is therefore relevant to the broader UN system operating within the mission area. Such intelligence shall be passed to the senior-most UNDSS representative (or his/her designated representative) and the Designated Official for security. These arrangements shall be included in the Mission Intelligence Support Plan.

d) Missions may share peacekeeping intelligence with non-mission, non-United Nations entities, such as host state security forces or parallel security operations insofar as doing so falls within the mission's mandate and is consistent with applicable rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the United Nations. When shared with such entities, products shall be accompanied by written arrangements ensuring originator control over any subsequent use or application. All instances of peacekeeping-intelligence sharing must be registered centrally by authorized and trained personnel, documented and justified in terms of the mandate, and approved by the Head of Mission or the delegated authority. Arrangements for decision-making and record keeping on the sharing of intelligence shall be detailed in the mission's Intelligence Support Plan.

e) All decisions to share intelligence products with non-mission entities shall be taken based on the rules, regulations and policies of the United Nations. Where peacekeeping intelligence may be shared, either directly or indirectly, with non-United Nations security forces, the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP) applies. Mechanisms, structure and processes required to ensure compliance are included in the HRDDP. Where technical arrangements exist for the ongoing sharing of sensitive information between the mission and non-United Nations security forces, a general and preliminary risk assessment may be conducted but shall be regularly reviewed and decisions to share peacekeeping intelligence shall be taken on a case-by-case basis.

f) The sharing of peacekeeping-intelligence products with third parties that could raise issues in terms of the Mission's mandate, the UN Charter, UN rules and regulations, and any bilateral arrangements or agreements with non-UN parties may be submitted to the guidance of the Mission's Senior Legal Advisor for advice. Further advice may in addition be sought from UNHQ, including the Office of Legal Affairs.

g) For detail information, refer to DPO Guidelines on Sharing Peacekeeping-Intelligence with and Receiving Intelligence from Non-UN and Non-Mission UN Entities.

Slide 29



Key Message: The UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Cycle and management structure are designed to direct, acquire, collate, analyse, and disseminate Peacekeeping-Intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This is necessary to inform decision-making at all levels of the UN structure.

- **Strategic Peacekeeping-Intelligence (SPK-I)** informs the United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) and its departments involved in peacekeeping operations.

- **Operational Peacekeeping-Intelligence (OPK-I)** refers to the intelligence requirements and processing at the Mission level. Operational-level Peacekeeping-Intelligence encompasses products that inform the UN Force Commander's decision-making process. Information acquired and Peacekeeping-Intelligence produced at this level, when combined with that of other mission entities, will inform the decision-making process of the Head of Mission (HoM)/Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), which often has a more strategic focus.

- **Tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence (TPK-I)** relates to the G2 at Sector level and S2 at Battalion level; there is also likely to be similar representation from police and civilian mission components. Tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence is required both to support the local commander and to feed localized Peacekeeping-Intelligence up the chain to inform the operational and strategic Peacekeeping-Intelligence picture. Just because it is conducted at the lowest level does not mean that tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence is not important. Tactical Peacekeeping-Intelligence or even unprocessed information acquired at the tactical level may have strategic importance. In many large UN peacekeeping missions, it is crucial that the G2 is also able to provide short- and medium-

term analysis by acquiring and analysing information from multiple sources and preparing integrated analysis and predictive assessments to Support the decision-making, planning, and crisis management of the Sector Commander and need to be shared with the FHQ/Mission HQ for their respective PK-I processing.

Notes to instructor:

At the strategic level, all UN departments involved in peacekeeping operations have elements dealing with information and analysis:

- Within DPO, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) has the Current Military Operations Service (CMOS) dealing with current information from the military channel in UN peacekeeping missions, as well as an Assessment Team (AT), comprising trained intelligence officers, focused on the production of regional Peacekeeping-Intelligence assessments.
- In addition, the Single Regional Structures (SRS) reporting to both DPO and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) serve as a mechanism to deliver strategic and operational guidance to field missions. Furthermore, the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team (PICT) in the Office of the USG DPO is in charge of coordinating Peacekeeping-Intelligence activities by all participating actors at UNHQ and in the field and ensuring compliance with the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy Framework.
- The Department of Safety and Security (DSS) has a Threat and Risk Assessment Service in charge of providing intelligence through regional- and country-specific threat assessments to support field duty stations and to ensure the safety and security of all civilian personnel.
- The United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) provide the 24/7 communication between the strategic and mission level and also serve as a key information and Analysis hub at UNWG level. In addition, it provides policy and guidance to the JMACs at mission level.

Slide 30



Key Message: At the operational level, the key entities in the management of operational Peacekeeping-Intelligence are: JMAC, JOC, U2, CPKIU, CSA, among others.

The **JMAC** is an integrated entity comprising civilian, military, and police personnel, established to support mission-level planning and decision-making through the provision of integrated analysis and predictive assessments. The JMAC acquires and analyses multi-source information to prepare mid- to long-term integrated analysis and assessments for strategic, operational, and contingency planning, decision-making, and crisis management.

The **JOC** is an integrated entity established to support the decision-making processes of the MLT and UNHQ through the provision of integrated situational awareness in routine and special incident reporting. The JOC acquires and collates all current reporting, receiving reports from all in-theatre UN entities, and has a 24-hour monitoring capability. The JOC strives to establish information exchange and working relationships with relevant UNCT/Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) entities.

Details about JMAC and JOC were discussed in Module 1.

While the **Force Headquarters (FHQ) MPK-I Cell (U2)** cell is obviously part of the MPK-I structure, it is important to recognise that it is also part of the Mission's operational Peacekeeping-Intelligence structure. Military units beneath the FHQ level often have unique access and a valuable perspective on the tactical situation.

The **Police Component | Crime Peacekeeping-Intelligence Unit (CPKIU)** is normally similar to the military component, with Sector- and Battalion-level deployments and can provide valuable Peacekeeping-Intelligence from a police perspective.

UNDSS/Chief Security Advisor (CSA) has the responsibility to provide protection and security advice for UN civilian personnel, the CSA and other UNDSS personnel have access to security-related information. As such, they have much to offer to the MPK-I organization.

Other Entities: Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Liaison, Civil-Military Affairs personnel, as well as those working with Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) mandates can be a rich source of information. Where possible and appropriate, the U2 should strive to develop relationships with them. These entities may also, on invitation from the Chief JMAC, be members of the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM).

Slide 31



Key Message: Individually, the different entities of a UN mission (UNDSS, U2, UNPOL, JOC, JMAC) serve as providers of operational peacekeeping-intelligence; however, their collaborative efforts result in more effective and coordinated operational peacekeeping intelligence.

This cooperation is facilitated through the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM). While the specifics of the MICM may vary across missions, its core principles remain consistent:

The Mechanism comprises mission entities responsible for peacekeeping intelligence acquisition, analysis, and dissemination, typically including the JMAC, JOC, UNDSS, and relevant military and police components (such as the U2). Other mission entities may be invited to participate as required.

The purpose of the MICM is to provide centralized control, allowing for decentralized execution, direction, and coordination of the mission's peacekeeping intelligence system.

The MICM may operate as a standalone body, or its functions may be integrated within the JMAC.

The primary responsibilities of the MICM, as outlined in the Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, include the following:

- Deriving strategic guidance from senior mission leadership and translating it into Priority Peacekeeping Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and other Information Requirements (IRs).
- Managing the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) and the acquisition effort to fulfil all senior leadership IRs.
- Developing and maintaining the Mission Intelligence Support Plan (MISP).

It is important to note that some of the MPK-I IRs will originate from the MICM, and these IRs will be incorporated into the Force IAP. Representatives of the Force Commander, likely the Chief U2, must also participate in regular MICM meetings.

Slide 32



Key Message: The primary responsibilities of the MICM are outlined in the PKI Policy but include the following:

- Draw strategic guidance from senior mission leadership and translate this guidance into Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
- Manage the Mission Information Acquisition Plan and the acquisition effort, satisfying all senior leadership Peacekeeping-Intelligence requirements (IRs).
- Develop and maintain the Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan (MISP).

Note that some of the Military PK-I IRs will originate from the MICM and that these IRs will form part of the Force IAP. Representatives of the Force Commander (most likely the Chief U2) must also participate in regular MICM meetings.

Slide 33



Key Message: The Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) is a tool that captures all the Peacekeeping-Intelligence requirements (questions) from the Mission leadership, including the Force Commander, and from other sources that need to be answered using PKISR assets.

The IAP is a living document. It must be reviewed regularly to ensure questions have been answered and that new requirements are added to the plan. The plan is the basis for collating requirements, prioritising them and tasking PKISR, ensuring the right sensor is deployed to answer a specific question.

Several IAPs will exist within the mission, such as a Mission / Force / Sector and Battalion IAP depending on the different assets and questions being asked at each level.

The IAP is the basis for an executive order. The staff use the IAP to task, direct and manage acquisition assets to acquire information against the requirements. The daily tasking of ISR assets will be found in the Force's Information Acquisition List, which we will go on to next.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Some participants may be accustomed to referring to an IAP as an Information Collection Plan (ICP). The instructor can explain they are one and the same, but the UN uses the word 'acquisition' rather than 'collection' due to political sensitivities connected to the latter.

b) Not to be confused with Integrated Assessment and Planning Process (IAP), which will be discussed later in Lesson 3.5.

Slide 34



Key Message: The Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Support Plan (MISP) outlines how intelligence will support the overall mission objectives. It focuses on the acquisition (collection), analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This includes strategic intelligence about the operational environment, tactical intelligence for day-to-day operations, and operational intelligence to support specific missions or tasks.

The MISP covers the management of intelligence resources, defines the roles and responsibilities within the intelligence structure of the operation, and specifies the procedures for intelligence sharing.

In comparison to the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP), the key difference lies in their scope and detail:

- The MISP is broader, dealing with the strategic role of intelligence and how it integrates with the mission's goals, including the sensitive aspects of intelligence work.
- The IAP is narrower, focusing on the practical aspects of collecting information from various sources, which may or may not be part of formal intelligence operations.

In the context of UN peacekeeping, both plans must align with the mission's mandate and the UN's principles, such as impartiality and respect for human rights. The IAP would be a component of the broader MISP, detailing how information necessary for creating intelligence products is to be gathered in the field.

Slide 35



Key Message: The different entities' intelligence focus will target their specific requirements.

While the focus of military intelligence gathering and analysis is for the purposes of military operations, the intelligence gathering and analysis of UNDSS are concerned specifically with the safety and security of UN personnel, assets, and programmes in operations.

The MSC focuses on day-to-day situational awareness, and the JMAC carries out analysis on emerging issues and trends, basing its assessments on its verification and analysis of past events.

The focus of UNPOL intelligence is on policing-related information gathering.

JMAC products incorporate political, security, human rights, development, and humanitarian considerations. Various mission substantive sections, such as Political, Civil Affairs, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Humanitarian, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), have significant information collection capabilities, and analysts are able to contextualise information from their respective lenses.

The military component can contribute to and benefit from the work of these entities. Regular contact (weekly meetings) and information exchange at senior and working levels are strongly advised. This exchange – through the MLT (in which the Head of Military Component is represented) and through the military personnel assigned to the JMAC and MSC – will greatly improve synergies and information sharing.

Slide 36



Key Message: Peacekeeping-intelligence analysis shall be a whole-of-mission process that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages, and cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques. The examples shown are some gender-related early warning indicators/peacekeeping intelligence requirements.

Important aspects of peacekeeping intelligence – also depending on the mandate of the respective mission – might be:

- Protection of civilians intelligence requirement.
- Gender-based intelligence requirements.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** **-** More detailed information can be found in the April 2023 Guidelines – Role of the HOMC in UN PKOs, and the August 2022 Guidelines - Gender and Peacekeeping-Intelligence.

Slide 37



Key Message: The slide summarises the efforts to establish a Peacekeeping-Intelligence Framework.

Guidance on tools and activities of individual components and the functions of DPO/UNHQ offices in supporting, coordinating, and backstopping mission peacekeeping-intelligence systems will be developed/issued in subordinate operational policies and standard operational procedures (SOPs).

The graphic highlights the work done/still to be done for the strategic – mission/operational level. It also indicates the requirements for training and preparation at the unit as well as at the individual level (right side of the graphics).

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For detailed information about this slide, refer to Annex A of the 2019.08 Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence.

Slide 38



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- Peacekeeping-intelligence principles, processes, and parameters, which have been set out to manage the peacekeeping-intelligence cycle, are key to the success of peacekeeping-intelligence.
- PK-I supports UN missions to better understand their environment, and anticipate strengths, and weaknesses of spoilers that impact the execution of the mandate.
- MPK-I practical principles support the military component and their interaction with other interlocutors.
- Missions shall establish a mission intelligence coordination structure (MICS) to direct and oversee the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within the mission.
- Intelligence Requirements (IRs) derive from gaps or voids between what is known and what is not. These need to be defined by all entities of the PKMs.
- The Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan (IAP) translates the strategic direction provided by Senior Mission Leadership and requirements communicated by operational planners into tangible IRs.
- The Mission Intelligence Support Plan describes the boundaries within which the peacekeeping intelligence cycle will be executed.

☞***Note to instructor -*** For detailed information on the content of this Lesson and for additional information on PK-I, refer to the following reference materials:

- 2022.12 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (PKISR) Unit Manual
- 2022.08 Gender and Peacekeeping-Intelligence (Guidelines)
- 2022.05 Sharing Peacekeeping-Intelligence with and Receiving Intelligence from Non-UN and Non-Mission UN Entities
- 2022.03 Open-Source Peacekeeping- Intelligence (OPKI) (Guidelines)
- 2020.15 Peacekeeping-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Staff (PKISR) Handbook
- 2020.05 Acquisition of Information from Human Sources for Peacekeeping-Intelligence (HPKI) (Guideline)
- 2019.08 Peacekeeping-Intelligence (Policy)
- 2019 Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook

Lesson
3.2

UN Mission Support

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.2 provides an overview of the United Nations logistics system and its operations in support of field missions.

Relevance

Logistics is not just the realm of the logistician. All personnel deployed in the mission need to understand the mission support arrangements of the Mission.

Today, the typical field environment is remote, austere, and increasingly dangerous, sometimes openly hostile to a United Nations presence. In such settings, lines of communications (for support and sustainment) are often long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, housing stock is frequently in short supply, and reliable communications infrastructure is lacking.

MSOs' understanding of logistic support structures and services in place at the mission area will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.

Note:

Detailed training for Logistics Officers is available in the Reinforcement Training Package on Operational Logistics (OPLOG), accessible in the Peacekeeping Resource Hub at https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/rtp/OPLOG.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe UN Mission Support concept and principles
- List the key Mission Support entities in field missions
- Describe UN Mission Support to uniformed personnel

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 34
Summary of Key Messages	35
Learning Activity	36

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.2 provides an overview of the United Nations logistics system and its operations in support of field missions.

Logistics is not just the realm of the logistician. All personnel deployed in the mission need to understand the mission support arrangements of the Mission.

Today, the typical field environment is remote, austere and, increasingly, dangerous, sometimes openly hostile to a United Nations presence. In such settings, lines of communications (for support and sustainment) are often long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, housing stock is frequently in short supply, and reliable communications infrastructure is lacking.

MSOs' understanding of logistic support structures and services in place at the mission area will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe UN Mission Support concept and principles
- List the key Mission Support entities in field missions
- Describe UN Mission Support to uniformed personnel

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: The required logistics functions are generated from various sources including the UN Owned Equipment (UNOE), Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) or contractors.

The exact composition of the logistics component is decided by DOS at UNHQ during the mission planning process in consultation with relevant offices of DPO and DPPA. The combination of logistics support resources selected for a particular mission will depend on different factors including the mission's tasks, its operating environment, economics, available budget, urgency of deployment and security situation.

Slide 5



Key Message: UN Peace Operations vary widely in size and complexity, requiring tailored logistics concepts to meet their diverse needs. Concepts range from self-reliance in smaller missions to specialised logistics support groups in larger ones, with the potential for civilian service support as missions evolve.

There is a common phrase that every mission is different. Missions can range from traditional to multidimensional and thus vary in size from a small group of observers, who may be civilian, police, military or a mixture of all three, to a combined operation of land, sea and air assets involving tens of thousands of personnel. Consequently, various Logistics concepts will need to be considered to fulfil a mission's Logistics requirements. Any concept will have to be tailored for a specific mission considering the operational task, space and time, environment, climate, infrastructure, and resources available. It may include features that are mobile or static, civilian, or military, with in-theatre warehousing or national resupply lines or in most cases, a combination of all. There are, however, a number of concepts which have proven workable in past operations:

- **Self-Reliance Concept – Smaller Missions**. In some cases, reliance on the local economy may be the best method of support. There may be a requirement for a small reception team at a point of entry to maintain Logistics links with contributing Member State (MS) and the UN. While specialist repair of vehicles, communication or technical equipment may be achieved out-of-theatre, self-sufficiency is highly effective in many areas of the world where a relatively modern civilian infrastructure is available. Good examples where this concept is applied is UNMOGIP and MINURSO.

- **The Force Logistics Support Group Concept**. Larger missions with considerable equipment and volume of transactions can be better supported by specialized Logistics support groups. One MS may be tasked to assume overall responsibility for the coordination of the Logistics Support Group (LSG) and to incorporate Logistics units or National Support Elements (NSEs) from the contributing member states into the Force Logistics Base. This concept is often used on mission initiation for larger missions and is used extensively in UNDOF.
- **Civilian Service Support Concept**. As missions stay longer in an area, the opportunities to arrange Logistics support from civilian contractors increase. Assuming that civilian support is possible and cost effective, the military LSG would then be phased out or elements incorporated into Mission Support Division (MSD) as enabling units.

☞***Note to instructor*** - More detailed information can be found in the UN Operational Logistics (OPLOG) RTP. Reference Guide. Chapter 3. Logistic functions within a UN field mission.

Slide 6

Key Message: This slide shows the full spectrum of UN Mission Support provisions.

The full spectrum encompasses the following:

- Personnel
- Budgeting
- Payment
- Recruitment
- Property Management
- Procurement
- MOU administration
- Troops deployment
- COE reimbursement
- Accommodation
- Fuel
- Water Supply
- Power management
- Ration
- Information Technology (IT)
- Communication
- Transportation
- Medical service
- Disciplinary issues
- Board of inquiry
- Audit management

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - The Secretary-General, for the purposes of decentralising decision-making, aligning authorities with responsibilities and strengthening accountability, and to delegate to managers the necessary managerial authority over human, financial and physical resources to allow for effective mandate delivery, promulgates the new framework for delegation of authority in 2018 (Reference: ST/SBG/2019/2 - Secretary-General's bulletin for Delegation of authority in the administration of the Staff Regulations and Rules and the Financial Regulations and Rules). Note that not all these services may fall under the responsibility of Mission Support due to the authority, responsibility and accountability of the head of the entity/service.

Slide 7



Key Message: Service Centres serve two main goals: a) Delivers predefined modules for goods and services, which are critical enablers for rapid deployment; b) Host the operational support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services.

The United Nations Global Service Centre (UNGSC) mandate consolidates service packages for global delivery. The global service centre delivers predefined modules for goods and services at the global level, including Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Asset Management; Financial Systems technical support' Global Education grants processing; Field Contract management; and Airfield air terminal standards.

The UN Regional Service Centre - Entebbe (RSC-E) will be discussed in the next slide.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - Detailed information about the United Nations Global Service Centre (UNGSC) is available at United Nations Global Service Centre | Home Page (ungsc.org).

Slide 8



Key Message: The UN Regional Service Centre - Entebbe (RSC-E) provides a full range of administrative, logistics, and information and communications technology services to Client Missions in Africa, representing most of all United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions. The Centre delivers services at the regional level through operational support teams responsible for providing day-to-day support services that do not require the presence of the recipient of the service when the transaction is performed.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - Detailed information about the UN Regional Service Centre - Entebbe (RSC-E) is available at https://rsce.unmissions.org

Slide 9

Key Message: The Kuwait Joint Support Office (KJSO) is a shared service centre currently serving 18 UN missions (8 full client missions and 10 Payroll & Education Grant client missions) focusing on the service delivery pillars of Human Resources, Finance, Payroll, and Travel.

Slide 10



Key Message: The UN Mission Support includes three main elements: Personnel, Logistics, and Resource Management.

Personnel: especially the civilian personnel, who will be recruited especially for the respective mission. The recruitment/generation of military and police personnel and units is a separate process/mechanism.

Logistics: which comprises further entities/capabilities, including, but not limited to:

- Logistics operations.
- Strategic movements, like deployment of units and personnel.
- Air transportation, including AirOps & Air Safety (direct to CAO).
- Surface transportation, including maintenance to the third line.
- Supply/life support, including contract management (fuel, rations, services etc.).
- Engineering, including facilities management, civil engineering, accommodation. De-mining is separate.
- Communications, IT and Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
- Medical, including MEDEVAC/CASEVAC and dental.

Resource Management: in this case the Peacekeeping Budget, which needs to be provided for each PK Mission through a dedicated budgeting process.

Slide 11



Key Message: This slide presents the UN Principles of Logistics.

Many nations have Principles of Logistics doctrine. These are principles which must be considered during planning in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of logistic support options. They are often used during Course of Action Analysis as one means of evaluating a support option.

The UN has its own set of Principles of Logistics. While similar to those of many nations, they vary because of the unique nature of the United Nations, including the required flexibility, mobility and multinational construct of UN Logistics, and, importantly, that the UN is, at all times, acting at the behest of the Member States, and must demonstrate to the Member States that funding and direction is being correctly followed.

The UN Principles of Logistics are:

- **Responsibility**. The support to a field mission is task-tailored for each mission; therefore, articulating responsibility is crucial. The contributing Member States and the UN have a collective responsibility to ensure that forces deployed on any UN peace operation are fully equipped and supported. This may be achieved either through national or cooperative arrangements, but they must be clearly agreed upon prior to deployment. Member States and the UN have a collective responsibility for the care, custody, and safeguarding of UN assets.

- **Foresight**. The administrative and logistic planning for any mission begins well before the commencement of any peace operation. This includes first identifying resources within or close to the deployment area and obtaining information regarding the infrastructure of the site. Consideration should be given to any special on-site requirements such as

clothing, munitions, accommodation, and mobility. Contingency planning for strategic movement should begin at the earliest opportunity. During the mission implementation phase, foresight is required to anticipate changes in the mission area that will affect logistics delivery. Planners must prepare for mission closeout and understand what will be required to transition out of a mission area. Foresight is a principle common to many nations, however it requires additional thought in a UN mission, because often, the key advisors that a commander would rely on to instinctively anticipate Force/Police activity are not located within the Force/Police component and are in fact in Mission Support. Within a UN mission, foresight requires close cooperation between the uniformed component (Military or Police) and Mission Support Division. Aside from the technical expertise that Mission Support Division provides in managing Logistics support; the civilian staff in that division have extensive experience, often in multiple UN missions, and (with good engagement) will be able to advise uniformed planners about support requirements (or potential problems), and the appropriate timelines needed to prepare (or resolve).

- **Flexibility.** Flexibility in the field of logistics means the ability to conform to operational plans that will almost inevitably be subject to frequent change, particularly in the early stages of any peace operation. In conditions where lines of communication are liable to be disrupted, it may be necessary to deviate from pre-set procedures and to modify standard methods of operation to meet unexpected events. Flexibility requires foresight. It involves ensuring that contingency planning has been considered, and, if possible, rehearsed. Flexibility also involves having clear lines of command and control, so that changes can be rapidly executed. Flexibility is aided by understanding not only the commander's direct orders, but their underlying intent.

- **Economy**. On any mission, resources are rarely plentiful and must be used effectively, efficiently, and economically. Early integration of all available assets provided by the contributing Member States should be the main goal. When possible, this integration should be planned prior to deployment to avoid duplication of resources at the mission site. Notwithstanding a desire to rationalise logistics assets at the earliest opportunity, there is likely to be a surge of operational requirements to assist with the initial deployment of any UN force, and this may, in the short term, create duplication of some resources. Economy is not simply the cheapest/lowest resource option. Rather, economy achieved when effective support is provided using the least amount of resources necessary at the least cost, within an acceptable level of risk.

- **Simplicity**. Complicated procedures can slow down or completely fail the mission. The simpler the logistics plan is, the easier it is to understand. The greater the understanding of the plan is, the more effective the cooperation between contributing countries and the speed an original plan can be adapted to meet changing circumstances will be. Simplicity therefore aids flexibility and cooperation. Standardised procedures are a valuable tool in creating simplicity – and ensures that staff effort is focused on the most important part of the problem. For this reason, Force and Police HQ are strongly encouraged to (in consultation with Mission Support) develop robust Standard Operating Procedures which are used and kept up to date. Similarly, templates for standard messages, requests etc are valuable if they improve understanding and reduce the time taken to perform routine (or urgent) tasks. An example of this is the "Alert" format used to advise a casualty.

- **Cooperation**. Cooperation will always be the key to producing a workable logistics structure for a UN mission. Levels and standards of support differ by country. There are often a variety of nationalities with different languages, cultural requirements, and capabilities. In order to achieve a workable logistics product, cooperation is necessary. A high level of mission headquarters (MHQ) cooperation with the UN force logistics headquarters is required. For many national contingents, cooperation is taken for granted, as contingents are used to working with their own forces (or with allies that they work with regularly). The friction that arises from working in a multinational UN mission should not be underestimated. It takes effort and leadership to overcome the natural desire to expect that "tasks should be performed the way my nation prefers" and focus on a solution which meets the ultimate goal of achieving the mission's mandate.

- **Sufficiency**. The levels and distribution of logistics resources must be enough to meet the sustainability and mobility needs of the operational plan. Stock levels should consider the expected nature and duration of the mission and consumption pattern. Peacetime stock levels tend to be inappropriate for most UN peace operations. Sufficiency requires that contingents and HQ planners pay close attention to not only stock provisioning (that is, ensuring that stock holdings are well planned, having regard for both normal and high tempo rates of usage, and allow for potential disruptions in supply), but also for equipment maintenance planning, to ensure that vital equipment will be available for support at the right times. While the UN does not direct specific internal practices of a unit, it does expect that the ultimate capability/performance is met, and it is not only reasonable but desirable if HQ Logistics staff engage to ensure that unit planning in these matters aligns with Force/Police HQ planning and is appropriate having regard for the ability of Mission Support capabilities.

- **Accountability**. The importance of accounting for assets cannot be understated. The UN and contingents in the mission area must know what they have available and what is and is not serviceable. Accountability also means who is accountable to initiate, carry out, and audit logistics functions. Accurate accounts must be kept for all assets that are purchased and issued to contingents for the support of a mission. This includes any equipment classified as COE. Accountability comes from a recognition that UN funding is always constrained, and that even small shortfalls or losses can have a disproportionate effect. There are many case studies of UN missions which are unable to achieve the expected operational effect because equipment could not be correctly identified and thus used; or had been consumed for incorrect purposes and thus was not available for the mission. Member States expect their funds and assets to be used wisely, and actively seek regular assurance that missions genuinely need the funds and equipment provided and will withdraw support if not assured. Delegation of Authority and AC2 Policy are designed around the unique challenges that the UN face in being required to account for funding and resources consumed. This principle underpins why the DMS controls and prioritises scarce resource assets.

- **Visibility**. Logistics assets are vital to an operation and represent large amounts of money. It is important that a full audit trail is available for all assets dispatched to, in, and from the mission site. This can be achieved using several methods ranging from barcodes, satellite tracking, or basic card systems. The force headquarters must always have access to inventoried information. This includes information regarding the numbers of personnel,

quantities and types of materials and supplies held, usage rates, pipeline times for resupply, and future requirements of any portion of the mission. Prior to deployment, the logistics staffs of Member States must have a clear plan regarding how they will keep and supply such information on-demand or by timed return. The Force Commander should develop on-site SOPs outlining required information maintenance. When considering visibility, a planner should also consider the visibility of the mission and its practices to the wider world. Visibility can encompass how Member States perceive a mission, how T/PCCs perceive the mission (and the value of their contributions), how the host nation perceives the UN, and how the community perceives the mission. There are many policies, manuals and guidance which outline the respective responsibilities of the UN, T/PCCs and individual organisations within the mission. A UN logistics planner will need to understand exactly how this translates within the mission to the specific task at hand. The overarching policy guidance comes from 2019 Authority Command and Control Policy (AC2) and the COE Manual.

☞***Note to instructor -*** More detailed information can be found in the UN Operational Logistics (OPLOG) RTP. Reference Guide. Chapter 4. Principles of UN Logistics.

Slide 12



Key Message: This slide depicts the generic Field Mission Support Structure for large Peacekeeping Missions.

The Director or Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS= reports to the HOM and is responsible to the HOM for the effective provision of support to all mission organisational units in the areas of supply chain, service delivery and operational resource management. The D/CMS advises and represents the HOM on the management of financial, human and physical resources of the mission in support of the mission's mandate.

The Field Mission Support Structure consists of Operations and Resource Management; Service Delivery Management, and Supply Chain management.

Let's examine each one of them in more detail.

Slide 13

Key Message: This slide depicts the main functional areas of the Operations and Resource Management.

Slide 14

Key Message: This slide depicts the main functional areas of the Service Delivery Management.

The Service Delivery Management is responsible for the provision of key logistics support services to all mission components and other clients of the Mission Support organisation through technical sections. The Service provides the following logistics support services to the mission:

- Engineering and Facilities Maintenance.
- Life Support (fuel, rations/catering and general supply).
- Medical.
- Aviation (mission air operations, including military utility helicopters). Note that Aviation Safety generally reports directly to D/CMS.
- Transport: manages the mission's vehicle fleet, which includes only UN-owned equipment and does not cover contingent-owned equipment.

Slide 15

Key Message: This slide depicts the main functional areas of the Supply Chain Management.

The Supply Chain Management is responsible for all supply chain areas that are integrated on the basis of end-to-end processes, namely, Plan, Source, Deliver, Return, and Enable and Cover activities related to demand planning, acquisitions, procurement, warehousing, asset, and inventory management, transportation and freight planning (air, land, sea), expediting movement and tracking of distribution, business intelligence, and performance management.

In summary, the Supply Chain Management provides planning, sourcing, delivery, return, and enabling functions, including:

- Acquisitions Management: covering acquisition planning, requisitioning, and contract performance evaluation.
- Procurement.
- Central Warehousing.
- Movement Control (MOVCON): Facilitates the movement of UN-owned equipment, contingent-owned equipment, and personnel.

Slide 16



Key Message: The Mission Support Centre (MSC) serves as the central hub for logistics operations within a mission, encompassing functions such as information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, and feedback.

The MSC is a joint civilian/uniformed unit within the Operations and Resource Management (ORM) pillar.

The D/CMS, Chief ORM, and Chief MSC, in consultation with the MLT, shall guide MSC tasking and regularly review the prioritisation of mission support activities. The Chief MSC exercises tasking authority over all United Nations personnel assigned to the MSC.

Let's explore further details about the Mission Support Centre in the upcoming slides.

Slide 17



Key Message: The Mission Support Centre (MSC) typically falls under Operations and Resource Management. The purpose of an MSC is to provide all mission components with a single point of coordination for all aspects of logistics support.

The purpose of the MSC is to offer a unified point of coordination for all mission components, including both UN and non-UN entities, addressing every aspect of logistics support within the mission area. The MSC consists of the following Units: Logistics Plans; Current Logistics Operations; COE, and Information Reporting and Visit.

MSC Leadership:

Chief MSC: The Chief MSC is an experienced logistics officer at the P-5 level with a comprehensive understanding of the United Nations logistics system and administrative procedures. The Chief MSC also serves as the principal advisor to CORM/DMS on all logistics planning and operations matters. The Chief MSC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring all logistics operations for the mission on behalf of the DMS. The Chief MSC leads an integrated team of military, civilian, and UN Police Officers under the integrated support concept.

Deputy Chief MSC: The Deputy Chief MSC is an experienced military logistics officer at the P-4 level (equivalent rank to LtCol) with a thorough understanding of the United Nations logistics system and administrative procedures. The Deputy Chief MSC assists the Chief MSC in supervising planning, coordination, monitoring, and reporting of all logistics operations for the mission. The Deputy Chief MSC is also responsible to the Chief MSC for performance management, training, and technical supervision of all MSC staff, particularly logistics Operations Officers/Assistants in the Field Offices. The Deputy Chief MSC assumes all functions of the Chief MSC during the latter's absence.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) In some missions, the Military Chief U4 also fulfils the role of Deputy Chief MSC. This arrangement can present significant challenges in terms of span of responsibility and may lead to conflicts of interest due to the dual chain of command to the Force Commander and DMS. Most missions maintain separate appointments for the Chief U4 and the integrated military Deputy Chief, although they collaborate closely.

b) Depending on the mission setup and size, there could also be Regional MSC (Support at Sector Level) located in Field Offices (Sectors). These Regional MSC are managed by a Regional Administration Officer (RAO). Under the RAO, the Regional MSC Log Ops supervisor leads the Log Ops team to coordinate the day-to-day logistics support activities of all MSD components in the Regional Office. MSC Regional Log Ops staff are expected to coordinate and ensure delivery of a full range of approved and authorised logistics support to all Mission components and external clients in the field under the supervision of the RAO.

Slide 18

Key Message: The next two slides explore the main responsibilities of the MSC. It's important to emphasise to participants the pivotal role of the MSC in military operations and planning. The articulation of military plans and associated logistics requirements through the MSC, followed by formal requests, is essential for mission support to effectively plan and provide the necessary logistics provisions.

MSC Functions:

- Integrated planning, prioritization, coordination, tasking, monitoring, and reporting of all logistics functions and harmonize employment and tasking of the logistics resources of all Mission components.
- Review and prioritize all requests for logistics support from all mission components as well as external partners and international/regional/national entities, in accordance with the Mission's aims and objectives, and allocate the most suitable approved civilian, commercial, or military support resource to meet the requirements in the most effective and economic manner. This does not include standard and regular life support sustainment for the uniformed component and FTS and General Supply items for all mission offices/staff, which are dealt with routinely by concerned MSD sections.
- Ensure that budgetary and human resources are identified and allocated for approved operations and projects.
- Plan, prioritize, integrate, coordinate, and task logistics resources on behalf of DMS or CMS/Chief ORM.

Slide 19

Key Message: Responsibilities of the MSC (continued).

- Coordinate tasking of all Mission Level air, land and maritime transport assets for all movements by air, water or surface in consultation with Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) and Joint Movement Coordination Centre (JMCC).
- Work in close coordination with the Regional Administrative Officers (RAOs) to ensure that all logistics support issues raised by RAOs at Mission are timely and efficiently addressed by MSD Sections at Mission level.
- Serve as the Mission's single point of contact at all levels for the coordination of logistics issues with approved non-Mission actors and potential clients/users, such as Government and Non-Government Organizations (NGO's), UN agencies and Regional entities.
- MSC provides an overview of Mission Support Division priority projects and realign them to changing mission priorities.
- Update DMS/CMS and Mission Support Division senior management with reference to ongoing troop/police deployments, rotations, operations and impact on Mission resources and capabilities.
- Provide Mission Support Division key operational priorities and inputs into mission strategic documents and prepares annual Mission Support Division Plan. This requires close collaboration and coordination with key mission partners such as the strategic planners, uniformed components and substantive pillars is essential to ensure integrated planning, unity of effort and adaptation to changing mission environments.

- Monitor and report all logistics functions for the efficient use of mission logistics resources using an information management system (such as UMOJA).
- Manage the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Unit. The COE Unit acts as an advisory body on UN rules and regulations with emphasis on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE).

Slide 20



Key Message: In multi-dimensional PKOs, numerous Military Staff Officers (MSOs) are generated and deployed to serve in integrated functions or are embedded within the Mission Support structure. The slide highlights some of these offices/entities where MSOs might be posted.

Depending on the mandate and mission capabilities, MSOs may work in various offices (entities) within the mission support structure.

Slide 21



Key Message: The Mission Support Centre (MSC) centralizes the distribution of tasks among various logistic support assets of the Mission, including military assets, to ensure that every mission component receives equitable support aligned with identified priorities.

Mission resources are distributed equitably among all mission components based on functional needs and assessed priorities. This is why the management of logistic support assets – both civilian and military – is centralized at the mission level, with a single point of entry for all support requests (the Mission Support Centre).

Regardless of their origin or ownership, certain formed units are considered common to the mission and are often referred to as Enabling Units:

- Engineering Units (excluding unit's integral Combat Engineering).
- Transportation Units.
- Aviation Units (excluding Attack aviation).
- Communication Units.
- Medical Units.
- Logistics Units.
- EOD Units.

These assets are tasked by and used alongside UN assets and commercially contracted assets, under the coordination of the Mission Support Centre. These units are established by UNHQ as enabling units and cannot be reassigned to the HOMC without extensive negotiation with UNHQ and the Member State.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Combat engineering units are not tasked by the MSC.

Slide 22



Key Message: The mission support concept differs for individual military personnel and contingent members. For individual deployed personnel, mission support includes office facilities, IT support, communications, transportation, and medical services. For contingent members, the mission support depends on the phase of the mission.

A Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) is provided to UNMOs, MSOs, IPOs, and FPUs, covering accommodation, food, and incidental expenses, allowing individuals to manage their accommodation, meals, and living costs. If security requires allocation within "UN-provided installations," the MSA will be adjusted accordingly.

For contingent members, mission support varies depending on the phase of the mission. During the setup/initial deployment phase, contingents must be self-sustaining for 30-90 days, requiring provisions such as food, bottled water, supplies, and services. The UN Mission Support System may not yet have full capabilities to support these needs.

Once the mission support structure/capabilities are established, the UN provides support with untreated water, fuel, food, supplies, services, etc., enabling Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and UN-owned Equipment (UNOE) to be operated and maintained by the contingent.

Slide 23



Key Message: The UN mission support provided for the deployment of T/PCC individual personnel and/or contingents is summarized in this and the following two slides.

Slide 24



Key Message: The UN mission support provided for the deployment of T/PCC individual personnel and/or contingents continues in this slide.

Slide 25



Key Message: The UN mission support provided for the deployment of T/PCC individual personnel and/or contingents continues in this slide.

Slide 26



Key Message: Mission support capabilities are defined by capabilities and equipment solutions (options).

In the framework of UN Peace Operations, the main options for equipment support are:

- UN Owned Equipment (UNOE) – equipment provided/procured by the UN for the use of/by the mission. For example, individually deployed military personnel (UNMEMs, MSOs) will mostly use UNOE, such as all the IT equipment (PCs, printers, faxes, telephones) as well as transportation assets (buses, cars).
- Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) – equipment provided by the respective contingent deploying to the mission. The equipment requirements have been discussed and agreed upon between the UN and the TCCs based on the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) and are included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
- UN contracted resources – to provide capacities/equipment that are not part of the UNOE or COE. This might include specialized services or capabilities.
- Host Nation Support (HNS) – the Host Nation might be able to supplement UN mission support, often providing capabilities at/around national infrastructure (e.g. airports, seaports, or communications infrastructure).

Slide 27



Key Message: There are two independent processes as part of the reimbursement framework for the UN.

The first relates to equipment - the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). The key event of the process is the "COE Conference" scheduled every 3 years in New York to discuss and agree on COE to be included/deleted from the COE Manual, to agree on the respective reimbursement rates, and to provide further information regarding the management of COE.

The other process determines the "troop cost". The troop cost survey is conducted every 4 years to determine the costs Member States (MS) incur in preparing their military contingents and personnel for service in the UN. This would include the cost for training, trainers, training facilities for conducting UN training, special equipment, medical examinations, and other costs for the preparation of the contingents for service with the UN.

It is important to note that both processes are owned by the MS, and the UN Secretariat only provides support to the MS throughout the processes.

The final decisions on the inputs for the COE Manual as well as the determination of the "troop costs" rest with the MS. The COE Manual itself will be approved by the General Assembly before it is promulgated.

Slide 28



Key Message: The Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) system was adopted by the United Nations to simplify the means by which countries are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel, and self-sustainment support services to formed military or police contingents in peacekeeping missions.

As already mentioned, for the TCC and the UN to agree upon the provision of capabilities (equipment for a UN PKO), a contractual agreement needs to be negotiated, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

The process established by the Member States through the General Assembly is the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) process. The basis for the negotiations of the MOU between the UN and the respective Member State (MS) is laid down in the "Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions," abbreviated as COE-Manual.

The COE Manual is the key document for COE and MOU related issues. It contains the consolidation of recommendations made at various working groups through issue papers submitted by both Member States and the Secretariat.

It also lists the current monthly reimbursement rates as well as the current rates for major equipment (Annex B) and current rates for self-sustainment (Annex C).

The key elements to be negotiated between the UN and the MS for each individual unit to be deployed to a UN PKO are the annexes:

Annex A – defining the number of personnel of the respective unit.

Annex B – the number and type of major equipment to be part of the unit.

Annex C – the self-sustainment capabilities of the unit.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Further explanation and examples of the mentioned categories will be provided with the next slides.

b) The original COE-Manual is in English, and it will be translated into all UN official languages.

Slide 29



Key Message: Major equipment refers to significant items directly linked to the unit's mission, as mutually determined by the United Nations and the troop/police contributor.

Major equipment is accounted for either by category or individually. Separate reimbursement rates apply for each category of major equipment items. These rates include reimbursement for minor equipment and consumables in support of the major equipment item.

Examples of major equipment include:

- Armament.
- Accommodation Equipment.
- Vehicles.
- Logistic Equipment.
- Electrical Equipment.
- Medical and Dental Equipment.
- Demining Equipment.
- Engineering Equipment.
- Miscellaneous Equipment.

Other equipment such as aircraft, ships, dogs, etc., require a letter of assist from the contributing countries to the UN.

☞***Note to instructor -*** Minor equipment refers to equipment supporting contingents, such as catering, accommodation, non-specialist communication, engineering, and other mission-related activities. Specific accounting of minor equipment is not required. Minor equipment is divided into two categories: items designed to support major equipment, and items directly or indirectly supporting personnel. Reimbursement rates for minor equipment apply to personnel-related equipment.

Slide 30

Key Message: 'Self-sustainment' is a logistics support concept for T/PCC unit in a peacekeeping mission whereby the contributing State provides some specific or all logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis.

Self-sustainability is critical for the first 30 to 90 days. In an established mission, logistics support is in place, and contractors deliver rations according to religious, dietary, or national preferences (e.g., Western-style, beef-free, or pork-free). Reserves of rations are stored according to menu types requested by contingents. Commercial contracts for the supply of water and diesel to run generators and vehicles are likewise in place. However, in a mission's start-up phase, the situation is usually quite different. Contingents and peacekeepers that arrive in a newly established mission must expect hardships. The United Nations may not yet have had the time to establish the required logistics, so, according to the mission MOU, contingents must be self-sufficient for the first three months in some or all categories. Units are expected to deploy to the mission area with 30 to 90 days supply of rations and drinking water, canteen supplies (cigarettes, toilet articles, etc.), repair parts, and diesel fuel.

The right of troop/police contributors to provide any or some categories of self-sustainment will be taken into consideration during the negotiation of the memorandum of understanding. The United Nations has a responsibility, however, to ensure that any self-sustainment services provided by a troop/police contributor meet minimum operational capabilities and are compatible with the needs of other troop/police contributors, when interface is required, and that the cost to the United Nations is similar to what it would have cost the United Nations to arrange centrally for the provision of these self-sustainment services. Should a contingent receive self-sustainment services from another contingent, the self-sustainment rates will be paid to the contingent providing the services.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Within the overall self-sustainment defined categories (as depicted on the slide) have been defined and are reflected in Annex B of the MOU.

b) Further information on self-sustainment can be found in Chapter 3 – Annex A of the COE-Manual.

Slide 31



Key Message: Verification and control procedures are intended to ensure that the terms of the memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the troop/police contributor are met by both parties at the outset and throughout the period of effect of the memorandum.

Major equipment and self-sustainment standards are defined to ensure operational capability.

Verification and control will be carried out on the basis of a number of types of inspections:

- **Arrival inspection**: The arrival inspection is to take place immediately upon arrival and to be completed within one month. If equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the memorandum of understanding is concluded, the first inspection will be carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities and is to be completed within one month of that date.

- **Operational readiness inspection**: An operational readiness inspection must be carried out at least once in every six-month period of a unit's deployment in the mission area and any time the mission believes the equipment or services do not meet the specified standards. The condition of the major equipment and self-sustainment will be inspected with a view to assessing whether the capability is sufficient and satisfactory.

- **Repatriation inspection**: The repatriation inspection shall account for all major equipment of the troop/police contributor to be repatriated and verify the condition of the major equipment provided under the dry lease arrangement. The inspection shall also ensure that no United Nations-owned equipment is part of the equipment being repatriated.

- **Other verifications or inspections**: Other verifications or inspections deemed necessary by the Head of Mission or United Nations Headquarters, including compliance with the Environmental Policy for United Nations Field Missions and the Waste Management Policy for United Nations Field Missions, shall be carried out.

The main purpose of inspections is to verify that the terms and conditions of the memorandum of understanding have been met, providing:

- the information for the reimbursement process.
- the opportunity for the TCC to take corrective action (when required) to prevent reduction in reimbursement or troop costs.
- valuable inputs into the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) with respect to equipment availability/shortfalls and maintenance of the respective unit / TCC.

Failure to meet those agreed standards may result in deductions to a MS reimbursements.

If the serviceability of COE for a specific unit remains unsatisfactory over a long period, the MS is further penalised with a reduction in the amount of troop costs reimbursements.

Slide 32



Key Message: The troop/police contributors are reimbursed under wet or dry lease arrangements, at the rates adopted by the General Assembly.

Reimbursement is limited to those items of serviceable major equipment (including associated minor equipment and consumables) specifically agreed in the MOU negotiation phase.

The lease options of major equipment:

- **Dry lease**: troop/police contributor provides equipment to the mission, and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment.
- **Wet lease**: troop/police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment.

Slide 33



Key Message: Levels of medical support for UN peacekeeping missions have been standardised. This is necessary to ensure that the highest standard of medical care is provided to peacekeepers, particularly as medical units and personnel can come from different countries with varying standards of medical care.

These levels are as follows:

- **Basic Level**. This effectively refers to basic First Aid and preventive medicine practised at the smallest sub-unit level. As there is no doctor present, care is provided by the peacekeeper, or by a trained paramedic or nurse, using basic medical equipment and supplies.
- **Primary Care (Level One)**. This is the first level where a doctor is available and may be either a COE or UNOE facility. It provides first-line primary health care, emergency resuscitation, stabilisation, and evacuation of casualties to the next level of medical care within a peacekeeping mission.
- **Hospital Care (Level Two)**. Again, these services may be provided by COE or UNOE (contingent staffed facilities) and have mission-wide responsibilities. It is the next level of medical care and the first level where surgical expertise and facilities are available. The mission of a Level Two medical facility is to provide second-line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilisation, limb and life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next echelon.
- **Hospital Care (Level Three)**. This is the highest level of medical care provided by a deployed UN medical unit. It combines the capabilities of Level One and Two units, with the additional capability of providing specialised in-patient treatment and surgery, as well as extensive diagnostic services. It is important to note that a Level Three unit is rarely

deployed, and that this level of support is generally obtained from existing civilian or military hospitals within the Mission area or in a neighbouring country.

- **Tertiary/Out of Mission.** A tertiary medical facility provides definitive medical care and specialist medical treatment unavailable or impractical to provide within a Mission area. This includes specialist surgical and medical procedures, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and convalescence. Such treatment is highly specialised and costly and may be required for a long duration. It is neither practical nor cost-effective for the UN to deploy such a unit within the Mission area. Such services are generally sought in the host country, a neighbouring country, or in the troop-contributing country itself. The UN can arrange transfer of a patient or casualty to such a facility, and for reasons of cost, compensation, and pension, continues to monitor the patient's progress.

In addition to the level of care provided, there are also critical timelines for receiving medical treatment.

A significant proportion of personnel with serious injuries will have increased chances of survival if they receive prompt and appropriate treatment.

As a guiding principle, the "**10 – 1 – 2 Rule**" has been set to ensure continuity of care.

- Any casualty is expected to receive first aid at the incidence site within 10 minutes or advanced trauma care (pre-hospital trauma life support).
- Or reach a Level 1 facility within one hour of injury.
- To improve the chances of survival and the quality of the treatment outcome, all seriously injured casualties should be evacuated to a facility that provides intensive care support, and where necessary, surgical care support is also available. As a planning guideline, they are expected to receive damage control (life- or limb-saving) surgery or must reach a Level 2 or above facility not longer than within two hours of injury.
- Missions are to maintain or have arrangements for around-the-clock (24/7) capability to support MEDEVAC requirements. To ensure continuity of care, ambulance teams and AMETs are to be well trained and adequately equipped.
- In circumstances where any of the above three criteria cannot be achieved, additional medical capabilities may be required at a forward location to improve the chances of survival of any seriously injured casualty. Such support capabilities are well described in the COE Manual.
- Medical support in the field cannot be viewed from the perspective of any single medical facility but comprises a continuum of care from basic first aid to definitive medical treatment at a Level 3 or 4 hospital. Equal emphasis is to be placed on first responder training and equipping, as on areas like blood supply and out-of-theatre air evacuation.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For further information, see UN Medical Support Manual for UN Field Mission, 3rd Edition, 2015.

Slide 34



Key Message: Medical evacuation is a mission responsibility shared between the Chief Medical Officer (civilian mission posting) and the Force Medical Officer (FMO).

The doctor responsible for treating the patient initiates the evacuation. The responsibility for planning and establishing an effective medical evacuation system lies with the planning staff in DPO/DOS and the administration and medical staff in the Mission area.

The CMO liaises with DOS/Division of Health-Care and Occupational Safety (DHMOSH) for all matters relating to external Aero Medical Evacuations (AME). The FMO coordinates in-theatre evacuation activities, with the support of the Mission Support and the guidance of the Medical Services Division. Details of the evacuation plan are to be included within every Mission's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The FMO is responsible for SOP, planning and keeping a roster of uniformed medical personnel to use as escorts for evacuations.

Except in actual evacuations, which are the responsibility of the CMO, the FMO has technical and operational control over the AME Team.

There are three categories of patient or casualty transfer, these being:

- **Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC).** Evacuation of a casualty from the site of injury to the closest medical facility, which should ideally be conducted within 1 hour of injury.
- **Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).** Evacuation of a casualty between two medical facilities, either within the Mission area (in-theatre) or out of it (out-of-theatre). The casualty may either return to duty (RTD) within the time-frame stipulated in the holding policy or be repatriated.

• **Medical Repatriation.** Return of a patient or casualty to his/her home country because of medical reasons, following which s/he would be unlikely to return to duty.

☞***Note to instructor -*** For further information on CASEVAC/MEDEVAC refer to 2020.07 DOS Policy – CASEVAC.

Slide 35



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

• UN Mission Support provides solutions that are rapid, effective, efficient, and within the rules.

- It involves Personnel, logistics, and Finance functions.
- Global and Regional Service Centres deliver predefined modules for goods and services.

• The Mission Support Centre is the nerve centre for logistics functions in a mission involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, and feedback.

- All non-combat Logistics support units are tasked by the Director Mission Support. Combat forces remain under the AC2 of the Force Commander (e.g., combat engineers, attack helicopter).

• UN Equipment Support is categorized under UN Owned Equipment (UNOE), UN Contracted Resources, and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE).

- Self-sustainment is crucial within the first 30-90 days of deployment.

Slide 36



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.
- Allocate eight (8) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.
- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the group and add points if required.
- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
3.3

Crisis Management

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.3 provides an overview of the crisis response in the UNHQ and DPO-led field missions, as well as highlighting the role of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) during a crisis situation.

Relevance

The need for a peace operation usually indicates a current or recent crisis. This lesson deals with managing crises within the pre-existing condition requiring the mission's urgent response.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Define Crisis
- Describe the principles of UN Crisis Management
- Explain the Roles and Responsibilities in Crisis Management in Field Missions
- Explain the Crisis Response Coordination Mechanism and Procedures

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 22
Summary of Key Messages	23
Learning Activity	24

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.3 provides an overview of the crisis response in the UNHQ and DPO-led field missions, as well as highlighting the role of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) during a crisis situation.

The need for a peace operation usually indicates a current or recent crisis. This lesson deals with managing crises within the pre-existing condition requiring the mission's urgent response.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Define Crisis
- Describe the principles of UN Crisis Management
- Explain the Roles and Responsibilities in Crisis Management in Field Missions
- Explain the Crisis Response Coordination Mechanism and Procedures

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: A crisis is an incident or situation, whether natural or man-made, that due to its magnitude, complexity, or gravity of potential consequence, requires a UN-wide coordinated multidisciplinary and integrated response.

A crisis marks the point at which events become intensely difficult or dangerous. The term crisis can also be used to indicate a period of extreme instability.

Notes to instructor:

Reference: Essential Capabilities for Crisis Management Manual (UN DPO – declassified on 21 Oct 2022).

Slide 5



Key Message: To be considered a crisis, the incident or situation must include two or more of the following:

- presents an exceptional risk to the safety and security of UN personnel, premises, and assets,
- presents an exceptional threat to the effective execution of the UN mandate or other field presence,
- may have a significantly negative humanitarian impact, or
- may give rise to serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

Slide 6



Key Message: Crisis Response is defined as the spectrum of activities undertaken to respond to a crisis situation.

Crisis response activities in the field should be implemented at the lowest effective level of authority, with Headquarters playing a supporting role.

The senior-most UN official in the country (SRSG) is responsible and accountable for coordinating UN crisis management efforts in-country. In a UN mission, the military pillar often plays a decisive role in providing or building a secure environment. However, crisis management cannot succeed without cross-mission, integrated cooperation to deal with the plethora of threats. Cross-pillar relationships need more than simply harmonised processes.

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

Key Message: Crisis management is defined as decision-making in support of the identification, prioritisation, coordination and execution of crisis response activities. Crisis Management involves crisis responses at both HQ (New York) and in the field (mission level).

In UNHQ, DPO-DOS are involved in the crisis management in respect of a crisis in New York. In addition to ensuring the safety of staff, the imperative for DPO-DOS is to ensure the ability to provide continuing support to peace operations.

The response to crises in the field - in which there is a Peace Operation - will be led by the mission and coordinated with the UNCT and other actors.

Many crises can be handled at the mission level, but where more strategic support is necessary, DPO-DOS will provide it.

Due to the nature of peacekeeping, which to some extent is designed to deal with crises, missions and DPO-DOS are called upon to respond to two types of crises:

Internal: Those that directly impact the mission and its ability to function effectively:

- an attack against the facilities or personnel.
- a communications or IT system failure.
- a disease outbreak affecting staff.
- a natural disaster.

External: Those that relate to the mission's ability to respond to crises, which may not directly affect the mission's ability to function effectively, but is instead a function of the mission mandate:

- the ability of the mission to respond to election-related violence.
- or to respond to a threat to civilians posed by an armed group.

Effective crisis management in a UNPKO comprises:

(1) Process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, or serious breakdown of law and order, or a major loss of moral authority;

(2) planning for possible escalation; and

(3) addressing the underlying causes.

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

Key Message: Crisis Management should be guided by the principles of accountability; field-focus; adaptation to context; inclusiveness; simplicity and predictability; respect for values, standards and principles; and respect for humanitarian principles.

The following paragraphs clearly define these principles as they guide effective crisis management:

- **Accountability:** Crisis management should be guided by clear accountability framework and structures.
- **Field-focus:** Necessary response activities should be implemented at the lowest effective level of authority in the field, with Headquarters playing a supporting role. Unnecessary layers of management should be removed. In exceptional circumstances, such as incapacitation of the field leadership or when the scope of the crisis extends beyond the capacity of the UN presence in the field, Headquarters may assume greater crisis management responsibilities until such time as the field can be strengthened or re-established.
- **Adaptation to context:** The UN response to any crisis should be managed to reflect the prevailing circumstances. Form should follow function, and responses should be based on criteria of expected impact, transaction costs and assessment of risks. UN entities should ensure that their readiness, capacity and response level is appropriate to the evolution of a situation.

- **Inclusiveness:** In response to any crisis, there should be appropriate consultation among UN entities and between the field and Headquarters such that the various streams of response activity and messages are complementary and harmonised to the highest degree possible, taking into account all recognised principles of UN engagement across humanitarian, human rights, development, political and security areas. Views of those affected by crisis and relevant stakeholders need to be considered and help guide UN actions in the field and at Headquarters.
- **Simplicity and Predictability:** UN crisis management architecture and processes should be clear, light and simple and known by all stakeholders to allow for a certain level of predictability in any response. Decision-making, coordination and information sharing should be streamlined to enable an accelerated response. Structures set up for crisis response should be time-bound with clear activation and de-activation protocols with proper follow-up arrangements agreed upon at the conclusion of the response.
- **Respect for values, standards and principles**: Crisis management should be guided by the overall values, standards and principles articulated in the UN Charter and relevant international law, including the Secretary-General's renewed commitment to uphold the responsibilities assigned to the UN whenever there is a threat of serious and large-scale violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
- **Respect for Humanitarian Principles:** Crisis management arrangements should take full account of recognised humanitarian principles.

As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (19 December 1991) and subsequent resolutions, humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Adherence to these principles reflects a measure of accountability of the humanitarian community.

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

Key Message: The SG is responsible for ensuring that the UN system responds appropriately to crisis situations and for ensuring the effective coordination of UN crisis response at HQ and in the field.

The SG typically delegates the responsibility for ensuring an effective, coordinated UN crisis response to a lead coordinating entity or entities at HQ and to senior individuals in leadership roles in the field.

All USGs, including heads of agencies, funds, and programmes, are individually responsible and accountable for directing preparedness and response activities within their entities, in their mandated areas of responsibility.

All UN entities are jointly responsible for the development and implementation of UN-wide crisis response strategies in the field and at UNHQ, including communicating and coordinating their response with the crisis coordination mechanisms.

Slide 10



Key Message: The lead coordinating entity/entities shall be responsible for ensuring the effective coordination of UN crisis response efforts. When it is necessary to have multiple coordination mechanisms operating in parallel, the lead coordinating entity shall ensure appropriate collaboration and information sharing between these mechanisms.

Lead coordinating entities will usually be determined as follows based on the type of UN field presence on the ground:

In mission settings, DPO is the lead coordinating entity for countries/areas with peacekeeping operations deployed, and DPPA is the lead coordinating entity for countries/areas with special political missions deployed.

In non-mission settings, DPPA and the relevant Regional UNDG Chair shall oversee crisis response coordination efforts as co-leads.

In all cases, the SG shall make the final determination on the lead coordinating entity/entities.

Additional entities have responsibility for specific aspects of the crisis response:

- Safety/Security - Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
- Humanitarian - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- Health - World Health Organisation (WHO)
- Human Rights - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

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

Key Message: Crisis response activities in the field should be implemented at the lowest effective level of authority, with HQ playing a supporting role. Unnecessary layers of management should be removed.

At the field level, the following responsibilities and accountabilities apply:

- **The senior-most UN official in country (Head of Mission/SRSG/ERSG, RC/HC or RC**) is responsible and accountable for coordinating UN crisis management efforts in-country. In line with the principle of mutual accountability, the UN leadership team is jointly accountable for the development and implementation of UN strategy.
- **The Resident Coordinator** should remain in the lead for coordinating all operational activities for development and should continue to perform the UNDP Resident Representative and Designated Official functions when applicable. Where a Humanitarian Coordinator has been designated, s/he should remain in the lead for coordinating the humanitarian response, reporting to the Emergency Relief Coordinator.
- **The Designated Official in-country (normally the senior-most UN official in-country**) has specific security management responsibilities pursuant to the Security Policy Manual and is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. He or she is responsible for the security of UN personnel, premises and assets throughout the country or designated area of operation and for leading security management team meetings.

In exceptional circumstances, the SG, in consultation with relevant entities, may decide that the nature of a situation warrants the highest level of management engagement and shall either directly oversee or delegate the authority to the DSG or an appointed EOSG representative to oversee the coordination of the UN response. This determination shall be made by the SG, either at his/her discretion, or upon request by at least two affected UN entities.

During crisis activation in mission settings, the Head of Mission shall retain operational authority at all times over deployed uniformed personnel and shall exercise his or her operational authority over the military and police components through the respective heads of those components. The Head of the military component and/or the Head of the police component shall continue to exercise operational control over all military and police personnel in the mission.

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

Key Message: The Crisis Response Coordination Mechanism details the actions to be taken by the key actors in each of the four stages of crisis management.

Crisis Response & Management is the capability by which the Crisis Response Mechanism is implemented. The Crisis Response Mechanism is activated upon the significant deterioration of a situation or in the event of a sudden onset crisis in the field that requires centralised response coordination among multiple pillars of the UN for accelerated and streamlined decision-making, operational coordination, information flow, and communications.

This Mechanism stays active until the situation has abated, has evolved into a more protracted scenario, or additional capacities have been established to replace the dedicated crisis response architecture. The four phases are:

- Preparedness.
- Enhanced Monitoring.
- Activation.
- De-activation.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** At UN HQ level the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) shall serve as the information and crisis hub throughout all stages of crisis management, to provide common situational awareness, maintain a common venue, and track action points for decision-making; by working closely with the Integrated Operational Team (IOT) of the DPO/DPPA Joint Structure and a DOS representative as nominated by the Assistant Secretary-General DOS.

Slide 13



Key Message: At the Mission HQ, the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) serves as the nerve centre and focal point for the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) to manage the crisis situation. It integrates the mission and its partners in the country while also liaising and coordinating with UN leadership in New York.

Slide 14



Key Message: Preparedness refers to the normal day-to-day activities to ensure readiness to support developing and/or ongoing crisis situations in a country/area with a deployed peace operation.

The UNOCC, at UNHQ level, maintains a 24/7 watch capability to monitor developments in countries/areas with a United Nations presence, including peace operations, and shall inform the IOT and other relevant DPO and DOS senior leadership of disruptive events that impede the implementation of a peacekeeping mission's mandate.

The IOTs shall monitor events in their respective mission areas and shall notify all actors concerned, including the UNOCC Director, of any need to move beyond the Preparedness stage.

In line with the Policy Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (JOC), the JOC is an integrated entity supporting mission decision-makers in situational awareness and crisis response and shall be reachable by the UNOCC on a 24/7 basis for clarification of events in the field.

As specified in the SOP on Integrated Reporting from DPO-led Field Missions to UNHQ, significant developments shall be reported to the UNOCC via a Special Incident ("Flash") Report, as required, which is separate from the integrated daily situation report sent each working day at 06:00 hours New York time.

In addition, recalling its role as an integrated entity supporting mission planning and decision-making, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) is well placed to assist with mission preparedness efforts through its provision of predictive assessments and integrated analysis.

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

Key Message: At the UNHQ level, Enhanced Monitoring shall be undertaken within DPO and DOS in response to a deteriorating situation or a situation that has the potential to evolve into a crisis in a country/area with a deployed peace operation.

While Enhanced Monitoring does not involve a departure from standard decision-making procedures, measures shall be put in place to enhance the preparedness of DPO and DOS and the affected peace operations.

The IOT shall consult with the respective mission on contingency plans, including updated security and evacuation arrangements, and explore options for cooperation with other missions.

To limit parallel information flows to United Nations senior leadership, information from the mission and other relevant United Nations actors shall be channelled through the UNOCC, to be disseminated to relevant actors at UNHQ for situational awareness and to guide decision-making and response.

Based on developments in the field, Enhanced Monitoring may evolve into the activation of crisis response procedures for enhanced coordination or even return to the Preparedness stage.

A return to the Preparedness stage shall suggest the discontinuation of all Enhanced Monitoring arrangements previously put in place.

At the mission level, the SRSG might provide guidance to enhanced monitoring and initiate mechanisms to increase reporting and coordination within the mission area as well as with UNHQ.

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

Key Message: As the situation in a mission area rapidly and significantly deteriorates or in the event of the sudden onset of a crisis, the IOT, in consultation with the UNOCC and the mission leadership, shall recommend to the USG/DPO the **activation of crisis response procedures.**

This serves to accelerate and streamline decision-making, operational coordination, information flow, and communications spanning the pillars of the United Nations.

Following a decision by the USG/DPO on the activation of crisis response procedures, the USG/DPO shall inform the Head of Mission and the Designated Officials, as well as the UNOCC. In turn, the UNOCC shall notify relevant actors in the United Nations System.

On behalf of the Secretary-General, the lead coordinating entity/entities shall be responsible for activating the crisis coordination mechanisms. The lead coordinating entity/entities should consult the senior-most UN official(s) in-country, including the RC (and HC, if distinct), and in the relevant UN regional office in non-mission settings, and the Designated Official, if different, and inform them if activation is being considered.

When a decision to activate is taken, the UNOCC will notify the UN system, including at field level, on the decision and next steps.

The Senior Action Group or other Principals-level forums chaired by the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or Chef de Cabinet may request the lead coordinating entity/entities to activate the crisis coordination mechanism on behalf of the Secretary-General.

Upon activation, all information between the affected mission and UNHQ related to the situation and developments within the mission's area of operations and its crisis management activities over the past 24 hours shall be shared with the UNOCC.

Offices in DPO and DOS shall coordinate all requests for additional information with the UNOCC, copying the relevant IOT, to avoid burdening the affected mission with similar requests through multiple channels during a time of crisis.

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

Key Message: When crisis response procedures are activated, DPO shall establish a centralised crisis coordination mechanism.

This mechanism consists of two bodies:

- **Crisis Management Team (CMT**) – This leadership-level, cross-pillar decision-making body shall be chaired by a Crisis Manager, who will be the USG/DPO or designated person at UNHQ, and the Head of Mission or designated person in the mission. In exceptional circumstances, the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or an appointed EOSG representative may assume this role.
- **Operations Coordination Body –** This working-level, cross-pillar body shall be led by a Crisis Coordinator, who is usually the Director of the relevant regional division of the DPO/DPPA Joint Structure or the IOT Team Leader at UNHQ, and a person designated by the Head of the field presence. The person may differ depending on the nature of the crisis but will be a person of sufficient seniority and capability as well as provided with adequate resources and authority to undertake the task as Crisis Coordinator. This body will support all relevant tasks, such as day-to-day operations of the crisis response, policy recommendations, and common messaging.

The UNOCC shall support the efforts of the crisis coordination mechanism and work closely with the Crisis Manager and Crisis Coordinator at UNHQ by providing situational awareness, maintaining a crisis venue and co-location space, enabling information management platforms, providing secretariat services for relevant meetings, ensuring secure communications and tracking action points.

At the mission level, the SRSG should also call for the set-up of a Crisis Management Team (CMT) and establish a mission (country) level Operations Coordination Body.

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

Key Message: The Crisis Manager shall determine the CMT membership based on the specific nature of the crisis.

The Crisis Manager (most likely the SRSG or his/her deputy) supported by the CMT will focus on the urgent need to continue to implement a mission mandate. The OCB will support all relevant tasks, such as day-to-day operations of the crisis response, policy recommendations, and common messaging.

The Crisis Manager and the CMT should consider:

- How will the mission be led through the crisis?
- What is the political effect of this crisis? Are neighbouring countries affected?
- What is the most appropriate political approach to the crisis?
- What is the main effort?
- What are the T/PCCs prepared to do/not prepared to do? What are their limitations?
- What are the resource limitations of the mission?
- How will this impact the implementation of the mandate?
- What does the mission need from the UNHQ? What should be managed locally?

Slide 19



Key Message: To avoid parallel information flows to senior leadership, information from the mission and other UN actors shall be channelled through the UNOCC for dissemination to relevant UNHQ actors for situational awareness and to guide decision-making and response. The UNOCC will disseminate the integrated information to relevant UNHQ actors, reflecting a common operational picture of the situation.

The Crisis Manager, together with the UNOCC and in consultation with the field, shall be responsible for ensuring that information is collected and disseminated in a timely fashion within the UN system. The UNOCC shall monitor the development and implementation of relevant standard operating procedures (SOPs) and toolkits in this regard.

Slide 20

Key Message: The CMT should decide on key common messaging to ensure coherence across the system. The Department of Public Information (DPI) should be called upon to provide support and guidance on crisis communications issues and support the production and dissemination of relevant internal and external crisis communications products.

There are two crucial aspects to crisis communications: external communications, including reputational management, with Member States, affected communities, media, private sector, donors and wider civil society; and internal communications with staff (including affected staff, responders, and all staff) and their dependents.

For internal communication at the strategic level, DMSPC, DOS (for peace operations), UNDSS and DPI are responsible, in consultation with the lead coordinating entity/entities, for coordinating timely and continuous internal information dissemination to UN personnel.

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

Key Message: The CMT has the sole responsibility of determining when to deactivate crisis coordination mechanisms.

The decision may be made for a variety of reasons including the fact that the crisis has abated and no longer requires sustained accelerated attention and support from Headquarters, in which case at its last meeting, the CMT should outline any measures that should be taken and if and how mechanisms should continue to monitor the situation and inform the system on follow-up measures.

Crisis coordination mechanisms may also be deactivated if the crisis has become protracted or if mission-planning has commenced and it is determined that there is sufficient standing capacity both at Headquarters and in the field to manage the situation, and thereby no longer requires additional support from the dedicated crisis response coordination architecture.

The Crisis Manager, at the last CMT meeting, shall clarify the following:

- The return to the Enhanced Monitoring or Preparedness stage at UNHQ.
- Measures taken to continue monitoring the situation to keep the broader United Nations system informed on follow-up measures.

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

Key Message: Considerations of Crisis Management are:

- Enhance situational awareness and communications
- Integrate analysis and planning for early identification and response to deteriorating situations
- Decentralise crisis management
- Accelerate decision-making and coordinate structures on all levels
- Develop guidance clearly outlining roles and responsibilities, authority and accountability
- Identify a central venue for crisis response activities
- Exercise flexibility of available funding in addressing urgent needs

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

Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- A crisis is defined as an incident or situation, whether natural or human-made, that due to its magnitude, complexity or gravity of potential consequence, requires a UN-wide coordinated multi-dimensional response.
- Crisis Management should be guided by the principles and accountability; field-focus; adaptation to context; inclusiveness; simplicity and predictability; respect for values; standards and principles; and respect for human principles.
- Crisis Response Coordination Mechanism consists of the following phases: preparedness, enhanced monitoring, activation and de-activation.
- UNOCC (UNHQ level) and JOC (Mission level) play central roles in crisis management coordination.

References:

- 2012.17 Guidelines – Enterprise Risk Management
- 2016.17 SOP - Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of Peacekeeping Operations
- 2018 Technical Adjustment to United Nations Crisis Management Policy (19 March 2019)
- 2019.10 SOP - Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ
- 2019.23 Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- Essential Capabilities for Crisis Management Manual (UN DPO – declassified on 21 Oct 2022)

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

- Instructions:

Divide participants into two groups, one for each topic to be discussed.

Allocate five (5) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the groups and add points if required.

Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
3.4

Operational Rhythm, Staff Work and Digital Tools

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.4 explains the Operational Rhythm, Staff Work, and Digital Tools within UN Peacekeeping Operations HQs.

Its purpose is to equip Military Staff Officers (MSOs) with a clear understanding of how Operational Rhythm operates in F/S HQs, their role within it, the types of Routine Staff Work they'll encounter, and the array of Digital Tools available to enhance the situation awareness and support the decision-making process.

Relevance

MSOs must have a clear understanding of how Operational Rhythm operates in F/S HQs, their role within it, the types of Routine Staff Work they'll encounter, and the array of Digital Tools available to enhance the situation awareness and support the decision-making process

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the Operational Rhythm concept
- Explain Staff Duties
- Describe the Digital Tools available to enhance Situation Awareness and support Decision-Making

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 45
Summary of Key Messages	46
Learning Activity	47

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.4 explains the Operational Rhythm, Staff Work, and Digital Tools within UN Peacekeeping Operations HQs.

Its purpose is to equip Military Staff Officers (MSOs) with a clear understanding of how Operational Rhythm operates in F/S HQs, their role within it, the types of Routine Staff Work they'll encounter, and the array of Digital Tools available to enhance the situation awareness and support the decision-making process.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the Operational Rhythm concept
- Explain Staff Duties
- Describe the Digital Tools available to enhance Situation Awareness and support Decision-Making

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key message: A well-designed Operational Rhythm facilitates inter-branch and inter-mission staff work while leaving sufficient time for routine tasks and coordination within each subject matter area. The design of Operational Rhythm is typically the responsibility of the Chief of Staff.

Each Headquarters (HQ) follows a routine for meetings, reporting, assessment, and tasking on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis. This routine is known as the F/S HQ Operational Rhythm. Although it varies across missions due to different mandates and responsibilities, it can also vary within a mission based on operational needs to swiftly respond to events or crises. Every F/S HQ must define its routine Operational Rhythm.

Given that the Military Component (MC) is just one component of a UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO), close coordination and cooperation with other mission entities are crucial for achieving mandated tasks. This coordination can be institutionalised through regular meetings or the creation of working groups, which should be integrated into the HQ Operational Rhythm.

The Operational Rhythm is used to align staff efforts and is customised to the specific needs of each mission, following and supporting the Commander's Decision Cycle. It may occur weekly or even monthly, with all meetings described in a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) outlining their purpose, required products, and necessary representation from HQ staff, civilian experts, or representatives from other mission components.

Operational Rhythm events may involve personnel from both subordinate and superior HQs. Meetings are typically grouped into boards and working groups (WGs). WGs are designed to prepare board-level meetings or serve as coordination meetings for various staff branches and subordinate HQs. They can be chaired by a branch head responsible for the subject area and are used for cross-functional coordination.

Boards are used for decision-making, providing recommendations, or requesting decisions or further guidance from the commander. Examples include the Military Coordination Board (which defines mid-term prioritisation of military efforts) or the Military Operations Assessment Board (which assesses progress towards military objectives and provides prioritisation recommendations to the commander). These boards help prepare the commander for Mission Leadership Team discussions.

☞***Note to instructor*** – For further information on Operational Rhythm, refer to the UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook (2023), Chapter 5, Force HQ Structure, Item 5.9.

Slide 5



Key Message: This slide provides a generic example of the daily Operational Rhythm at the F/S HQ level.

- Important daily meetings include:

- Shift Change Brief: This aims to ensure a smooth transition between shifts and should be overseen by the shift leader. The outgoing shift will not depart until the incoming shift is sufficiently briefed to commence its duty period.
- Situational Awareness Briefing (SAB): Designed to brief a Commander on the activities of the last 24 hours in detail and those of the next 24 hours in outline. The brief is coordinated by the MOC director, and all available staff should participate. It should be kept short (maximum 30 min) and focus on essential information for the Commander. All briefings are to be archived to enable future queries.
- FCOS Coordination Meeting: This key working-level meeting for the HQ is chaired by the FCOS. It is used to coordinate the efforts of all staff functions and provide leadership guidance for the next 24 hours.

- Regular Meetings include:

- Sector HQs, Subordinate Unit Coordination Meeting.
- Military Operations Assessment Board (MOAB/WGs).
- Military Coordination Board.
- Operational Planning Group (OPG).
- Mission Support Board.
- MPKI Acquisition Management WG.

☞***Note to instructor*** - For further information on FHQ internal Operational Rhythm, refer to the UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook (2023), Chapter 5, Force HQ Structure, Item 5.9.1.

Slide 6



Key Message: To facilitate mission-wide cooperation with the MHQ and other UN entities engaged in the mission area, regular coordination and information exchange meetings, sometimes even combined planning meetings, are crucial.

Listed below are examples of meetings FHQ personnel conduct regularly with personnel from MHQ and other UN entities.

- On the left side of the slide: Meetings at the level of FC/DFC/FCOS:

- Principal Management Meeting (PMM).
- Head of Sections (HoS) Meeting.
- Senior Management Group (SMG).
- Senior Management Team (SMT).
- Crisis Management Team (CMT).
- Technical Working Group.
- IED Threat Mitigation Working Group.

- On the right side of the slide: Meetings for the FCOS:

- Operational Coordination Committee (OCC).
- FCOS Staff Synchronization Meeting (includes Mission Support Division (MSD) and Political Affairs Division (PAD)).
- COE and MOU Management Review Board (CMMRB).
- Weapon and Ammunition Advisory Board (WAAB).
- Integrated Project Team (IPT).
- Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Group.

☞***Note to instructor*** - This FHQ Battle Rhythm with MHQ / other UN entities is an example from UNMISS, the names of coordination mechanisms and the participating actors may vary in different missions, and other missions may have additional meetings as well.

Slide 7



Key Message: Staff meetings at the MSO level may include the ones listed on this slide.

U-2:

- JMAC Early Warning.
- Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM) Meeting.

U-3:

- Operation Assessment Board.
- JOC Coordination Meeting.
- Risk Assessment Coordination Meeting.
- Risk Management Board (RMB).
- MOVCON Coordination Meeting.
- Operation Lifeline (OLL) Meeting.
- SAGE Meeting.

U-4/FMO:

- Medical Working Group Meeting.

U-5:

- Result Based Budgeting.
- Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS).
- Rotation Working Group.
- Security Sector Reform Meeting.
- Secretary General's 90 days report.

U-7:

- IMTC Training Coordination Meeting.

U-9:

- Political Affairs Division (PAD) Meeting.
- Military Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Meeting.
- World Food Program (WFP) Logistics Cluster.
- Collection Management Board (CMB).
- UNHCR Protection Cluster.
- OCHA Humanitarian Situational Briefing.
- OCHA Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG).
- Human Rights Division Meeting.
- Migration Working Group.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - Advise participants that meetings listed above will not be explained in detail, but advise MSOs, upon arrival in the respective mission, to obtain the respective branch SOP to learn about the Operational Rhythm of the branch and what meetings need to be attended.

Slide 8



Period	Event	Location	Participants / Reporting line
Daily	Shift Change	Operation Centre	**Duty Officer**
Daily	Situation Update to HOMC/FC	Briefing Room	**HOMC/FC, DFC, Force CoS, U-1~9, Personal Staff, Liaison Officers, ***
Daily	Daily Information Summary (INFOSUM)	U-2	**DPO/OMA (0600hrs NYT)**
Daily	Daily Situation Report (SITREP)	U-3	**DPO/SITCEN (0600hrs NYT)**
Weekly	Weekly Information Report (INFOREP)	U-3	**DPO/OMA (0600hrs NYT)**
Weekly	Weekly Situation Report	U-3	**UNHQ DPO/ SITCEN/OMA (0600 hrs NYT)**
Weekly	Mission Leadership Team (MLT) Meeting	Mission Briefing Room	**HOMC/FC, U-2/3**
Weekly (depending Security sit.)	Security Management Team (SMT)	Mission Briefing Room	**HOMC/FC, Members of SMT, CSO, U-2/3/5, Info Ops**
Monthly	Monthly Military Strength Report	U-3	**DPO/OMA/OO**
Monthly	Military Monthly Report	U-3	**DPO/OMA/OO**
Monthly	Mission PK-I Coord Mechanism (MICM)	U-2	**COS, Intel elements from all components and mission partners**
Quarterly	HOMC/FC Conference	Sectors	**HOMC/FC, Contingent Commanders, U-2/3/5, ***
Bi-annually	Inter-Mission Conference	Force HQ	**HOMC, U-2/3/5, ***
Every 6 Months	Operational Readiness Report	U-3	**DPO/OMA/OO**
Ad-hoc	Plans update to HOMC/FC	U-3	**HOMC/FC/DFC/CoS, U-1~9, Personal Staff, LOs,***
Ad-hoc	Notification of Casualty (NOTICAS)	U-3	**DPO/OMA/OO**
As Required	Special Incident Flash Report (SINREP)	U-3 (JOC)	**DPO/SITCEN/OMA**
As Required	Reporting following the Use of Force	U-3 (JOC)	**DPO/SITCEN/OMA**

*** Others as required**

Key Message: This slide provides a generic example of the Schedule Plan of the Operational Rhythm at the F/S HQ level.

Slide 9



Key Message: Other functional meetings at the FHQ level may include the ones listed on this slide.

- (Key Leader) Engagement WG. Coordinates engagement activities of key leaders and the wider military engagement plan including levels of engagement.
- Force Protection WG.
- Special Forces WG.
- UN-CIMIC Coordination meeting.
- Weekly Mission Leadership meetings.
- Daily Operational Brief.
- Weekly FC's Planning Meeting with FHQ Staff.
- Weekly SMT meeting.
- Monthly Operational Update to SRSG and OMA.
- Monthly Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM).
- Quarterly FC's Meeting with FCs from the same region.
- Quarterly FC's Conference with Commanders.
- Regular FC's visit to all major units.
- Six Monthly Inter-Mission-Cooperation Conference.

- Six Monthly Mission Operational Capability Review.
- Six Monthly Contingent Commanders Conference.
- Annual Force Report.
- Annual HOMCs Conference in United Nations Secretariat.

Slide 10



Key Message: MSOs are responsible for collating information and analysing its implications and consequences for the mission and operations. MSOs must provide timely and accurate recommendations to the HOM/FC, particularly through written and oral communications, to support the best possible decisions.

In this part of the lesson, we will explore the common types of reporting and briefings that MSOs may participate in or conduct during their deployment.

Slide 11



Key Message: This slide outlines the most common types of UN written communications at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

- Strategic level (UNHQ level).
- Operational level (MHQ / FHQ level).
- Tactical level (Sector / Unit level).

Slide 12



Key Message: Depending on the type of the written communication, different systems are used for drafting and submission.

- E-Mail: The UN utilises the Microsoft Office Application "Outlook" for drafting, submitting, and storing emails. To ensure data security, the UN employs the SMART System for encrypting emails.
- SAGE: An event and incident tracking system provided to Field Missions through the Unite Aware platform.
- Code Cable System: Used for drafting and submitting Code Cables, it is a standalone system for formal correspondence exchange between UN HQ and Field Missions.
- Operations Report Repository (ORR): A secure web-based tool for registering, approving, providing authorised access, and storing mission situation reports.

All correspondence must adhere to information security policies and procedures and comply with the UN classification system.

Slide 13



Key Message: The security classifications used for UN documents are: Unclassified, Confidential and Strictly Confidential.

Sensitive information may be classified as "confidential" or "strictly confidential".

- The designation **"unclassified"** shall apply to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected not to cause damage to the work of the United Nations.
- The designation **"confidential"** shall apply to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the work of the United Nations.
- The designation **"strictly confidential"** shall apply to information or material whose unauthorised disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to or impede the conduct of the work of the United Nations.

☞ ***Note to instructor:***

a) Reference: ST/SGB/2007/6 - Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling.

b) Default security classification for all SITREPs is CONFIDENTIAL. This classification is automatically captured in the document ORR metadata and must also be marked on each page of the document. SITREPs are internal documents and may not be published, even in edited form, in any open-source environment.

Slide 14



Key Message: The provision of timely, reliable, integrated and actionable information from peacekeeping missions to UNHQ is critical to ensure effective situational awareness, monitor mandate implementation and facilitate decision-making.

Integrated SITREPs, reports drawing on information provided by all mission components and originating from other UN entities in proximity such as United Nations Country Team (UNCT), are of fundamental importance in the larger information flow from field missions to UNHQ. They provide a holistic situation overview through describing and assessing events and developments affecting the wider peace process, mission operations and mandate implementation efforts, as well as reporting on related actions taken by missions. SITREPs are supplemented by verbal updates to UNHQ and by Flash Reports when there is an emergency, a critical incident, a rapidly deteriorating situation, a crisis, or when mission personnel are threatened or harmed.

Once approved by the mission, integrated SITREPs should become immediately available to authorised personnel at UNHQ. SITREP content is made available to senior UNHQ decision-makers via a variety of means, including (but not limited to) a United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) Daily Report for the Secretary-General and Senior Management Group of the United Nations, Peacekeeping Briefing Notes to senior DPO, DPPA-DPO Regional Structure, and Department of Operational Support (DOS) staff and twice-weekly briefings at DPO Directors Meetings. In addition, weekly SITREPs provide the core input to the Secretariat's weekly Briefing Notes on Peace Operations to the Security Council.

Roles and Responsibilities

Head of Mission. The Head of Mission, through the Chief of Staff, is responsible for directing peacekeeping mission components/units on their reporting contributions to the JOC to enable the production of timely and accurate SITREPs and Flash Reports that are fully integrated. The Head of Mission must issue a mission specific directive on reporting to ensure that component inputs are received in time to meet reporting deadlines.

Mission Chief of Staff (MCoS). The Chief of Staff is responsible for approving the mission's integrated daily and weekly SITREPs. The Chief of Staff will direct whether the JOC or the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) will be responsible for the production of integrated weekly SITREPs.

Heads of mission components/units. The head of Component/Unit must submit inputs to the JOC in time to meet the integrated SITREP submission deadlines for UNHQ. Mission components/units should inform JOC of any significant events/developments that have occurred the same day but after the submission of the initial daily inputs as soon as possible. Mission components/units must also provide information on critical incidents as soon as possible and ideally within an hour of the incidents taking place to enable the JOC's production of Flash Reports.

JOC. The JOC fulfils situational awareness and integrated operational reporting obligations in a peacekeeping operation. It is responsible for collating and deconflicting information from mission components/units and the UNCT and external sources; and preparing integrated daily SITREPs for approval and transmission to UNHQ by the stipulated deadline. It is also responsible for preparing Flash Reports, for approval and transmission to UNHQ.

JMAC. The JMAC in a peacekeeping operation generates integrated analytical products, providing a comprehensive and timely understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of cross-cutting issues such as gender-related analysis and trends, and threats and opportunities that may affect the implementation of the mission's mandate.

United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC). The UNOCC is the unit at UNHQ responsible for maintaining global situational awareness, including in peacekeeping settings. Drawing on the integrated reporting provided by missions, the UNOCC produces daily reporting and trend analysis/analytics for senior staff at UNHQ.

Notes to instructor:

a) For further detailed information on Reporting – Roles and Responsibilities, refer to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ (2019.10).

b) Additional References for Reporting:

- 2023.08 UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook
- 2023.04 Guidelines – The role of the Head of the Military Component in a UN Peacekeeping Operations
- 2019.10 – Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) – Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ

Slide 15



Key Message: The Head of Military Component (HOMC) maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the Military Adviser (MILAD) in the UNHQ to address or clarify specific military-related issues. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with executive decisions taken by the HOM in the field.

An overview of the most important reports sent by the Military Component (MC) to UNHQ is below:

- **Military Daily and Weekly Reporting**. The HOMC, through the FCOS or designated FHQ staff, is required to provide military specific SITREPs, on a daily and weekly basis (Daily or Weekly SITREPs), to the MILAD via CMOS.
- **Military Monthly Reporting**. The HOMC, through the FCOS is required to provide a technical military report every month to the MILAD via CMOS, which is to include statistical and evaluative data concerning the Military Component and its operations in the field mission. This report is to reach the MILAD in UNHQ by the fifth day of the following month.
- **Military Annual Reporting**. In January of each year, an Annual Report on the Military Component is sent to the MILAD in UNHQ, covering the previous 12 months.
- **Significant Incident Reports** need to be sent out, when an incident occurs or is on-going, and its significance is of a level, that an inclusion of the reported information into the regularly provided SITREPs would lead to an unacceptable loss of knowledge and reaction time for the higher command.
  - Flash Report.
  - Notification of Casualties (NOTICAS).

- Intermediate Report, Final Report and After-Action Report.
- Use of Force Reporting.

Other relevant reporting from FHQ to UNHQ

Other relevant reports from FHQ to UNHQ include (this list is not exhaustive, and the required reports may vary between the different missions in requested content and frequency – a detailed mission-specific reporting scheme should be laid out in mission-specific SOPs), include:

- Technical Reports.
- Personnel Status Reports.
- Peacekeeping-Intelligence Reports.
- Performance Related Reports.
- Unit Performance Evaluation Reports.
- End of Assignment Report.
- Data Collection.

☞ ***Notes to instructor -*** For further detailed information, refer to the 2023.04 Guidelines on The Role of the Head of the Military Component in a UN Peacekeeping Operations and 2023.08 UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook.

Slide 16



Key Message: To keep the leadership at all levels best possible informed in all mission relevant aspects, reporting is essential. The main types of In-Mission Reports used within a mission are depicted in this slide.

- Military Daily and Weekly Situation Report (SITREP).
    - Military-specific report to the UN Military Adviser.
- Special Incident Report (SINCREP).
    - Also known as "Flash Report".
    - Provides brief information in case of crisis and incidents that may affect the mission's mandate.
- Notification of Casualties (NOTICAS).
    - Information on injuries / Casualties (sickness, accidents, hostile action).
- Military Monthly and Annual Reporting.
    - Technical report that includes statistical and evaluative data on military component and operations in the field.
- Reporting following the Use of Force.
    - Armed or lethal is used by a member of the military component.
    - Inquiry will be conducted and reported to the UN Military Adviser.
- Verification and Operational Readiness Reporting.
    - Every three months, unit's equipment will be verified – for reimbursement.
    - Every 6 months, components are to revise their material requirements and provide for the operational readiness report.

- Patrol Report.
    - After a patrol has finished its patrolling tasks, the patrol leader must write a patrol report summing up all relevant information and findings during the patrol.
- After Action Report (AAR).

Slide 17



Key Message: This slide provides a flow chart of reports relating to an incident in a mission area.

- Hostile Action (HA): Is a significant incident to be immediately reported through a **flash report.**

- Flash Reports (and any necessary updates) are used to provide short and operationally focused information in the event of an incident of foremost urgency, such as a significant and/or critical event, an emergency, crisis or other rapidly deteriorating situation (e.g., a noteworthy change in the operational situation, a mission-area event that has immediate or potential impact on the mission's operations or preliminary information about UN personnel death or serious injury/illness). Flash Reports may be issued following significant incidents or events, including but not limited to, significant political events (e.g., election announcements or results, and progress made on peace agreements), operational incidents, safety and security incidents (e.g., air crash), significant disease outbreak (e.g., Ebola outbreak), and natural disasters (e.g., earthquake).
- Flash Reports should be transmitted by the mission's JOC and/or FHQ U3 Duty Officer to UNOCC and/or respective CMOS Desk Officer, as soon as possible following the incident. A verbal report may precede the flash report via email or phone call to CMOS Desk Officer. Flash reports should be supplemented by written and verbal updates provided to UNOCC and CMOS as additional information becomes available.
- While it is understood that information should be verified to ensure its accuracy, the timely issuance of Flash Reports is vital for DPO to effectively support peacekeeping missions and fulfil their responsibility to keep the Secretary General, the UNSC and

countries that contribute personnel informed. Flash Report(s) should be followed by a more comprehensive report. Updates on casualty statistics should be reported to the UNHQ in subsequent updates of Flash Report(s) or SITREPS.

- **Follow up:** In case of significant update, CMOS provides to OMA leadership and Permanent Mission.

- NOTICAS: Upon occurrence of casualty/fatality, mission generates NOTICAS in 48 hrs.

- NOTICAS shall be prepared by the Office of the HOMC and submitted to OMA in the event of any of the following incidents involving UN military personnel serving in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations or Special Political Missions in the field:
    - Death, or
    - Serious injury or illness, defined as an acute, life-threatening, medical or surgical condition that may lead to death or the significant and permanent loss of limb, eyesight or function.
- **Follow up:** CMOS shares with PM of the respective TCC via fax. In case of any fatality, condolence letter to the Heads of the Governments/ PRs by the SG/ USG is prepared by CMOS.

Slide 18



Key Message: Subordinated units use reports to higher command to inform them on a regular basis or on an ad-hoc basis in case of incidents or accidents for the FHQ and MHQ to compile these reports, evaluate them and be able to act and react accordingly. Furthermore, to fulfil the FHQs reporting requirements to MHQ and to UNHQ, regular reporting from subordinated units is essential.

The subordinate level reporting is from:

- Battalion or unit level to Sector HQ.
- Sector-level HQ to FHQ.
- Force-level units (components), like Tactical Helicopters, to the FHQ.

If the PKO has a mandated task for monitoring and observing, with dedicated UN Military Observers (UNMOs) to be part of the military component **reporting may be conducted along two reporting chains:**

- The force elements will follow the reporting chain as discussed earlier.
- The UNMOs will report through the Chief Military Observer (CMO) to the FHQ.

The information of the two chains should be merged at the **Joint Operations Centre (JOC).**

To be able to conduct the mission's operational tasks efficiently and effectively, FCs are to distribute mission-specific directives on the mission's reporting mechanisms. FHQs are encouraged to reduce the number of reports from subordinated HQs / units to the minimum amount necessary. FHQ's own reporting requirements to MHQ and UNHQ are not to be changed by the FHQ unilaterally.

Slide 19



Key Message: This slide provides the most common types of Tactical Reports in a UNPKO.

Further reports might be required to be provided – depending on the mandate, tasks and mission set-up.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Advise participants, upon arrival in their respective UNPKO, to request the SOP of the cell/ branch/ office to learn more about the reporting requirements of the UNPKO.

Slide 20



Key Message: To contribute effectively to the conduct of the business of the United Nations, the correspondence of the Organization must be concise, clear and accurate in content, direct and dignified in style, correct in form and attractive in appearance.

The 2020 UN Correspondence Manual provides guidance on the drafting of UN correspondence.

It states that, to contribute effectively to the conduct of the business of the United Nations, the correspondence of the Organization must be:

- Concise.
- Clear and accurate in content.
- Direct and dignified in style.
- Correct in form and appearance.

Also, think before drafting regardless of the urgency; take time to answer the questions

- "Why am I writing?
    - Is it to give someone information? If so, what information? For what purpose? Will they understand the words I've chosen to use!
    - Do I need information? If so, what information? For what purpose?
    - Is some action needed? If so, what action? For what purpose?

- To whom am I writing?
    - Who will the reader(s) be?
    - What does (and doesn't) the reader know about the situation?
    - What does the reader need to know?
    - What questions will the reader have in mind when reading my communication?
    - How is the reader likely to react?
    - What is my relationship to the reader?

What, if any, action do I expect as a result of what I have written?" This will make it easier to draft more clearly and concisely.

Once you have answered the above questions for yourself, write simply, clearly and concisely.

- once we know what we want to communicate, to whom and why,
- we can draft correspondence clearly, correctly and concisely using a simple style
- it is basic and therefore is easily understood.

Slide 21



Key Message: MSOs must adhere to the principles of reporting in all types of communications.

Principles of reporting:

a. Each level of command analyses and filters information to ensure only important and relevant information is communicated with the next higher HQ. This ensures information discipline and prevents important information from being overlooked.
b. All information is to undergo analysis and assessment at all levels of command. All information should be treated with the "So What?"-question to determine its relevance and applicability at the next higher HQs.
c. The Chain of Command is NOT to be changed, bypassed or skipped – reports must be provided along the chain of command.
d. Distribution lists are to be scrutinised and disciplined. Excessive distribution of information dilutes ownership and accountability. The confidentiality of the information must be ensured, nevertheless, the need to share information with other mission entities is not to be obstructed.
e. Reporting periods are to be observed and where is nothing (new) to report, "Nothing significant to report (NSTR)" should be used. Retention of old information in routine reporting confuses the reader and prevents new and important information from being identified.
f. Routine reporting schedules should be observed by all reporting missions/HQs/units. Information of a non-critical nature, but still important for higher HQs situational awareness, should be included within routine reporting templates and formats.

g. Information relating to the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), incidents, violations or time critical information should be reported to higher HQs in a timely manner, using the procedures for incident reporting.
h. Identification and referencing of the reporting entity (FHQ / SHQ / Unit HQ / Platoon / Patrol, etc.) must be clear and unambiguous; therefore, unique identification mechanisms are to be generated by each mission and referenced in all reporting. This will ensure positive identification of all reports.
i. When reporting on sexual violence incidents, information must be shared with the nearest Women's Protection Adviser or CRSV focal point in the Human Rights component with the same sense of urgency as reporting to the chains of command. Immediate sharing of information is crucial to enable timely and adequate verification and follow-up of incidents, including through the referral systems. Personally identifiable information about victims/survivors and aggressors should never be included in reports (names, addresses, pictures etc.). If members of the MC happen to have this information, then they should only share it with the nearest Women's Protection Adviser or CRSV focal point in the Human Rights component to protect victims/survivors and prevent breaches of confidentiality.
j. All reports should reflect gender and age-sensitive considerations, including by desegregating information by age and gender.

Slide 22



Key Message: Most routine reports have submission due dates or times.

SITREP content is used by the UNOCC in the preparation of early morning updates for UNHQ senior staff, desk officers, and others. Due to the short timeframe within which the UNOCC must collect, verify, and summarise relevant information for its daily products, it is imperative that missions adhere to the deadlines outlined below.

- Daily SITREP content shall cover the 24-hour period up to midnight Local Time (LT) preceding the date of issuance of the report and must be released to the UNOCC via the ORR system by no later than 0500 hrs New York time (NYT) every morning, Mondays to Fridays (inclusive). On Monday, or in certain missions Sunday, the report must include relevant developments over the preceding weekend and the day before the weekend. Missions in which Fridays are non-working days need not release a SITREP on Fridays but shall release a SITREP covering the Thursday, Friday, and Saturday period instead.
- Weekly SITREPs shall cover the period from 0001 hrs Tuesday to 2400 hrs Monday. Weekly SITREPs must be released to the UNOCC through the ORR system by 0900 hrs NYT on Tuesdays. Individual arrangements may be made to adjust the period covered by integrated SITREPs to ensure that information reaching UNHQ is as current as possible. Such arrangements must be agreed between the mission and the UNOCC.

☞ ***Note to instructor –*** For additional information on report deadlines, refer to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ. Pages 7 and 8 (Reference: 2019.10).

Slide 23



Key Message: MSOs will participate and/or conduct various types of meetings and briefings during their deployment.

Briefings pursue various purposes. They are either intended to provide general information or information to a specific audience, to facilitate the workflow or to prepare a decision. Do not unnecessarily repeat information. Present facts - otherwise call it assumptions - describe shortfalls, critical constraints or limitations with regard to your own capabilities.

Recommendations for action should include What, When, Where, Who and Why (if applicable also How).

One briefer or a group of briefers may hold the briefing. In the latter case, an agenda has to be established, and the areas of responsibility of each individual briefer have to be coordinated to avoid repetition.

The briefer should keep the following aspects in mind:

- Analyse the audience.
- Decide on the purpose of the briefing and the desired outcome.
- Be brief and concise under due consideration of the given time limit.
- Decide on the focus of your briefing (or your part of the briefing).
- Do not go too much into detail if not requested to do so.
- Use visual aids (slides, map, and sketches).
- Choose short, descriptive, precise words and pronounce them clearly.
- Avoid words you find difficult to pronounce.
- Don't speak too fast (especially if you are a native speaker).
- Avoid lyrics and meaningless phrases.
- Maintain eye contact with the audience.

☞***Note to instructor –*** Be aware that an international environment may demand more formal behaviour than you might be used to in your own forces.

Slide 24



Key Message: This slide provides common types of briefings that MSOs may participate/conduct during their deployment.

Some purposes of these types of briefings are detailed below:

The Visitor Information Briefing is intended to inform visitors or guests about the current situation or a specific topic. The briefing does not include conclusions and recommendations, nor require decisions. The briefing deals primarily with facts.

Content:

- Introduction
  - Greeting.
  - Address the person(s) being briefed. Identify yourself and your organization.
  - Type and Classification of Briefing.
  - Purpose and Scope.
  - Outline or Procedure.
  - Briefly summarize the key points and your general approach.

- Body
  - Arrange the main ideas in a logical sequence.
  - Use visual aids correctly to emphasize main ideas.
  - Plan effective transitions from one main point to the next.
  - Be prepared to answer questions at any time.

The Staff Briefing is to coordinate the effort on a particular task.

The workflow and planning process is intended to secure a coordinated or unified effort. This may involve the exchange of information, the announcement of decisions within a command, the issuance of directives, or the presentation of guidance.

Staff briefing guidance:

- Keep the commander and staff abreast of the current situation.
- Coordinate efforts through rapid oral presentation of key data.

Possible Attendees:

- The commander, his/her deputy, and chief of staff.
- Senior representatives of his/her primary and special staff; commanders of his/her subordinate units.

Common Procedures:

- The person who convenes the staff briefing sets the agenda.
- The chief of staff or executive officer normally presides. Each staff representative presents information on his/her particular area.
- The commander usually concludes the briefing but may take an active part throughout the presentation.

The aim of Military Information Briefing is to inform superiors or subordinated commanders on the current situation. It includes:

- Mission.
- Situation of the parties to the conflict, capabilities and presumable intentions.
- Situation of superior formation, adjacent units and other organisations.
- Situation of friendly forces in all basic functional areas.
- Friendly intentions.
- Special command and control problems.
- Requests/recommendations.
- Summary.

Slide 25



- Instructions:

Questions flashed on the screen.

Discuss answers after 3 mins.

- Facilitator Notes:

Outcome – self-check on learning and address queries, if any.

Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Slide 26



Key Message: In this part of the Lesson, we will introduce a range of emerging digital tools that are progressively being rolled out to Field Missions to enhance Situation Awareness and support Decision-Making.

- Unite Aware and its applications: SAGE, Maps, and Patrol Plans.

- Operational Reports Repository (ORR).

Slide 27



Key Message: In his first communication to the UN, the SG highlighted the importance of Situational Awareness.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Memorandum - Strengthened Information Management, Coordination and Crisis Management Arrangements (2017).

Slide 28



Key Message: This slide provides the definition of situational awareness for the UN.

Definition: Situational Awareness is the ability to provide decision-makers with timely, accurate, and actionable crisis-related information regarding the nature and complexity of the situation, any secondary effects, threats to staff and facilities, and the effectiveness of response and recovery actions. This involves the successful collection of information sufficient to allow decision-makers to identify, prevent, mitigate and/or respond to threats and opportunities.

Slide 29



Key Message: With around 71,417 authorised personnel deployed in often remote and high-risk locations, UN peace operations require specialised and high-performing ICT capabilities as the backbone of command, control, and situational awareness.

In high-tempo, complex, and dangerous environments, where asymmetric, hybrid, and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peacekeepers and the population and impact mandate implementation. In these environments, there is a need for peacekeeping missions to better understand their operating environments. This also includes maintaining a strategic overview of developments and anticipating the strengths and weaknesses of threats/spoilers that may impact the ability of peacekeepers to execute their mandate effectively.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** - To access the map in pdf, visit https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data, and navigate to the latest Peacekeeping Fact Sheet.

Slide 30



Key Message: Enhancing Situational Awareness is a key deliverable of the Digital Transformation Strategy and is integral to a peacekeeping mission's ability to carry out its mandate, protect civilians and ensure the safety and security of its personnel.

The operating environment in peacekeeping missions requires us to continuously ingest, manage and analyse large volumes of information to inform a timely response. However, understanding a fragmented and evolving conflict landscape has become challenging with current systems and capabilities. Recent reviews of peacekeeping's approach to Situational Awareness, and the technology platform Unite Aware, have identified the urgent need for a more integrated approach, to ensure missions have the right doctrine, expertise, data management, processes, and underlying technologies to gain an informed and as close to real-time understanding of their operating environment as possible, with information flows optimised to support the analysis and planning of responses at all levels.

Drivers for change:

With digital technologies taking on a prominent and ever-more complex role in 21st century conflicts, the framework of the Secretary-General's strategies on new technologies and on data set the stage for UN peacekeeping to forge its own path toward harnessing the potential of digital technologies and better deliver on its mandates, now and for the future. The vision for deeper internal capacities and exposure to new technologies is consistent with the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative; the A4P "Plus" (A4P+) priorities of 2021 emphasise the need for innovative, data-driven, and technology-enabled peacekeeping. The Security Council and the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) have acknowledged the efforts to better integrate the

use of new technologies for the purposes of increasing safety and security, improving situational awareness, enhancing field support and facilitating substantive mandate implementation.

Slide 31

Key Message: The Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) created Unite Aware (UA), a cohesive suite of tools, applications and devices conceived and developed for and with the JOCs, to aggregate data sources and support operational and strategic decision-making.

The situational awareness solution will systematize data collection, optimize information sharing, streamline reporting and provide an improved graphic interface for better sensor visualisation to support operational planning and analysis at all levels in order to improve operational response times.

The solution will:

- Foster cross-component integration and increase awareness of the operating environment by empowering the JOC as the information hub, with JMACs and MSCs at the heart of the solution at the Mission Headquarters level. At field level, focus will be on those integrated structures working directly to Heads of Field Offices.
- Provide mission-specific information management solutions to enable timely access to relevant information for analysts and planners. Solutions will be recommended for data and information management resource and capability gaps.
- Enable peacekeeping to become increasingly pro-active through the incorporation of sensor technology, better visualisations to support planning and analysis and integrated reporting procedures.
- Improve communications through a single data layer with individual access controlled by agreed permissions, respecting need-to-know principles.

Slide 32



Key Message: Unite Aware is the flagship technology platform designed to provide a coherent, comprehensive and integrated approach to situational awareness and information analysis for UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Unite Aware addresses the current fragmented and stove-piped approach to managing field missions' critical information flow.

Slide 33



Key Message: The Unite Aware platform systematises data collection, optimises information sharing, streamlines reporting and provides an improved graphic interface for better sensor visualisation to support operational planning and analysis at all levels in order to improve operational response times.

Unite Aware incorporates a suite of integrated applications and technologies used to collect and manage a broad range of data and information sources in a secure manner and presents that information to non-uniformed and uniformed decision-makers via intuitive visualisations, reporting and analysis instruments.

Slide 34



Key Message: These are the main benefits that Unite Aware offers to field missions:

- Standardise the data collection process
- Increase awareness of incidents and events
- Present and share information in a secure but intuitive and timely manner
- Support and guide decision-making

Slide 35



Key Message: Unite Aware contains these core applications.

These Applications provide different functions and complement each other to enhance situation awareness of a mission:

- UA Sage (Incidents)
- UA Patrol Plans
- UA Maps
- UA Dashboards
- UA Training

Slide 36



Key Message: Sage is used by different teams to capture and collect information on a variety of incidents and events in a mission area, ranging from civil affairs activities to serious security occurrences. These incidents and events may impact the security and safety of UN staff and the local population.

Sage ensures the validity of data, improves accuracy, and avoids data duplication. Data entered in Sage can be visualised on maps or displayed on reports and dashboards to support timely decision-making.

Slide 37



Key Message: UA Patrol Plans is used by military and police units to enter details of their planned patrols within a mission area.

Within this application, relevant information is recorded for each patrol, such as: date and time of departure, itinerary, or the number of vehicles. Patrol Plans has a simple approval workflow, enabling commanders to quickly review and approve the schedule for their units. When a patrol finishes its trip, its details are entered, and the patrol is marked as completed.

Slide 38



Key Message: UA Maps pulls data entered by different teams in other UA applications such as UA Sage, UA Patrol Plans, as well as other data sources, and presents this data in a visual and contextual format on a map.

Slide 39



Key Message: As data is collected through UA Sage, Patrol Plans and other sources, it is saved in a Central Database and stored for future reference. This data is then used to create mission dashboards and reports, such as the Mission Footprint Dashboard, the Daily Situation Report, or the list of Approved Patrol Plans.

Benefits of UA Dashboards:

- Data is intuitively presented for an easier interpretation
- Historical data and trends can be viewed for easy analysis
- Management and Mission Leadership have factual data available to make informed decisions

Slide 40



Key Message: UA Training provides several courses and training sessions to explain how UA Sage, UA Patrol Plans and UA Maps are used.

The courses are sequentially organised in several levels, with certificates awarded after their completion.

The UN C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP) conducts the Unite Aware CARANA scenario-based exercise training course for JOC and JMAC personnel at the UN Regional Service Centre (RSC-E), Entebbe, Uganda.

Slide 41



Key Message: The following slides will present the main benefits of the Unite Aware Platform to MSOs in the F/S HQs, JOC and JMAC.

Common Operational Picture:

- Possibility to select, visualise and navigate in different layers of the mission map.
- Change map content (layers, groups, and themes).

Slide 42



Key Message: The Unite Aware Platform provides MSOs easy to access critical information.

Search for incidents:

- Filter by forms, category and date range.
- Link Incidents and create groups.
- Manage linked incident.
- Manage flash reports.
- Archive Flash Reports.

Slide 43



Key Message: The Unite Aware Platform provides MSOs the possibility to track UN vehicles and aircraft, as well as to see what is happening at the moment, using images from CCTV, UAVs etc.

Slide 44



Key Message: The Unite Aware Platform provides MSOs with Business Intelligence.

- Search the map content by area.
- Filter the map layers for specific content.
- Use the geo-analysis services in maps: Road risk, incident cluster, count and trend, risk prediction.
- Set up your own geo-analysis criteria.
- Generate geo-analysis reports.
- Calculate and display measurements on the map.
- Draw graphics to highlight the map content.
- Plot coordinates of a point of interest.
- Edit and remove elements from the map view.

Slide 45



Key Message: The Operations Reports Repository (ORR) is a secure web-based tool for the registration, approval, authorised access and storage of mission situation reports.

Authorised mission and UNHQ users may access the ORR directly through the UNHQ or UN mission networks. The ORR supports the following tasks: document uploading with automated notifications, document browsing, full-text document search, and secure, long-term document storage as well as user administration.

Slide 46



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- All staff officers need to understand the tasks and Operational Rhythm of their own departments and that of others regularly dealt with.

- Staff Officers will be responsible for compiling and submitting reports and researching and conducting briefings so must be familiar with the concepts and comfortable with the delivery.

- The benefits of Unite Aware to field missions are:
    - Standardise the data collection process
    - Increase awareness of incidents and events
    - Present and share information in a secure but intuitive and timely manner
    - Support and guide decision-making

- ORR provides UNHQ with a secure tool for the management of reports from field Missions

Slide 47



- Instructions:

Questions are flashed on the screen.

Discuss answers after 3 mins.

- Facilitator Notes:

Outcome – self-check on learning and address queries, if any.

Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
3.5

UN Planning Process and UN Military Decision-Making

Lesson at a Glance

General

Lesson 3.5 provides a general overview of the Planning Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP).

This Lesson is designed to ensure that all participants to be deployed as Military Staff Officers (MSOs) in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) at Force Headquarters (FHQ) and Sector Headquarters (SHQ) understand the UN MDMP and are able to effectively work and plan UN military operations according to the UN standards and procedures.

The Learning Activities (LA) available in Lesson 3.5 are designed to reinforce the learning outcomes of each step of the UN MDMP and enhance the ability of participants to apply the knowledge and practise the UN MDMP, using the fictitious CARANA country scenario.

Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs) should examine the learning outcomes and design their culminating LA to achieve those within their available resources.

Aim

Consolidate the major learning outcomes from Lesson 3.5, enabling participants to practise and apply the UN MDMP within a secure and safe learning environment using the fictitious CARANA scenario. These LA are also designed to be the baseline for the Scenario-Based Exercise (SBE) to be conducted in the final stage of the UNSO course.

Time Required

A total of three/four days will be required to conduct Lesson 3.5, including the delivery of the CARANA country study briefing, theoretical sub-lessons and the five (5) LAs.

Overview

Lesson 3.5 consists of one (1) briefing, seven (7) sub-lessons, and five (5) LAs. The Lesson is designed and structured to follow the sequential order outlined below:

Briefing, Sub-Lesson, LA	Topic
Briefing	Carana Country Study Briefing
3.5a	Planning Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations
3.5b	Overview of the UN Military Decision-Making Process
3.5c	Analysis of the Operational Environment
LA 1	Analysis of the Operational Environment
3.5d	Mission Analysis
LA 2	Mission Analysis
3.5e	Course of Action (COA) Development
LA 3	Course of Action (COA) Development
3.5f	Course of Action Analysis and Comparison
LA 4	Course of Action Analysis and Comparison
3.5g	Decision and Order Development
LA 5	Decision and Order Development

Essential Training Materials to Conduct Lesson 3.5

- Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5
- Carana Country Study Briefing
- Current Situation M+180 (Annex A to Facilitator Guidance)
- Carana Country Study: Light Version Package

Supporting Training Materials

- Carana Country Study: Complete Package
- Maps
- Templates

☞ ***Note to instructor –*** Conduct the **Carana Country Study Briefing** before starting Lesson 3.5a. For detailed information, refer to the Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5.

Lesson
3.5a

Planning Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5a provides an overview of the Planning Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations and the essential directing documentation for planning military operations.

Relevance

Military Staff Officers (MSOs) must have a clear understanding of how the UN Planning Process is conducted at all three levels (Strategic, Operational and Tactical), as well as their role within it, to effectively work and plan UN military operations according to UN standards and procedures, and support the decision-making process.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the planning process for UN Peacekeeping Operations
- List the key planning documents which "operationalise" SC Mandates
- List the essential documentation for planning military operations at the mission level
- Describe the roles of military staff officers in the UN planning process

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 25
Summary of Key Messages	26

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5a provides an overview of the Planning Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations and the essential directing documentation for planning military operations.

Military Staff Officers (MSOs) must have a clear understanding of how the UN Planning Process is conducted at all three levels (Strategic, Operational and Tactical), as well as their role within it, to effectively work and plan UN military operations according to the UN standards and procedures, and support the decision-making process.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the planning process for UN Peacekeeping Operations
- List the key planning documents which "operationalise" SC Mandates
- List the essential documentation for planning military operations at the mission level
- Describe the roles of military staff officers in the UN planning process

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4

Key Message: The Security Council (SC) decides on the deployment of a Peace Operation. The process leading to that decision includes an analysis of the conflict situation in consultation with key partners.

When a crisis or dispute occurs (between or within countries), the Secretary-General (SG), the General Assembly (GA), and any Member State (MS) can request the SC to consider and debate the situation.

The Strategic Assessment (SA) provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consideration of the SG. The decision on the options proposed in a Strategic Assessment lies with the SG. If a decision is made to propose the establishment of a mission, the recommendation is articulated in a report of the SG to the SC.

The SC, based on the recommendation of the SG, decides whether or not to authorise the establishment, reconfiguration, or termination of a UN Peace Operation or field-based Special Political Mission (SPM) and issues a mandate accordingly.

☞***Notes to instructor:***

a) The SC considers a UN Peace Operation as a suitable response to a conflict situation:

- The SC addresses each crisis on a case-by-case basis to find the most suitable response, which includes peaceful and coercive measures as outlined in the UN Charter.

- The SC assesses the risk to international peace and security. If a situation poses a risk, the SC may ask the SG to initiate UN conflict prevention or peace-making measures. It may also choose to monitor measures that regional powers are already undertaking.

- As a situation evolves, the SC may consider a UN Peace Operation.

b) The SC decides to deploy a UN Peace Operation – adopts a resolution with a mandate:

- Based on the findings and recommendations of the Strategic Assessment, the SG usually issues a report to the SC. The report from the SG may recommend a UN Peace Operation.

- If the SC decides to deploy a UN Peace Operation, it issues a resolution with a decision and a mandate.

- The SC mandate authorises the mission, sets the size (total number of personnel), and tasks.

Photo: UN Photo.

Slide 5



Key Message: The articulation of a common UN vision, priorities, and responsibilities in support of peace consolidation is developed through an inclusive analytical and Integrated Planning Process (IAP).

If the Security Council (SC) authorises the establishment of a UN Peace Operation or changes to an existing mandate, the Mandate and Strategic Assessments (SA) should be used as a basis for the development or revision of the Directive to the Special/Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (S/ERSG)*, Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), and Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

The Secretary-General's (SG) Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an ISF. The SG's Directive also transfers the responsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG and the senior leadership team (e.g., DPO, DOS, DPPA, DSS).

On the basis of the Mandate, SA, and the SG's Directive, the vision, shared objectives, and means through which the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated through an inclusive analytical and planning process whose conclusions are reflected in an ISF document.

The ISF is a strategic plan for the UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors in the host country.

Under the guidance of the SG and in coordination with field leadership and Task Force partners, lead departments (e.g., DPO, DOS, DPPA) at headquarters (HQ) are responsible for initiating, organising, and conducting integrated assessment and planning processes in line with the IAP Process.

The S/ERSG, supported by Deputy SRSGs, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners, Chiefs of Staff, and other senior managers, are responsible for initiating, organising, and leading integrated assessment and planning processes at the field level, for the establishment of the required integrated mechanisms, and for the conduct of field-level consultations on draft planning and reporting documents.

In the following slides, we will discuss in more detail this Planning Framework and the main planning documents prepared at the strategic level that will provide the directing documents for field missions to plan and conduct military operations.

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a) The term S/ERSG is used to refer to the head of a UN Peacekeeping Operation or Special Political Mission and therefore also applies to Special Coordinators.
b) The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC is issued and updated by the SG upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force (ITF) at the political level.

Slide 6



Key Message: The UN Planning Process is conducted at three different levels: Strategic (UNHQ), Operational (UNHQ/MHQ/FHQ), and Tactical (FHQ/SHQs/Units). The integration of the planning process occurs at all levels within the UN system.

From a UN military perspective, different planning processes are used at different levels within the UN peacekeeping environment, as outlined in specific UN guidance documents.

At the Strategic level (UNHQ, New York), the DPO is responsible for providing the UNPKO with policy guidance and strategic direction. The process to be applied for the planning of a new or revising an existing multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission is described in the Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning Process (2013). In addition, the UN MDMP for the development of the Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is covered in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development Handbook (2022).

At the Operational Level, the Head of Mission (HOM) is part of the strategic IAP process and is, with the support of the MLT, responsible for defining the strategic objectives for the mission and operational objectives for subordinated components, in accordance with the ISF for the mission. The respective Component Heads at the Mission Headquarters (MHQ) are not only part of the strategic planning process as members of the MLT, but they are also responsible for translating the strategic objectives into operational plans. Thus, operational planning for the military is conducted at the FHQ level, under the guidance of the HOMC. The military planning process for the operational level is defined in the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP), which will be further detailed in the following 3.5 sub-lessons.

Whereas the Sector HQs (SHQs) are responsible for the planning of tactical operations within their area of operations, it is not unusual for FHQ to conduct tactical planning for military units for some operations to ensure the necessary cooperation and coordination with other military and civilian mission assets. In missions without a Sector Level, the tactical planning of operations must be conducted at the FHQ level. However, for the military planning process to be conducted by TCC Units, it is permitted to use their national planning process.

☞***Note to instructor*** - The Planning Framework for UNPKO at the strategic level (IAP) will be covered in this lesson, whereas the UN MDMP process for the operational level will be covered during lessons 3.5b to 3.5g.

Slide 7



Key Message: The UN has adopted an Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) Process to maximise the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system.

Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) is a strategic-level process undertaken by the Integrated Task Force (ITF) Regional Division in close consultation with existing in-country UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes in order to conduct a Strategic Assessment or Strategic Review (for existing missions).

The IAP processes are intended to maximise the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system. While there are important systemic constraints to integration within the UN, it is crucial that, at a minimum, the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, and development entities of the organisation share a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses in conflict and post-conflict settings.

The three words in the title are important as they reflect the composition and sequence of the process – Integrated suggests the multiple stakeholders who participate – Assessment suggests it's a process to deliver recommendations – Planning suggests a process to follow on these recommendations.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) An Integrated Assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic, or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities.

b) The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake integrated assessment at the UN system-wide level. Assessments of a technical nature, such as Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secretariat departments or agencies, funds, and programmes, are integrated if and when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system.

Slide 8



Key Message: Integrated assessment and planning (IAP) is essential to:

a. Improve the quality of the situational analysis,

b. Design interventions that are tailored to the requirements of each situation,

c. Support the effective management of integrated presences in line with mandates and the strategic vision of senior UN leadership,

d. Avoid gaps and overlaps between different UN activities,

e. Identify opportunities for closer cooperation across different parts of the UN, and

f. Make the UN a more coherent and consistent partner with host governments and other national, regional and international partners.

Slide 9



Key Message: As a key component of the IAP, an Integrated Task Force (ITF) or Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) consists of representatives of all relevant UN entities from headquarters to field level and external actors. It is the main forum for joint assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consultations and decision-making support.

The ITF includes political, logistical, military, police and other stakeholders, working in close consultation with the UN Country Team. It is the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences, and to coordinate HQs' participation in integrated assessment and planning processes before and throughout the deployment of integrated UN presences.

ITFs should consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated settings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have implications for other entities. ITFs should be used to resolve policy differences between UN entities, ensure information-sharing between Missions and UNCTs, and consult thematic entities as needed.

ITFs are established and chaired by lead departments on behalf of the UN system and include representatives of all relevant UN entities, including DPO, DPPA, DOS, PBSO, OHCHR and DSS, among others. Field presences should also be represented.

At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate.

It is the responsibility of senior leadership in the field and at HQ to convene integrated mechanisms regularly to discuss and make decisions on joint strategic and operational issues.

The configuration of these structures should be tailored to each context, but in all cases they should include:

a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. This forum should include the key in-country decision-makers such as the S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission components and Heads of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes. External partners should be invited to participate where appropriate.
b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. All entities that are part of the integrated presence should either be represented in or seek to otherwise contribute to the joint analytical and planning capacity.

Some of the key tasks of the ITF at this stage of the planning process are:

• Coordinate the conduct of Strategic Assessments to identify strategic objectives for support within an existing or potential mission context, and, based on the decisions of the SG and the mandate from the SC, consolidate guidance to the field in the Directive to the SRSG, RC and HC.

• Discuss and agree on practical modalities to maximise the coherence of the UN's security, political, humanitarian, human rights, and relevant humanitarian and development interventions.

• Map existing UN capacities to ensure an optimal division of roles and responsibilities between the mission and the UNCT and ensure coherent guidance from Headquarters to field-based colleagues.

• Coordinate Headquarters communication with Member States, donors and other multilateral and bilateral actors on peace consolidation priorities.

• Identify other financial, logistics and administrative requirements necessary to support the overall strategy for an integrated presence.

Slide 10

Key Message: The purpose of a Strategic Assessment (SA) is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, the role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement based on an assessment of risks and opportunities.

SA result in a report and, where required, a recommendation to the Secretary-General (SG) through the Policy Committee. The decision on the options proposed in a SA, including whether to initiate planning for the establishment of an integrated UN presence or to propose changes to an existing presence, strategy or mandate, lies with the SG. If a decision has been made to propose the establishment of a Mission, the recommendation is articulated in a report of the SG to the Security Council (SC).

If the Security Council authorises the establishment of a Mission or changes to an existing mandate, the mandate and SA should be used as a basis for the development or revision of the Directive to the S/ERSG*, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

☞***Notes to instructor***:

a) The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by: a. The Secretary-General; or b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security; or c. An Integrated Task Force at Director level or above.

b) Strategic Assessments can be proposed by several UN entities including: a. A member of the Policy Committee c. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security d. A member of the Integrated Task Force e. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission g. The RC and/or HC, representing the UNCT.

c) Strategic Assessments should complement, and draw on, any other analytical processes that components of the UN system may have undertaken on the ground. Relevant interlocutors should be consulted including, to the extent possible, national authorities, civil society and other local representatives, as well as relevant regional and subregional organisations, international financial institutions and key member states.

d) For further information on Strategic Assessment, refer to the UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning, 2013 and the Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, 2013.

Slide 11



Key Message: Settings for Strategic Assessment: Mandatory for deployment of UNPKO. Where the UN is present, SA should be carried out following a significant change in the situation.

Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or a field-based Special Political Mission is being considered.

Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is undertaken by a Headquarters-based Integrated Task Force (ITF), which may already exist or may need to be established. The Strategic Assessment is then conducted in consultation with the UN Country Team (UNCT).

Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments should be carried out following a significant change in the situation or prior to a substantial change in a mission's mandate. In these settings, Strategic Assessments can be initiated at the field or HQ level. In this case, Military Staff Officers (MSOs) deployed to UNPKO may participate in the Integrated Assessment and Planning Process (IAP).

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) A technical assessment is defined as a Headquarters and field-based analytical exercise focusing on UN programs and operations (staffing, budgets, funding, systems, etc.) for one entity and/or one sector. By nature, technical assessments will vary greatly in scope, duration, purpose, composition, etc. They include Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs), usually conducted by Secretariat entities in support of a field, and sector-specific programming reviews carried out by individual agencies.

b) A Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) goes to the country or territory recommended for a UNPKO as soon as security allows. The role of the TAM is to:

- Analyse and assess circumstances on the ground – overall security, political, humanitarian, human rights, and military situation.

- Consider the implications of a possible UN peacekeeping operation.

The TAM may consist of representatives from the UN system. It should also involve the UNCT.

Slide 12



Key Message: The SG's directive provides strategic direction and priorities, basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework.

Based on the mandate from the Security Council, the Strategic Assessment, and decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC is drafted by Integrated Task Forces as part of the integrated assessment and planning process.

The Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC signifies the transfer of responsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence.

The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC is issued and updated by the Secretary-General upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force at the Principal level. Updates will usually result from a significant change in the environment or mandate, supported as required by an updated Strategic Assessment.

Slide 13



Key Message: The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is a strategic plan for the UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors in the host country.

Based on mandates, integrated assessments, and the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC, the vision, shared objectives, and means through which the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated through an inclusive analytical and planning process, with conclusions reflected in an ISF document.

The content of the ISF document must include:

a. The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, UN role, and comparative advantages.

b. A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including national capacity development and institution-building.

c. An articulation of all programmatic, functional, and/or operational areas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration.

d. Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities, and other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms.

e. A common monitoring and reporting framework, including indicators or benchmarks of progress.

ISFs are developed, updated, and endorsed in the field under the leadership of S/ERSGs, DSRSGs, Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators, and Heads of agencies, funds, and programmes. ISFs are also endorsed at Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces at the Director level and signed off by the USG of the lead department.

ISFs must be reviewed as necessary, especially after any substantial change in the mandate, Directive to the S/ERSG, RC, and HC, or circumstances on the ground, or at least every two years. The review of ISF is carried out by integrated mechanisms in the field and in cooperation with HQ.

UNPKOs and field-based SPMs must ensure consistency between the joint analysis, strategic priorities, and responsibilities agreed to in the ISF and relevant parts of their strategies for mandate implementation, including the Mission Concept, which articulates the main objectives and tasks of the Mission for each phase of its operations. These strategies guide other Mission-specific planning processes and products, including related technical assessments, component and support plans, concepts of operation, administrative plans, and results-based budgets. The Mission Concept reflects the responsibilities agreed to in the ISF and is revised when the ISF is revised.

Slide 14

Key Message: The USG DPO's Directive provides the basis for detailed operational planning, based on the strategic objectives articulated in the SG's Strategic Planning Directive.

The peacekeeping planning directive shall contain strategic guidance, including and consistent with any superior guidance or direction provided by the SG in the SG's planning directives, for planning a peacekeeping operation in support of a broad political strategy.

The peacekeeping planning directive will include:

a. assumptions, limitations and constraints.
b. a broad political strategy for the UN presence.
c. the end state(s) and the strategic objectives to achieve the end state(s).
d. a broad outline of the overall UN response and peacekeeping options to be considered.
e. partnerships (how to engage or relate to key actors that are internal and external to the UN).

In terms of process, the peacekeeping planning directive will set out the specifics of the planning process for a peacekeeping option or options, including timelines, deliverables and the composition of the peacekeeping planning team.

Based on the mission concept, OMA, Police Division and DOS shall finalize the military and police concepts of operations, and the support concept, respectively. The three must be consistent and coherent with the mission concept.

Slide 15



Key Message: The mission mandate is the basis of all the tasks of the mission. However, the mandate does not provide details or specific instructions. DPO, DPPA, and DOS use the mandate to develop detailed plans or an "operational framework" for a mission – to put the mandate into action.

Security Council mandates give high-level strategic direction.

Additional detailed plans put into action or "operationalise" an SC mandate. Key planning documents guide how a mission implements an SC mandate. These documents clarify how to interpret the mandate and the roles and responsibilities of military, civilian, and police personnel. These planning documents make up the "operational framework" of a peacekeeping mission.

Key planning documents are:

- Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).
- Mission Concept.
- Mission's Results-Based Budget (RBB).
- Concept of Operations (CONOPS).
- Mission Plan.

Let's discuss these plans in more detail in the following slides.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) As previously discussed, the ISF is a planning document applied to all UN entities present in a country – a UN-wide plan.
b) The Mission Concept and the mission's RBB are planning documents applied across the UN peacekeeping mission – mission-wide plans.
c) CONOPS are planning documents applied to the different peacekeeping personnel or "components" (military, police, civilians) – component-level plans. For the purpose of this training package, only the Military CONOPS will be presented.
d) The Military Component plans will be discussed in detail in the following 3.5 sub-lessons, as part of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP).

Slide 16

Key Message: The Mission Concept applies to the UN peacekeeping mission. It translates the political intent of the mandate into strategy, plans and guidance for all components.

The Mission Concept is prepared by UNHQ in a close coordination with the mission; it is a statement of intent and strategy on how a UNPKO plans to implement its mandate from the UNSC and translates the political intent of the UNSC and other mandates into strategic planning guidance for mission components.

The Mission Concept is a guidance statement through which UNHQ and mission leadership articulate strategic direction for mandate implementation in support of the overall political objectives. The Mission Concept articulates this strategic guidance for mandate implementation in the context of a broad and longer-term vision to guide the elaboration of component concepts, such as the Military Concept of Operations, the Police Concept of Operations and Support Concept.

The Mission Concept is primarily a tool for:

• Strategic planning and decision-making – setting strategic objectives, prioritising and sequencing priorities to achieve a transition end state based on the strategic assessments or reviews and the mandate.

Linking shorter-term mandate implementation to a longer-term vision.

• Deciding on the way forward based on a broad assessment of performance and impact.

• Communication – articulating the strategic direction for the mission.

• Guidance on resource allocation – guidance on committing mission resources to strategic priority areas.

• Guidance for developing staffing and resourcing plans to be reflected in overall budgets and in providing logistical support.

The details on principles and decisions for allocation would generally be included in the Mission Plan.

A Mission Concept contains:

• a vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission,

• a strategy to promote coherence by sequencing and prioritisation of tasks giving through the UNSC and the mandates, and

• timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each Mission component

☞ ***Notes to instructor**:*

a. S/ERSGs are responsible for ensuring that responsibilities assigned to a peacekeeping or field-based SPM in mandates, in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Framework are reflected in the Mission Concept and prioritised accordingly in the Results-based Budget and component workplans.

b. Traditional peacekeeping operations do not operate in integrated settings and do not use the ISF to plan. They need a Mission Concept to fill the planning gap. For missions that do use an ISF or similar plan, the Mission Concept provides mission-specific priorities not included in the ISF.

c. New missions at start-up must develop a Mission Concept. Any change in conditions may require the development or revision of a Mission Concept. Examples include change in the mission mandate, reconfiguration of the mission or UN presence, and key milestones in the mission's lifecycle:

- **Mission Concepts for new missions:**

• Development of a Mission Concept is mandatory;
• A substantially consulted and agreed draft should be prepared as soon as possible after the adoption of the Security Council resolution mandating the new mission;
• Headquarters will formulate the draft Mission Concept to guide component-level planning;
• Planning responsibility, including the finalization of the Mission Concept, shifts to the field with the arrival of, and the issuance of the Directive by Headquarters to the Head of Mission.
• Authority and accountability over the development and execution of the Mission Concept rests with the Head of Mission, reporting through the lead department to the Secretary-General.

- Mission Concept for existing missions:

Mission Concept will be developed or revised as soon as practicable and, if feasible, before the next budget preparation, subsequent to the following:

- a change of mandate or significant specific tasking by the Security Council (e.g. strategic review, development of benchmarks);
- changes in circumstances or operating environment that result in an internal reconfiguration of the mission or a restructuring of the UN presence in the country or in the region deployed to address the situation;
- key milestones in the lifecycle of the mission or in the political/peace process (e.g., the completion of mission deployment or national elections);
- any other conditions that will render the reorientation of the mission necessary (e.g., a crisis, ceasefire, political/peace agreement, major shift in donor/aid policy).

Slide 17



Key Message: The Military CONOPS describes how the Military Component of a UNPKO intends to accomplish its identified tasks and gather the necessary resources to solve a current or emerging military problem. The approved Military CONOPS provides a basis for detailed planning by the Force Commander and the Force HQ.

The Military CONOPS is prepared by UNHQ/DPO/OMA in close cooperation with the UNPKO. Detailed information is needed for the planning process and for detailed decision/making and therefore, the mission will have to provide most of the operational and tactical level information. The CONOPS is synchronised with the UNHQ's main planning process, and it provides a framework to develop an operational plan for a new (start-up) or shaping of (reconfiguration, transition, drawdown, or withdrawal) an ongoing UNPKO.

A CONOPS describes how the MC of a UNPKO intends to accomplish identified tasks and the necessary resources to solve a current or emerging military problem. It details the information required by the Force Commander and the FHQ staff to develop the military operational plan. The CONOPS ensures that key elements from the Mission Concept, that are of military importance, are included (e.g., mission support, POC, SSR, DDR, Gender).

The CONOPS is not intended to be a standalone document and should be read in the context of UNSC resolutions, Secretary-General's reports, and the Mission Concept. The Mission's Military Component will use the CONOPS to develop their OPLAN, which will be endorsed by the SRSG. The CONOPS needs to be revised if the new mandate or new Mission Concept is issued. In principle, CONOPS should be reviewed annually to ensure they remain valid in the current situation.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) The CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement and the Statement of Unit Requirements for each type of military unit.

b) For further information on the "Military CONOPS", refer to the UNHQ Military Concept of Operations Development Process (CONOPS DP) Handbook (Office of Military Affairs, 2022).

Slide 18



Key Message: The Military CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) for each type of military unit.

Draft versions of the SURs have been prepared in the previous steps of the planning process. Although informal consultations with potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) begin in the strategic planning phases, it is at this point that the Force Generation Service of OMA set about securing formal commitments of forces from UN Member States for the UNPKO. Later, the plans can be reviewed and revised anytime, which may lead to the publication of revised mission documentation. Once the mission has deployed, the SRSG and his team will issue the ISF and other mission plans.

In summary, the Military CONOPS and its associated documents (SUR, ROE), produced by the Military Planning Service (MPS) of the Office of Military Affairs are integral part of the Integrated Mission Plan. These documents are also necessary to the TCCs for preparation of the units they pledge to contribute, reason why the need to have them as early as possible, even in their first draft form.

In line with the COE Manual 2023, the Statement of Unit Requirements will be included in the corresponding Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Additionally, during the life of the Mission, MPS will also contribute to a number of events involving planning activities:

- Military Capability studies to review the format/capability of the Force.
- Strategic review initiated by DPO / ITF.
- Contingency Planning in case of crisis.

Drawdown planning to organize the withdrawal of the Force during the transition phase (or a simple diminution of the strength of the military component during a stabilization phase).

Slide 19



Key Message: The Military and Police Capability Study (MPCS) serves as a tool for the identification and deployment of military capabilities in a UNPKO, in relation to the military component's assigned tasks.

The MPCS addresses all deployed military personnel and units in a mission. The assessment of the force and its units covers the configuration, its posture, the ability to function in relation to the operational environment and the ability to plan and execute all types of military operations on a 24/7 basis.

The objective of the MPCS, in support of the mission's military component, is two-fold:

- Assess the suitability and utilisation of current capabilities for current objectives, tasks and phase, and
- Assess the suitability of current capabilities for future objectives, tasks and phases of the operation.

Slide 20

Key Message: The Mission Plan translates the strategic guidance from the mission concept and components concepts into a concrete operational plan spanning all priority areas of the mission's work in implementing its mandate.

The Mission Plan is a MHQ product. It serves as a planning and management tool for senior mission management to translate the strategic guidance in the Mission Concept into a concrete plan, spanning all priority areas of the mission's work, and direct the mission's components, organisational units, and field offices to align, coordinate and synchronise their activities around short- to medium-term strategic priorities and long-term strategic objectives. The Mission Plan ensures clarity in operational direction, prioritisation and sequencing of mission tasks, integration, coherence, and synergy between all parts of the mission. The Mission Plan also incorporates cross-cutting strategies (such as protection of civilians, human rights, gender, or other thematic strategies).

The Mission Plan is primarily a tool for:

• Whole-of-mission planning – developing a concrete plan with actions to reach targets, bringing together all mission's components, organisational units and field offices around the strategic priorities articulated in the Mission Concept.

• Integration and coordination within the mission– facilitating coherence by bringing together all mission's components, organizational units and field offices around priorities to be implemented mission-wide, including through defining decision-making and coordination mechanisms.

• Management and assessment of impact and performance– providing a detailed overview of the mission's work, structured around strategic priorities; tracking progress in

mandate implementation in specific areas, focusing on impact on the ground; evaluation of changes required in the immediate course of action, resource allocation, administration and stewardship, reprioritisation and sequencing within defined phases or time segments.

☞***Notes to instructor***:

For further information on the "Mission Plan", refer to the Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations (2016.09).

Slide 21



Key Message: The mission's Results-Based Budget (RBB) is a mission planning tool which aims to achieve results. The mission achieves results through the management of resources.

Result-Based Budgeting (RBB) is a program-budgeting tool approved by the General Assembly in 2000 based on the premise that a budget needs to show what outcomes may be expected in exchange for public funds. Such measures were intended to provide a management tool to enhance responsibility and accountability in the implementation of programs and budgets.

Resources need to match the Security Council mandate for the peacekeeping mission to succeed.

The mission asks for and gets funding from the UN General Assembly to carry out tasks in the mandate. Funds cover activities, personnel, equipment, supplies and facilities.

Each UNPKO has its own RBB. It is a budget which outlines the expected results of the mission and identifies the activities to achieve the results, and the resources required for activities. It is used to measure the performance of the mission.

All needs must be covered in the annual RBB. No funds will be available otherwise.

Slide 22



Key Message: This slide summarises the IAP process at the Strategic Level.

Slide 23



Key Message: Once deployed, the Military Component leadership should endeavour to familiarise themselves with the ISF, and through the FCOS and U5 Branch ensure that military-related issues are considered as the Mission progresses.

Note that the directive for the HOMC/FC is issued by the UNHQ (DPO/DOS), which provides guidance and direction on the organisational and administrative responsibilities that a HOMC/FC is required to exercise in the performance of duties in the mission area.

The HOMC/FC directive is issued together with the military strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Rules of Engagement (ROE), all signed by the USG DPO and the Military Adviser.

Except in the case of mission start-up, these strategic documents are likely to have been prepared well before an HOM or HOMC has been identified, so it is incumbent on the deployed leadership to evaluate the validity of the guidance material regularly or as dictated by Mission headquarters.

MSOs may assist mission leadership with input to the Strategic Review, Military Capability Study (MCS), and other military-related information to the IAP.

Slide 24



Key Message: At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate. The Military Component must ensure that it participates in the integrated mechanisms at appropriate levels of representation.

Each mission will be structured differently and the Military Component leadership that is deployed at mission start-up will need to identify the most appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanism, including identifying measurable and meaningful benchmarks and risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support decision-making.

New leadership should endeavour to provide appropriate inputs to update these integrated mechanisms if greater effectiveness of the military's input can be achieved.

Slide 25



Key Message: This slide summarises the flow of the Planning Framework from a Mission's Mandate to the Operational and Tactical Plans for each military unit. It provides an overview of the different planning processes in the UN system and how they eventually impact operations on the ground, as well as presenting the key planning documents for the Military Component in a UNPKO.

The building blocks of any mission include the Security Council Mandate, Mission Concept, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Rules of Engagement (ROE), Mission Plan, accompanying plans, and the related Operations Orders for Mission Headquarters, sectors, and units.

From a military perspective, the process is important as it provides the key documents to plan and conduct military operations.

In the subsequent sub-lessons, we will explore the United Nations Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP) in depth. This planning process is utilised at the Operational and Tactical levels within Force Headquarters (FHQs), ensuring that UN military operations are effectively planned and executed.

Slide 26



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- IAP is a strategic-level process undertaken by ITF to conduct a Strategic Assessment.
- The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation.
- The ISF is a strategic plan for the UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors in the host country.
- The key strategic documents for Operational Planning are the SC Mandate, Mission Concept, Military CONOPS, and ROE.
- MSOs may contribute to the IAP process.

Lesson
3.5b

Overview of the UN Military Decision-Making Process

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5b provides a general overview of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP) to ensure all Military Staff Officers (MSOs) at the FHQ and SHQ understand the process. Successful UN military operations rely on commanders and MSOs understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process.

Relevance

Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) have their national doctrines and follow their own military planning process. Therefore, their officers are trained to plan military operations according to national processes. To be able to conduct effective planning in a multinational Field HQ, it is important for the UN to establish its own standard process to enhance interoperability, thereby facilitating combined operations at the FHQ/SHQ levels.

The UN MDMP complements rather than replaces national doctrines and is designed to ensure interoperability and operational planning consistency between MSOs at FHQ/SHQ as well as between UN contingents, while also incorporating UN principles into the planning and operations of UN units.

Note: The UN MDMP described in this training package is designed to be applied at the UN FHQ level. Primarily, it is for tactical planning functions within the scope of an unchanged Security Council mandate. Nevertheless, it may also be used analogously for a Sector HQ, or Brigade HQ. The UN INFBAT are supposed to do their planning in accordance with their national planning process.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this lesson, participants will be able to:

- Describe the 5 steps of the operational level of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP)
- Identify the purpose and desired outcome of each step of the UN MDMP
- List the range and purpose of UN Orders and Plans
- Outline other planning considerations

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

1 - 2 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Lesson Content	2
Learning Outcomes	3
The Lesson	4 - 21
Summary of Key Messages	22
Learning Activity	23

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5b provides a general overview of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP) to ensure all Military Staff Officers (MSOs) at the FHQ and SHQ understand the process. Successful UN military operations rely on commanders and MSOs understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process.

TCCs have their national doctrines and follow their own military planning process. Therefore, their officers are trained to plan military operations according to national processes. To be able to conduct effective planning in a multinational Field HQ, it is important for the UN to establish its own standard process to enhance interoperability, thereby facilitating combined operations at the FHQ/SHQ levels.

The UN MDMP complements rather than replaces national doctrines and is designed to ensure interoperability and operational planning consistency between MSOs at FHQ/SHQ as well as between UN contingents, while also incorporating UN principles into the planning and operations of UN units.

☞ ***Note to instructor:***

The UN MDMP described in this training package is designed to be applied at the UN FHQ level. Primarily, it is for tactical planning functions within the scope of an unchanged Security Council mandate. Nevertheless, it may also be used analogously for a Sector HQ. The UN units are supposed to do their planning in accordance with their national planning process.

Slide 2



Key Message: These are the topics we will cover in this lesson.

Slide 3



Key Message: In all good training practices, let's review the learning outcomes. At the end of this Lesson, our aim is for you to assimilate these topics:

- Describe the 5 steps of the operational level of the UN Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP)
- Identify the purpose and desired outcome of each step of the UN MDMP
- List the range and purpose of UN Orders and Plans
- Outline other planning considerations

Please take a moment to read and understand the requirements. This may help you to focus on the most relevant aspects.

Slide 4



Key Message: A Military planning process is a methodical process that relies on the joint efforts of commanders and staff to seek optimal solutions and make decisions to achieve an objective in a dynamic environment.

In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment needed to accomplish the task.

In the context of a UNPKO, many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ and provided as guidance through relevant documents like:

- Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission.
- Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).
- Mission CONOPS.
- Military CONOPS.

Training Tips

Consider discussing the following with participants:

- Ask participants what they think the UN MDMP entails. Who is part of this process? At what level does this take place?

- Answers should include: what is the mission, commander's intent, resources required, budget constraints, etc. This happens at the Strategic Level all the way through the Tactical levels.

Slide 5



Key Message: Good planning requires a methodical process that clearly defines the steps leading to optimal solutions.

A basic principle of good planning is that individual short-term decisions should support strategic long-term goals. This necessitates comprehensive situational analysis by staff officers and guidance and direction from leadership to manage the process effectively.

This process should reflect the following principles of planning:

- Comprehensive: All significant options and impacts on the work of other components are considered.
- Efficient: Efficient use of available resources.
- Inclusive: All components affected by the plan have opportunities to be involved.
- Informative: Results are understood by stakeholders (people affected by a decision).
- Integrated: Individual, short-term decisions should support strategic, long-term goals. Planning based on integrated inputs.
- Logical: Each step should lead logically to the next.
- Transparent: Everybody involved should not only be aware of the desired end-state but also understand their roles in each step of the process.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

It is important for all to understand these basic principles of planning and be able to apply them as they are common themes across all aspects of military operations.

Slide 6



Key Message: These are the Themes of Planning:

- Determine the nature of the problem and what is to be achieved
- Gather information
- Generate options to achieve those goals
- Decide on the way ahead and then execute it
  - Who, What, Where, When, How, Why?

Note to instructor:

Even though planning skills are used in everyday military life, participants should be aware that, in a peacekeeping operation, they will be engaging with civilian mission components and many agencies and organisations that may not be familiar with the UN MDMP but may possibly have a process of their own. The MSO must be flexible enough to combine these processes, especially in an integrated mission.

Slide 7



Key Message: The UN MDMP is a methodical process adopted by the UN which relies on joint efforts of commanders and staff to seek optimal solutions and to make decisions to achieve an objective in a dynamic environment, resulting in the development of OPORDs at FHQ/SHQ and combined unit levels, integrating aspects of UN civilian agencies/components and peacekeeping considerations into the MDMP.

The UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is a single, established, and proven analytical process to solve problems. It is a guide to assist the commander and the staff in developing estimates and plans. It helps the commander and his staff to apply structure, thoroughness, clarity, sound judgement, logic, and professional knowledge to reach a decision.

Slide 8



Key Message: The UN MDMP has 5 steps. It is depicted cyclically because of its continuous nature in DPO-led Peacekeeping Operations.

The UN-MDMP consists of the following steps:

- Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE).
- Mission Analysis.
- Courses of Action (COA) Development.
- COA Analysis and Comparison.
- Decision and Order Development.

Each step is subdivided into several sub-steps, which will be explained in detail in the following lessons. In addition, each step normally ends with a briefing or at least a discussion with the Force/Sector Commander on the respective findings and allows the Force/Sector Commander to provide further guidance before initiating the next step.

It is of critical importance that members from all HQ branches participate in the UN MDMP. Furthermore, in a UNPKO, there are several important aspects to be considered in the UN MDMP, such as POC, legal considerations, engagement, and UN-CIMIC. All military operations must include steps to protect civilians and mitigate potential harm to them that might arise from these operations. Efforts to mitigate harm to civilians must be taken before, during, and after the planning and implementation of operations.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Step 1: The Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is centrally located within the circle because it provides inputs for the development of each step. The AOE is a continuous process throughout the UN MDMP, which will be discussed in the following lesson.

b) Although the UN MDMP is a sequential process, it is also a circular process. Planning officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander's guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planners' ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander's ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.

c) Throughout the UN MDMP process, a series of Warning Orders (WARNORD) are provided to the subordinate units to facilitate parallel planning and preparation. The process also provides for a series of formal briefings to the commander to seek his/her decision, approval, and/or further guidance to the planning process.

d) References:

- 2023.08 - UN Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, Chapter 7.
- Guidelines – Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

Slide 9



Key Message: The UN MDMP is a logical process that facilitates timely planning and complex decision-making required by peacekeeping operations. It is an assumption-based method where known information is analysed and unknown information is deduced using risk-managed assumptions. It is a comprehensive process that forces planners to consider the full scope of determining factors before presuming a military solution.

It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make, and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.

Slide 10



Key Message: The purpose of the Analysis of the Operating Environment is to learn about the area and to gain a complete picture and understanding of the situation and all relevant factors on operational and tactical levels, in which the operation is taking place/will take place.

The Analysis of the AOE - is a systematic and continuous process of analysing the threats and the operational environment to produce an appropriate description of how they affect mandate implementation.

The AOE consists of three sub-steps:

- Operational Environment Evaluation
- Actor Evaluation
- Situation Integration

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** The AOE (Step 1) will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 3.5c.

Slide 11



Key Message: The purpose of Mission Analysis is to clearly define the tasks that need to be accomplished by the Peacekeeping Force (military component). This step should result in a restated mission, planning guidance, Commander's intent, incorporating purpose, method, and end state.

UN Mission Analysis consists of these sub-steps:

- Identify and analyse the commander's intent and the military end state
- Identify and analyse constraints and restraints
- Identify Mission essential, specific and implied tasks
- Conduct a threat and risk analysis
- Identify and analyse assumptions
- Define the mission statement.

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** The Mission Analysis (Step 2) will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 3.5d.

Slide 12



Key Message: The purpose of the COA Development is to develop two, or more, feasible COAs, based on the deductions made from the previous planning steps, taking into account new tasks or a changed situation.

This step ends with a description of one or more possibilities of own actions (courses of action).

The COA development is a process which leads from very general deductions to more and more specific descriptions of own tasks. Suitable and proper tasks will be combined to an option. The required Forces will be analysed for each option. By adding the Forces to an option, it becomes a COA. While many options may be considered, they must meet the criteria of feasibility, acceptability, completeness, exclusivity, and suitability to be considered a COA.

The COA Development consists of these sub-steps:

- Confirm Centre of Gravity.
- Conduct critical capability analysis.
- Develop (confirm) Lines of Operation and decisive conditions.
- Develop detailed COAs.
- Evaluate COAs.

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** The COA Development (Step 3) will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 3.5e.

Slide 13



Key Message: The purpose of the COA comparison is to determine the most suitable COA. Therefore, the identified COAs are first analysed individually and then compared against each other using approved methods and criteria.

Several analytical frameworks can be used for this like a **SWOT** analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) or a list of advantages/disadvantages of each COA. It may also be useful to measure the COA against a set of weighted criteria such as surprise, flexibility, simplicity, security, force protection and POC.

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** The COA Analysis and Comparison (Step 4) will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 3.5f.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Comparison of the COAs should be concluded by a decision briefing to the FC for approval. The decision briefing should include an agenda, address the key aspects of the COA analysis and comparison, and recommend the most suitable COA for the FC approval. The Commander will take a decision and provide further guidance (the concept) for the Order Development.

The Cdrs' decision and guidance provides the basis of WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD (or MCO or FRAGO) will then be produced.

An OPORD or a FRAGO is the final result from the planning process. The OPORD or the FRAGO are not intended to be standalone documents and should be read in the context of the OPLAN, the Security Council Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other mission-related documents.

All orders should include the following: Situation, Commander's Intent, Mission, Execution, Logistics, and Command, Control and Communications Paragraphs.

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** The Decision and Order Development (Step 5) will be discussed in more detail in Lesson 3.5g.

Slide 15



Key Message: This slide provides a summary of the most common UN Military Orders and Plans.

Operations Order (OPORD): is meant to direct subordinate units' activities with the conduct of military operations. An OPORD describes the situation, the tasks of the units and what supporting activities the units will conduct in order to achieve their commander's desired end state. OPORD are used to conduct operations and exercises involving subordinated units/ HQs including Combat Support (e.g., Engineers, indirect fire) and Combat Service Support (Logistic) subunits. Operations Orders are used to change the main effort of subordinated units/HQs.

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO): is a form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

Warning Order (WARNORD): is an executive order that initiates preparation among all concerned units and personnel for an impending operation. Warning orders are subject to continuous update during the planning process. They are therefore normally numbered progressively (Warning Order No.1), and are distributed to prepare the subordinate units for an upcoming task that will be directed by a FRAGO or OPORD.

Military Coordination Order (MCO): is used to transmit the Force Commander's Directive and Guidance to subordinated HQs, especially in the mid-term (e.g., 90 days prioritisation of effort), assign resources and tasks for this to subordinated HQs and units and provide guidance on the coordination of activities with other mission components.

Concept of Operations (CONOPS): describes how the Military Component (MC) of the peacekeeping operation intends to accomplish its identified tasks and gather the necessary resources in order to solve a current or emerging military problem. The draft CONOPS supports the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council. The approved CONOPS provides a basis for detailed planning by the Force Commander and the Force HQ. The Police Component (PC) will have a separate CONOPS to facilitate their planning efforts.

Operational Plan (OPLAN): is developed by the FHQ and is mainly based on the information received from the Mission Plan and the Military CONOPS. The OPLAN is a comprehensive plan, and it details how the MC will implement its tasks. It details for example the mission, end state, objectives, line of operations, command structure and tasks for the subordinate units. The OPLAN is aligned with police component plans, the Logistics Support Plan and other plans from key partners (e.g., CRSV, Child Protection, DDR, SSR, etc.).

Contingency plans (CONPLAN): are used to react to local or mission-wide emergency situations. The MHQ has the responsibility for whole-of mission planning and this planning will in most of the situations trigger further planning responsibilities to FHQ. A Mission Exit Plan, Relocation Plan or Counter Pandemic Plan are typical mission-level contingency plans. The FHQ is responsible for MC's contingency planning.

Slide 16



Key Message: When conducting the UN MDMP, MSOs must constantly be aware of the other parallel processes that are ongoing and must be considered as the planning progresses through all 5 Steps. Some of these parallel processes may be required to provide an ANNEX to the final OPORD.

Notes to instructor:

For more in-depth information on these parallel processes, please refer to the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub website and search for the corresponding Reinforced Training Package (RTP).

Slide 17



Key Message: Requirements (or principles) for military planners and decision-makers include:

- Follow the process sequentially (methodically).
- Consider the full scope of determining factors.
- Understand the risks associated with the assumptions.
- Refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action, even if it appears more agreeable to the commander or requires less effort.

Slide 18



Key Message: It is important to note that sub-units will require adequate time for their planning and preparations. As a general rule, a minimum of two-thirds of the time available is designated to sub-units.

While acknowledging that planning peacekeeping operations may not always allow for infinite time to produce perfect plans, a time constraint should not necessarily disrupt the process. Instead, it requires adjustments to meet the needs of the time restriction.

The application of the one-third/two-third rule enables sub-units to engage in detailed planning and preparation. However, consideration should also be given to utilising information technology for parallel and collaborative planning where available and secure.

Slide 19



Key Message: To support the UN MDMP, a comprehensive Information Collection Plan needs to be developed through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit, as part of the information and planning cycle.

The Force Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) is a tool that captures all the intelligence requirements (questions) from the Mission Leadership Team that need to be answered using PK-I SR and other assets.

The plan may be a Word document, Excel sheet, or any other format. On the left-hand side of the IAP, the Commander's PIRs are listed. These must also be broken down into SIRs, which in turn can be further broken down into EEI and, if necessary, a series of Indicators and Warnings (I&W). A priority is also assigned to each PIR and IR.

The UN MDMP is an assumption-based method where known information is analysed, and unknown information is deduced using risk-managed assumptions. Assumptions should be replaced with FACTS at the earliest opportunity.

Slide 20



Key Message: The UN MDMP works most efficiently when the commander is able to guide at regular intervals to ensure the planning is meeting his or her requirements. It is therefore recommended that in each phase of UN MDMP commanders should be presented with a verbal brief, supported by audio-visual aids, to ensure plans are progressing appropriately.

If this is not feasible, the part of "Mission Analysis" that analyses the commander's intent must be completed in specific detail to ensure there is no misunderstanding between the commander and the planning officers.

This allows the Planning Team to inform the Commander of the operational context and their assessment of the mission for the Force. The Commander should be briefed in the COA Selection Phase to ensure that the Commander is fully conversant with the analysis that has been conducted by the Planning Teams and is fully informed to make the appropriate COA selection.

The brief should be presented as a formal verbal brief, supported by audio-visual aids, to ensure the Commander has all appropriate information.

Slide 21

Key Message: Hasty and incomplete planning will likely result in the inefficient use of resources, potential loss of life, and ultimately mission failure.

Successful military operations rely on commanders making correct decisions that are developed into feasible plans and executed in a timely and appropriate manner.

The usual non-linear nature of Peacekeeping Operations imposes many command and control challenges for peacekeepers. Unit and sub-unit commanders who are remotely deployed or who face rapidly changing situations should be able to take decisions in line with the mission's overall objective. They would therefore need a clear understanding of their higher commander's intent and total comprehension of their assigned task/role and its purpose in higher commander's plan to enable them to make timely and appropriate decisions.

Mastery in planning and decision-making is achieved by the commander and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive process. However, there may be instances where hasty planning is required to meet operational needs or in reaction to a crisis. Regular training on the planning process will build trust and cohesion among the staff officers to deliver an effective product regardless of the time available to plan.

Slide 22



Key Message: These are the Key Messages of this Lesson.

- The UN MDMP is a comprehensive process, in which planning officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander's guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planners ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander's ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.

- It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make, and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.

- Throughout the UN MDMP process, a series of Warning Orders (WARNORD) are provided to the subordinate units to facilitate parallel planning and preparation. An OPORD/FRAGO/MCO is the final result from the planning process. These are not intended to be standalone documents and should be read in the context of the OPLAN, the Security Council Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other mission related documents.

Slide 23



- Instructions:

- Divide participants into three groups.

- Allocate seven (7) minutes for participants to discuss and note down the main ideas on a flip chart or board.

- One member of each group should explain the group's findings to the class.

- Facilitator Notes:

- Facilitator(s) to summarise the inputs from the groups and add points if required.

- Encourage participants to ask questions or seek clarification as needed.

Lesson
3.5c

Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE)

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5c explains Step 1 of the UN MDMP - Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE).

Relevance

Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is essentially research followed by analysis of that research. Once the need to conduct MDMP has been established, planning staff officers must study as much as they can about the area in which the operation is taking/will take place. AOE will start out broad and often incomplete. It will become more detailed, more accurate and more complete as the planning becomes more developed and more refined. Mission analysis will almost always commence before a full AOE has been completed.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Steps of the UN MDMP	2 - 3
The Lesson	4 - 29
Output of the Step	30
Learning Activity	31 - 33

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5c explains Step 1 of the UN MDMP - Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE).

Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is essentially research followed by analysis of that research. Once the need to conduct MDMP has been established, planning staff officers must study as much as they can about the area in which the operation is taking/will take place. AOE will start out broad and often incomplete. It will become more detailed, more accurate and more complete as the planning becomes more developed and more refined. Mission analysis will almost always commence before a full AOE has been completed.

Slide 2



Note: This slide reminds participants of the step of the UN MDMP we are discussing.

Let's explore Step 1 of the UN MDMP - Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) - in more detail.

Slide 3



Key Message: The Operational Environment (AOE) is centrally located because it provides inputs for the development of each step.

A permanent element of staff work is analysing the development of the situation in the mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR), also referred to as Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE), Area of Operations Analysis (AOA), or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This is done on the basis of incoming reports and other information and intelligence available.

Slide 4



Key Message: The purpose of the AOE is to understand the area and to gain a complete picture of the situation and all relevant factors on operational and tactical levels, in which the operation is taking place/will take place, and specifically to:

- **Review the existing situation** - what is the cause of the unrest and what peace agreements are in place?
- **Scope the likely threats** - who's who and what is their agenda?
- **Identify significant characteristics of the environment** - such as climate, terrain, infrastructure, lines of communication, etc.
- **Determine AO limitations** – define the 'Area of Interest' and 'Area of Intelligence Responsibility'.
- **Identify intelligence gaps** - what is unknown?
- **Determine key future information requirements.**

The AOE is a continuous process typically led by the military peacekeeping-intelligence (MPK-I) staff (U-2/G-2 branch), supported by other staff branches.

Slide 5



Key Message: The factor analysis serves as a tool for a methodological process to draw conclusions from the assessment of the main driving factors, as the basis for potential own action(s).

All factors should be analysed according to the following method:

- Description of the relevant facts of respective factors.
- Assessment of the relevant facts (favourable, unfavourable, probabilities, possible developments, etc.).
- Deduction (sources for own actions).

Notes to instructor:

a) Factor analysis as part of AOE and verified during Mission Analysis, which will be discussed in the following Lesson (3.5d).
b) In the context of a UN PKM many of the relevant factors would have been determined as part of the strategic/operational planning at UNHQ, and provided to the PKM as guidance through relevant documents like:

- Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).
- Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission.
- Mission Concept of Operation (Mission CONOPS).
- Military Concept of Operation (Military CONOPS).

Slide 6



Key Message: The AOE consists of three sub-steps:

- Sub-Step 1: Operational Environment Evaluation
- Sub-Step 2: Actor Evaluation
- Sub-Step 3: Situation Integration

We will explore each Sub-Step in more detail during this Lesson.

Slide 7



Key Message: There are frameworks/tools available to assist analysts in identifying relevant factors and cross-referencing them in columns. Analysts can then ask themselves what is known and what is not, helping to identify information gaps. These gaps can be incorporated into the Intelligence Acquisition Plan (IAP) to enhance knowledge and understanding of the Area of Operations.

The following methods/tools/frameworks might be used as part of the AOE:

- **ASCOPE:** Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People and Event factors.

- **PMERSCGHII – PT:** Political, Military, Economic, Religion, Social, Cultural, Gender, History, Information, Infrastructure, Physical and Time.

Let's explore each tool in more detail in the following slides.

☞ ***Note to instructor***: Further information on these tools is available in the Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPK-I) Handbook, 2019 Chapter 5.3 and Chapter 9.

Slide 8

Key Message: ASCOPE allows the analyst to cross-reference these columns and ask themselves what is known and what is not. This will help to establish the information gaps that exist. These gaps can be fed into the IAP to enhance knowledge.

The columns are structured into:

- **Areas**: Physical locations and terrain that affect all relevant actors e.g., boundaries or police districts.
- **Structures**: Significant infrastructure e.g., bridges, religious sites, hospitals, and schools.
- **Capabilities**: Key functions such as administration, food/water supply, and health/welfare provision.
- **Organizations**: Political, social, religious, tribal etc. These must be understood and their likely influence assessed.
- **People**: The local population including tribes, groupings, political parties, threat actors, and any other relevant human actors. Within each, leadership, intentions, relationships, pattern of life, needs, and any other sub-factors can be considered.
- **Events**: Harvest season, market timings, public holidays, and religious festivals for example.

Slide 9



Key Message: Similarly to ASCOPE, **PMERSCGHII – PT** allows the analyst to cross-reference these columns and ask themselves what is known and what is not. This will help to establish the information gaps that exist. These gaps can be fed into the IAP to enhance knowledge.

The columns are structured into:

- **Political.** Examines the political landscape, including governments, leadership, and international relations and describes the political power, structure, and hierarchy within the operational environment (OE).
- **Military.** Assesses the military forces and capabilities of relevant actors (enemy, friendly, or neutral) within the OE. The staff may perform a SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunities, threats) analysis at this point to complement their research/analysis.
- **Economic**. Analyses economic factors such as trade, resources, and economic stability.
- **Religion.** Assesses religions, beliefs/traditions and their impact on Politics, Economics, and Cultural / Family Life.
- **Social.** Considers societal elements, including culture, demographics, and social structures.
- **Cultural.** Examines symbols, language, norms, values, and relics.
- **History**. Analyses the historical context and the developments within the OE.
- **Information.** Analyses the information environment, including media, communication networks, and information flow.
- **Infrastructure.** Examines critical infrastructure like transportation, utilities, and communication systems.

- **Physical.** Assesses the physical geography, climate, and terrain of the area of operations.
- **Time.** Considers the element of time, including historical context and future projections.

☞***Note to instructor:*** **PMERSCGHII - PT.** Political, Military, Economic, Religious, Social, Cultural, Gender, History, Information, infrastructure, Physical and Time factors.

Slide 10



Cross PMERSCGHII PT ASCOPE	P Political	M Military	E Economic	R Religious	S Social	C Cultural	G Gender	H History	I Infrastructure	I Information	P Physical	T Time
A Area												
S Structures												
C Capabilities												
O Organisation												
P People												
E Events												

Key Message: When PMERSCGHII-PT and ASCOPE are combined (into a table), they will provide the peacekeeping-intelligence staff with a strong set of factors for analytical consideration.

Once the table is filled in, the peacekeeping-intelligence staff will have a good understanding of the OE, and equally, will have a good understanding of their peacekeeping-intelligence gaps, which will assist with acquisition planning.

☞ ***Note to instructor*** **-** For further **training** reference material, refer to the following training packages available on the peacekeeping resource hub website:

- Reinforcement Training Package for United Nations Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers.
- Reinforcement Training Package for the UN Peacekeeping Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (PKISR).

Slide 11



Key Message: The Sub-Step 'Operational Environment Evaluation' aims to analyse the physical, human, and terrain information.

Physical terrain information consists of the effect of terrain obstacles such as water bodies, road networks, urban areas, and other terrain factors that may obstruct the UN mission and broader humanitarian operations.

Human (social) factors, including ethnicity, culture, tribes, religion, and intercommunal relations, must also be considered for their impact on operations.

Additionally, communication infrastructure and weather conditions affecting mobility, visibility, and operational sustainability must be considered.

Slide 12



Key Message: To support the AOE evaluation, it is recommended to:

- Review the existing situation: what is the cause of the unrest and what peace agreements are in place?
- Identify significant characteristics of the environment such as climate, terrain, infrastructure, lines of communication, etc.
- Determine AO limitations: define the 'Area of Interest' and 'Area of Intelligence Responsibility'.
- Identify intelligence gaps: what is unknown?
- Determine key information requirements such as geography, infrastructure, humanitarian situation, human rights, etc.

Slide 13



Key Message: This is a list of factors normally to be evaluated at Mission/FHQ level. Depending on the respective situation/environment of the PKM further factors might have to be considered (added).

The Factor **Operational Environment** includes the following elements:

- Terrain,
- Infrastructure,
- Climate, weather,
- Security situation of the civilian population,
- Humanitarian situation,
- Cultural situation (religion, ethnicity, gender),
- Human rights situation, and
- Mine / Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) / Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) situation.

Operational Environment Analysis:

In the analysis of the **Terrain,** the following aspects should be considered:

- mobility of own forces,
- coverages for potential attackers, and
- suitability for the own task.

In the analysis of **Infrastructure**, the following aspects should be considered:

- mobility of own forces,
- facilities for relocated troops, and
- length of supply chain.

In the analysis of **Climate/Weather,** the following aspects should be considered:

- limitations for the own operation (temperature, sandstorms etc.),
- limitation in mobility (seasonal changes (wet & Dry season or seasonal storms), and
- living conditions for troops.

In the analysis of the **Security Situation of the population** the following aspects should be considered:

- recent attacks on civilians,
- potential perpetrators, and
- role and quality of the national forces and police.

In the analysis of the **Humanitarian Situation,** the following aspects should be considered:

- humanitarian needs in the population,
- activities of humanitarian actors,
- threats to humanitarian workers, and
- influence of the humanitarian situation on the security situation.

In the analysis of the **Cultural Situation** the following aspects should be considered:

- ethnical clashes and tensions,
- role of women and children in the conflict, and
- influence of religions on the conflict.

In the analysis of the **Human Rights Situation** the following aspects should be considered:

- history of human rights violations,
- types and intensity of human rights violations,
- cases of sexual-related human rights violations, and
- violators of human rights.

In the analysis of the **Landmine / UXOs / IEDs Situation,** the following aspects should be considered:

- density and locations of landmines, UXOs and IEDs,
- influence of the Landmine/UXO/IED situation on the own operation, and
- influence of the Landmine/UXO/IED situation on the civilian population.

Slide 14



Key Message: The Sub-Step 'Actor Evaluation' aims to identify relevant non-UN actors whose actions will impact the PKMs operation and mandate implementation.

Slide 15



Key Message: Actor Evaluation aims to identify relevant non-UN actors' intent, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and other critical factors, which will impact the UNPKO and mandate implementation.

In addition, non-UN actors are not only the parties to the conflict, but should also include possible militias, criminal gangs, organised crime groups, or tribal situations in the AOO. These parties are often a threat to the civilian population including humanitarian aid workers and to the UN itself.

The analysis of such parties should consider locations, behaviour (hostile, indifferent, friendly, unsure), strengths and weaknesses, human rights records, and behaviour against the civilian population. It also assists planners in understanding key local personalities, influencers, and community groups, including men and women, whom the mission is likely to engage with during operations.

Furthermore, the identification of threats and risks to a UNPKO are an integral part of the UN MDMP, with the aim to address the threats by mitigating (reducing/eliminating) the risks they pose to a UNPKO.

Slide 16



Key Message: This slide provides a list of factors normally to be evaluated at the Mission/FHQ level. Depending on the respective situation/environment of the UNPKO further factors might have to be considered (added).

The Factor **Actors** includes the following elements:

- Parties to the Conflict.
- Uncontrolled Armed Groups (UAGs).
- Private Security Providers (PSPs).
- Friendly forces.
- Own Forces.

Actors Analysis:

In the analysis of the **parties to the conflict,** the following aspects should be considered:

- locations of the different units.
- behaviour (hostile, indifferent, friendly, unsure).
- strength and armament of the groups.
- human rights records of the parties.
- behaviour against the civilian population.
- compliance with an existing ceasefire agreement/peace agreement.
- intention and most likely course of action.

In the analysis of the **Uncontrolled Armed Groups (UAGs),** the following aspects should be considered:

- locations of the different groups.
- behaviour (hostile, indifferent, friendly, unsure).

- strength and armament of the groups.
- human rights records of the groups.
- behaviour against the civilian population.
- intention and most likely course of action.

In the analysis of the **Private Security Providers (PSPs),** the following aspects should be considered:

- locations, strengths and tasks of the different units.
- employment / human rights records.
- reliability of PSPs, and management and control of PSPs.

In the analysis of **Friendly Forces**, the following aspects should be examined:

- locations, tasks, capabilities and limitations of the different units.
- areas of cooperation.
- measure of coordination.

The method of the **Own Forces** analysis**,** is the UN force, deployed in the mission or in the sector. The own situation analysis determines and describes:

- location of own forces.
- strength and capabilities of own forces.
- current commitment/engagement of own forces.
- availability of own forces.
- possibility to move own forces within the own area of responsibility.

Slide 17



Key Message: In the context of a UNPKO, all factors should be analysed according to the following method:

- Description of the relevant fact in a factor.
- Assessment of the relevant facts (favourable, unfavourable, probabilities, possible developments, etc.).
- Deduction (derivations for own actions).

Training Tips

Consider discussing the following with participants:

Let's look at the **example on the slide.** You are a member of a UNPKO deployed to a country in which several parties to the conflict as well as other armed groups (terrorist groups) are still operating. Based on a ceasefire/peace agreement an election in the country (mission area) is being planned. Looking at the situation you conduct the following Analysis:

- **Fact** that one of the groups, MPC has already executed several attacks against government institutions. They have frequently stated that they are against free elections and will not tolerate them.
- Assessing this Fact (reality) your **assessment** concludes that Terrorist attacks by MPC against the polling stations in the southern district and the main cities in the West are expected. Attacks against the polling stations in the other districts cannot be ruled out (As they have clearly stated they will not tolerate free elections to be conducted).

- The **deduction** (conclusion) of the assessment on how the mission operations may be affected or how it may be able to support the mandate implementation is that (to ensure free elections) the polling stations must be protected.

At this point in your analysis, you, as a staff officer, are not yet looking at who will be tasked to protect the polling stations. That will be determined within the next step of the UN MDMP.

Slide 18



Key Message: Threat and risk assessment is to be conducted as part of the UN MDMP.

One of the key drivers of the AOE is to understand the operational environment and to enhance situational awareness to enable UN decision-making for the protection of UN personnel and the protection of civilians, supported through Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPK-I) to:

- provide situational understanding and predictive peacekeeping intelligence products to better enable military peacekeeping planning and decision-making. Commanders who have access to good peacekeeping intelligence are better able to take appropriate actions.
- provide early warning of threats to the life of UN personnel, both uniformed and civilians.
- provide early warning of threats to life within the local population, in support of the protection of civilians. Linked to this is an early warning of any planned destruction of critical infrastructure or necessary natural resources.
- enhance the mission leadership's understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape through the early identification of relevant trends and threats. This will facilitate the identification of risks and opportunities for the protection of UN personnel and civilians within the scope of the mandate.

The identification of threats and risks to a PKM is an integral part of the MDMP, with the aim to address the threats by mitigating (reducing/elimination) the risks they pose to a UNPKO.

Together with other mission components (e.g. JMAC, DSS), risks need to be identified to allow for risk mitigation measures to be taken by the UNPKO.

Slide 19



Key Message: Threats are a product of both capability and intent.

A potential adversary group with intent to cause harm but with minimal capability is a limited threat, whereas a group with significant capability but no intent poses almost no threat.

The capability of the peacekeeping force to counter threats also needs to be considered, because again, even if an adversary has every intent to oppose a peacekeeping force, if that peacekeeping force is able to prevent the militant group from operating effectively, they again pose little threat to the operation.

Slide 20



Key Message: The military threat assessment, like most of the AOE, evolves throughout the MDMP. In the early stages, it will be a generic assessment combining the influences of: a) External actors to the AO (neighbouring states, NGOs, special interest groups); b) Internal actors to the AO (political groups, clans or tribes, business groups) and, c) Key leaders (allegiances, political agendas, religion).

Due to the usual complex nature of current conflicts, there may also be the need to study the external interest and internal dynamics players such as regional organisations, countries, governmental and non-governmental organisations, etc.

Threat assessments determine the targets, perpetrators, capabilities, most likely and most dangerous courses of action, and overall intentions of identified threats.

It also provides the FC with situational awareness that reduces the probability of surprise, enhances decision making and enables effective management of the operational environment thus enhancing the overall effectiveness of the force.

By the end of the UN MDMP, the threat assessment will have thoroughly considered likely adversary courses of action, and adversary reactions to each of the friendly forces COAs being considered for the peacekeeping force.

Slide 21



Key Message: Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the conflict parties, their composition and organization (to include size, leadership and chain of command), tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, sustainment systems, source of motivation, external and internal support, military and political objective, etc.

The military threat assessment normally focuses on armed threats to the PKO that might affect the safety and security of its own forces, designated persons, and designated infrastructure.

The military threat assessment for a peacekeeping operation can be even more complicated to conduct than for war-like operations because the adversary is commonly defined by irregular and complex relationships that often change if other conditions change.

It is unlikely that the adversary will be a force easily identified by their military uniforms, equipment, and tactics. However, while the likely adversary may not have the makings of a traditional military force, their potentially strong organisation, local knowledge, passion for their cause, motivation, local support networks, and fighting experience could still make them a formidable foe.

At a minimum, an assessment of all the potential adversary groups must include:

- Political, economic, and social agenda.
- Leadership.
- Force size.
- Force structure and disposition.
- Logistics and sustainability.
- Training of adversary.
- Capability and known tactics.

Slide 22



Key Message: Risk is characterised by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition.

Once the threats have been risk assessed, measures required to mitigate against the highest risks must be considered. The risk analysis provides planning officers with a priority list of threats that need to be mitigated based on how high the risk is for each threat.

☞ ***Note to instructor***: Example of mitigating against a high-risk threat:

To mitigate against the threat of roadside IEDs, a PKO plan would need to include factors such as personal protective equipment, mine-protected vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal teams.

Slide 23



Key Message: A risk matrix is a matrix that is used during risk assessment to define the level of risk by considering the category of probability or likelihood against the category of consequence (severity). It is a simple mechanism to increase the visibility of risks and assist management/leadership decision-making. As part of the risk assessment matrix the following parameters for likelihood (probability), impact (severity) and risk levels are normally applied.

Individual threat-risk assessments are conducted throughout the MDMP and must consider both mission and non-mission-related aspects that may have an impact. The end result of this assessment is an initial estimate of risk for each identified threat expressed in terms of VERY HIGH, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW or VERY LOW as determined from the standardised application of the risk assessment matrix.

LIKELIHOOD (probability that an event will occur)

- Very Likely/Imminent – Occurs often, experienced continuously.
- Likely – Occurs several times.
- Moderately Likely – Occurs sporadically.
- Unlikely – Unlikely, but could occur at some time.
- Very Unlikely - Can assume it will not occur.

IMPACT (The degree of injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors)

- Catastrophic - Death or permanent total disability, system loss, major property damage, loss of mission mandate.
- Severe - Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability in excess of three months, major system damage, significant property damage, loss of credibility.
- Moderate - Moderate injury, moderate system damage, moderate property damage.
- Minor - Minor injury, minor medical treatment, minor system damage, minor property damage.
- Negligible - First aid, negligible system impairment.

RISK LEVELS

- Very High - Loss of ability to accomplish mission.
- High - Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
- Medium - Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
- Low - Low impact on accomplishment of mission.
- Very Low - Little or no impact on the accomplishment of mission.

Slide 24



Key Message: Risk management is directed at reducing operational uncertainties while taking advantage of opportunities. This leads to the development of control and risk reduction measures to ensure acceptable levels of risk are not exceeded.

First, all threats to the force's current and future operations need to be identified. Each threat is then assessed to determine the risk of potential harm/loss based on the probability and severity of the threat. The risk of each threat must be assessed not only as risks to personnel, but also other risks such as those to essential equipment and to mission success.

Once the threats have been risk assessed, measures required to mitigate against the highest risks must be considered. The risk analysis provides planning officers with a priority list of threats that need to be mitigated based on how high the risk is for each threat.

Mitigating measures need to be monitored and evaluated to determine that they are addressing the threat sufficiently or if further measures need to be taken.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) Risk management is both a command and staff responsibility. It requires both elements to work together to ensure an effective risk management system is in place in the mission.
b) Example of mitigating against a high-risk threat: to mitigate against the threat of roadside IEDs, a PKO plan would need to include factors such as personal protective equipment, mine-protected vehicles, explosive ordnance disposal teams as well as clear guidance on reporting - especially to ensure the safety of personnel and to allow for medical care in case of an incident (CASEVAC).

Slide 25



Key Message: This is an example of a "New Risk Assessment" after the identification of the measures required to mitigate against the highest risk.

Slide 26



Key Message: The Sub-Step '' Situation Integration" provides an informed, predictive assessment that integrates the understanding of the operational environment and the actors within it. In this phase, potential future scenarios (most likely and most dangerous) are generated, and actor courses of action are developed and evaluated.

In the following steps of the process, the tactical tasks for the military component to respond to an evolving situation will be derived from these deductions.

Slide 27



Key Message: The results of the deductions will be summarised/integrated into the overall picture of the AOE, whether summarised in a list and/or stated on the planning map.

Situation integration provides an informed, predictive assessment that integrates the understanding of the operating environment and the actors within it.

In this step, potential future scenarios (most likely and most dangerous) are generated, and actor courses of action are developed and evaluated.

In a UN context, the impact of UN operations on other relevant actors must also be assessed, including the likely reaction to UN operations by local key leaders and vulnerable population groups.

Following the information gathered in defining the Operational Environment, it is determined what impact this might have on the operations of the PKM (i.e. it provides the 'so what').

The effect of the environment on own, friendly, and adversary forces needs to be determined, and these assessments should not be made in isolation or with bias. In isolation, one factor may appear to be of value to friendly forces, but it may be of even greater value to an adversary force.

Slide 28



Key Message: All available information is analysed to determine whether it should be collected to support the daily reporting and planning cycle or build the basis for further action.

Such action may include:

- Incorporation into routine briefings
- Flash or Situation Report (SITREP)
- Report to the Force Commander
- Report to or by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
- Report to or by the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
- An independently conducted reassessment of the situation and/or the initiation of the planning process in the case of a fundamental change in the situation, or if being tasked by the Head of Mission (HOM) or Force Commander (FC)
- The Sector/Battalion Commander at sector/brigade/battalion level planning

Slide 29



Key Message: The threat is influenced not only by the courses of action (COAs) of the peacekeeping force but also by those of adversary groups.

To develop adversary COAs, planning officers must adopt the perspective of the adversary and determine their potential actions in the same manner that COAs are developed for the peacekeeping force. Each adversary COA will present different threats and risks to the peacekeeping force, necessitating detailed analysis, particularly of the most dangerous and most likely scenarios.

Following the Threat Evaluation, gathered data must be analysed, and potential problems visualised and clearly stated, often in the form of effective schematics. For example, demonstrations, rioting, or seizures may represent the conflict parties' most dangerous and likely COAs. Additionally, a conflict party might seek to disrupt the electoral process to maintain a political stalemate. Counter COAs would then be developed to describe available options.

The most dangerous COAs are those that could severely impact the achievement of objectives, while the most likely COAs are those feasible for conflict parties to execute. After determining the most likely COAs, a comprehensive Information Collection Plan should be developed by tasking all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit as part of the information cycle.

Slide 30



Key Message: The outputs of the AOE encompass identifying intelligence gaps, determining threat actors courses of action, evaluating terrain and weather effects, assessing civil considerations, developing intelligence products, integrating intelligence into the operational plan, and conducting risk assessments.

These outputs collectively contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, fostering informed decision-making, effective planning, and successful execution of military operations.

Slide 31



Note to instructor:

Refer to the guidelines outlined in the "Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5 – UN MDMP" for further instructions.

Slide 32


Learning Activity 1 - AOE
SCENARIO
Based on the current situation (M +180) and updates (M+181 and 182), the situation in the mission started deteriorating.
The UNAC FC anticipates receiving the mission to intensify military operations in CARANA as part of the mission-wide plan to restore the country to normalcy.
You have been deployed as an MSO in the UNAC FHQ.
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Slide 33


Learning Activity 1 - AOE
Requirement:
• Based on the CARANA country study, current situation (M+180), and Updates (M+181 and M+182), prepare a briefing for the FC on the following key information (in general terms):
- The AOE (terrain and weather effects on UNAC operations)
- The humanitarian situation
- The security situation of the civilian population
- The Threat Actors evaluation:
- Parties to the Conflict (MPC, CISC, FDC)
- Uncontrolled Armed Groups (UAGs)
- Private Security Providers (PSPs)
- Friendly forces
- Own Forces
- Threat actors most likely and dangerous COA
- Risk Assessment
- Identify intelligence gaps and the Priority Peacekeeping-Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)
• Time of the Briefing: DD MM YYYY, HH MM hours (maximum 30 minutes)
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Lesson
3.5d

Mission Analysis

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5d explains Step 2 of the UN MDMP – Mission Analysis.

Relevance

Mission Analysis is the principal decision-making tool that guides the planning process. It takes the higher-level guidance provided to the planners, challenges it against the facts and assumptions, and then refines it to better detail the mission and the planning requirements.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Steps of the UN MDMP	2 - 3
The Lesson	4 - 17
Output of the Step	18 - 20
Learning Activity	21 - 24

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5d explains Step 2 of the UN MDMP – Mission Analysis.

Slide 2



Key Message: This slide reminds participants of the step of the UN MDMP we are discussing.

Let's explore Step 2 of the UN MDMP – Mission Analysis - in more detail.

Slide 3



Key Message: Mission Analysis is the principal decision-making tool that guides the planning process. It takes the higher-level guidance provided to the planners, challenges it against the facts and assumptions, and then refines it to better detail the mission and the planning requirements.

Based on the AOE, Mission Analysis will be initiated if the MDMP has been triggered. This might occur through a fundamental change in the situation, caused either by a major single incident that has a significant impact on the conduct of own operations (such as the non-availability of an earmarked unit) or by a sequence of single incidents (continued or multiple attacks against UN facilities, etc.) which, in their sum, have the same effect.

In the case of a fundamentally changed situation, it is recommended to adapt the method of operations. Criteria for a fundamentally changed situation may include:

- A clearly increased risk for UN personnel.
- The chances of successfully accomplishing the mission have clearly deteriorated.
- Conduct operations seem not to become successful (not to reach their goals/expected outcome) using the method of operation applied so far.
- The availability or capability of key resources (helicopters, earmarked units) has changed considerably.
- Other mission components (UN police, humanitarian actors, etc.) have significantly changed or need to change the way of conducting operations.

- The environmental conditions have changed radically (droughts, heavy rainfalls, flooding).
- Increased threats to civilians and the requirement for the protection of civilians (PoC).

If it is assessed that the situation has changed significantly, the staff initiates the planning process and immediately informs the Force Commander. Constant assessment of the situation is an element of routine staff work that can lead to triggering/initiating a new planning process. Therefore, this phase of the planning is also called the pre-planning phase.

A trigger for initiating the planning process may also be a task by the Head of Mission (HOM) or the Force Commander (FC).

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** Although the planning process is initiated and requested branches have to support the planning, all other staff procedures and processes must be operated as usual.

Slide 4



Key Message: The purpose of the mission analysis is to define what needs to be accomplished by the Peacekeeping Force (military component) to address a challenge/drastically changed situation.

This step should result in a restated mission, planning guidance, Commander's intent, incorporating purpose, method and end state.

Slide 5



Key Message: The Mission Analysis consists of six sub-steps:

- Identify and analyse the commander's intent and the military end state.
- Identify and analyse constraints and restraints.
- Identify Mission essential, specific and implied tasks.
- Conduct a threat and risk analysis.
- Identify and analyse assumptions.
- Define the mission statement.

Slide 6



Key Message: The Commander's Intent provides specific military direction and intentions derived from the higher-level directives and mandates.

The Commander's Intent is not meant to be too specific, it will not provide detailed tasks or actions, but rather it provides direction to the planning officers so that they can determine the solution.

The Commander's Intent is expressed in three parts: purpose, method and end state.

- the purpose provides the reason for the force conducting the operation.
- the method describes generically how the purpose is to be achieved.
- the end state defines the success criteria for completion of the operation.

The Higher Cdrs' intent is expressed by the desired strategic end state as mentioned in the CONOPS. In addition, the intent of the SRSG and/or FC must be taken into consideration. The military end state is a set of conditions that describe the achievement of military objectives as mentioned in the CONOPS.

Slide 7



Key Message: MSOs involved in the UN MDMP must understand what their Commander wants to achieve.

MSOs must understand the Commander's intention in terms of:

- The purpose of the operation and the expected outcome – Ideally at least two levels up – Why.
- Tasks – What is to be done.
- The Commander's Scheme of Manoeuvre and synchronisation – How.

Additionally, MSOs must identify their role in the Commander's plan and where the Main Effort will be. They should understand the Commander's priorities and how they fit into the plan.

Note to instructor:

- Additional Guidance - Requirements of Commander's Intent.
- MSOs must understand the Commander's intent two levels up.
- Include a clear and concise statement of the success criteria and desired end-state.
- Include key tasks that become the basis for planning.

Slide 8



Key Message: This slide provides an example of Commander's Intent.

- Commander's Intent - Example 2

Purpose: Restore security in the AOR to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

Method: Ensure free movement of the population throughout the AOR without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.

End State: Achieve a complete cessation of interference with humanitarian aid, attacks on civilians, and hostilities against the UN's presence.

Training Tips

Consider discussing the following with participants:

Analyse the example of Commander's Intent given in the slide and ask participants to answer the following questions:

- What is the reason for conducting the mission?
- What are the key tasks?
- How is the objective to be achieved?
- What are the commander's priorities?
- What are the success criteria?

Slide 9



Key Message: Operational Limitations include constraints and restraints.

Constraints (actions that must be done) and restraints (actions that must not be done) reflect the PKM's determination.

- Constraints are characteristics that cannot be changed and that affect the conduct of operations, such as distances, timings (start and/or end of the operations), and limitations of own force equipment and capabilities.
- Restraints are actions that a superior authority imposes that affect the manner in which the subordinate commander can conduct the operation. Examples of restraints are; compliance with international laws or agreements, prohibition of a pre-emptive strike.

Already given constraints and restraints are mentioned in the CONOPS and may serve as a reference/starting point for the analysis.

It is also important to differentiate between restraints and limitations. Limitations being aspects that do not depend on the subordinate command's will as for instance the lack of sufficient port capacities or roads. Moreover, provisions in a peace treaty with regard to time are not to be considered restraints. They are factors, as they were defined by the parties to the conflict rather than by a legitimised authority.

In UN PKM also Caveats (national caveats) might also have to be considered.

- Caveats – Restrictions attached to the deployment and taskings of troops or employment of resources (e.g. movement, use of aircraft or ROE limitations).

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** A simple way to remember the meaning of constraints and restrictions is:

a. constraints = 'must do' actions.

b. restrictions = 'must not do' actions.

Slide 10



Key Message: By categorising the required tasks as specified, implied and essential, the planning officer starts the process of shaping the operation. Generic orders now become much more specific and the planning process becomes much more focused.

In an ongoing PKM the existing mission and tasks have to be analysed against the changing parameters. The tasks should be identified and grouped into:

- Specified tasks
- Implied tasks
- Mission essential tasks

Specified tasks are those found clearly stated within the USG's Directive, Security Council Mandate or Mission/Military CONOPS. They must be completed because they have been given to the PK Mission. These may include:

- protection of the civilians (POC),
- safeguarding of the freedom of movement (FOM) of all mission elements,
- support of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process,
- protection and support of humanitarian operations,
- implementation/surveillance of a (weapons) embargo,
- provision of special capabilities (e.g. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection and destruction), and
- safeguarding of security during elections.

Implied tasks are those that must be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not specifically ordered/mentioned in one of the above documents. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the directive or mandate, the adversary situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit's current and future area of operations provides insights into implied tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks.

Additionally, an analysis of the doctrinal requirements for each specified task might provide implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require allocation of resources should be retained (e.g. establish liaison and monitoring mechanisms with local forces. These may be:

- treat and evacuate casualties
- Conduct patrols conduct a convoy/ escort
- establish/ conduct Checkpoints (CP)
- establish/ conduct an Observation Post (OP)
- maintain and rehabilitate of existing infrastructure
- conduct EOD clearance.

Essential Tasks

Once planning officers have a list of specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task's specific requirements. After analysing specified and implied tasks, they present to the commander for his/her approval a tentative list of tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission. These tasks are the **Mission essential tasks** and may include:

- protection of the civilians (POC),
- establishment and/or maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the country or in distinct regions (active, executive role),
- support of national security forces in establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment (semi-active, supportive role),
- support to the parties to the conflict in implementing a ceasefire/peace agreement (supportive role) and
- observation or verification of activities and processes or the compliance with agreements (supportive role).

Furthermore, whether there are given tasks from the Higher Command or the situation fundamentally changed, the main challenges and issues must be addressed. It is helpful to develop a problem statement, which during the Mission Analysis Brief (MAB), is agreed upon to have a common understanding for the further planning. In addition, it is purposeful to already identify the areas of main concern on the planning map.

Training Tips

Consider discussing the following with participants:

a) Discuss the specified tasks, implied tasks, and essential tasks for the military component in a peacekeeping mission in the implementation of the POC mandate of a current mission, and answer the following questions:

- How is POC stipulated in the UNSCR mandate?
- What is the role of military forces in protecting civilians?
- What are specified, implied and essential POC tasks?
- What are the constraints that affect the conduct of POC tasks and operations?
- What are the limitations of our own force capabilities?

b) It is recommended to distribute a copy of the SC mandate of the respective PKM to be discussed/analysed to course participants for this discussion.

Slide 11



Key Message: These are examples of specified and implied tasks in PKMs.

Slide 12



Key Message: Threats and Risks have already been determined and assessed as part of the Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) step and need continuously to be reviewed/validated throughout the MDMP process.

During the Mission Analysis, the threats and risks will be revisited and if required refined. Also new threats and risks might be identified at this stage, which need to be included into the revised AOE and to be factored in as part of the Mission Analysis.

Slide 13



Key Message: Planning officers gather two categories of information concerning the mission: facts and assumptions. Throughout the process, any assumption taken needs to be replaced by facts as soon as the information has been confirmed/consolidated.

Higher Commanders' assumptions are a predicted overall development, including the operational obstacles, under which the PKM will be conducted. It refers, for instance, to the behaviour of the parties to the conflict or the host state's government. The Higher Commanders' assumptions will be stated in the CONOPS.

Examples of Higher Commanders' assumptions:

- The parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire agreement.
- The host nation's government guarantees the UN mission's freedom of movement (or honours other guarantees/services promised).
- The positive situation development will continue.
- UN Forces will be targeted by XX armed group.

Facts are statements of known data or actual existing circumstances of the operational environment, including the Conflict Parties' and the mission components' strengths, dispositions, resources, etc. Critical facts are therefore those facts that need to be analysed because of their crucial importance in determining the state of affairs in the mission.

Assumptions are possibilities about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and

fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. They need to be regularly validated or replaced with facts as soon as possible!

Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. "Assuming away" potential problems is dangerous and may have a negative impact on the further planning process. Necessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not necessary and should be discarded.

Examples:

- The population generally supports the implementation of the mandate and the presence of peacekeeping troops in the Mission area.
- The parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire agreement.
- The host nation's government guarantees the UN mission's freedom of movement (or honours other guarantees/services promised).
- The positive situation development will continue.

Slide 14



Key Message: These are examples of Facts and Assumptions.

Slide 15



Key Message: On completion of analysing critical facts and assumptions, the planning officer will be left with many Information Requirements (IR), sourced from the list of assumptions, that need to be answered in order to effectively conduct the mission. The most important of these are termed Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

CCIRs identify information needed by the commander to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him/her by defining what is important to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of subordinates and staff, assist in the allocation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations.

CCIRs should be limited to ten or fewer to enhance comprehension. The CCIRs directly affect the success or failure of the mission. This is what distinguishes them from other 'nice to have' Requests for Information (RFI) that will provide information that is valuable but will not change the way in which the operation is to be conducted.

Slide 16



Key Message: The final output of this step is the development of a mission statement if it hasn't already been specifically provided by the commander from the beginning or the development of a proposed mission statement for the commander's approval.

The mission statement should describe the task with a purpose, and can be expressed using the elements of:

- Who - will execute the operation (tasks).
- What - operation (overall task or tasks) need to be performed/conducted.
- When - will the operation (tasks) begin or when will it need to be completed.
- Where - will the operation (tasks) be conducted.
- Why - each unit (for what purpose/aim) will conduct its part.

Slide 17



Key Message: This is an example of a Mission Statement.

Slide 18



Key Message: The Mission Analysis should be concluded by a mission analysis briefing and/or providing a short summary document to the FCOS/ FC on the results and to seek guidance before moving on to the Courses of Action (COA) Development.

Slide 19



Key Message: The Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB) should include an agenda and address the main aspects of the analysis conducted, and it should contain the proposed mission statement.

Purpose of Mission Analysis Brief:

- To integrate the planning efforts.
- Seek approval of the re-stated Mission Statement.
- Obtain further guidance from the Commander.

Slide 20



Mission Analysis Briefing - Tasks

Briefer	Subject
Chief of Staff	Purpose of brief and current mission
U2	AOE deductions Threats' Most Likely COA and Most Dangerous COA Risks identified
U3	Facts and Assumptions Analysis of Higher Commander's Intent Recommended essential tasks and end state
U1	Personnel service support and key deductions
U4	Sustainment capacity to achieve the mission
U5	Initial intelligence Collection Plan (CCIRs) Recommended broad COAs
Chief of Staff	Proposed restated mission
Commander	Guidance and intent

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Key Message: This is an example of tasks for a Mission Analysis Briefing.

Slide 21



***Note to instructor**:*

Refer to the guidelines outlined in the "Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5 – UN MDMP" for further instructions.

Slide 22


Learning Activity 2 –
Mission Analysis
SCENARIO
Sporadic fighting has been reported in different sector's AOR.
In Sector III, fighting has been reported in multiple cities along the FDC and CISC-controlled areas.
In SUREEN, Sector II, the law and order situation has drastically deteriorated.
Moreover, the sectors are also in dire need of administrative support to cope with the existing operational requirements.
The crises management team has been called by the SRSG and respective component heads have been asked to revise their mission.
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Slide 23


Learning Activity 2 –
Mission Analysis
SCENARIO
The SRSG intends military and police components to undertake targeted operations against the armed groups, restore the confidence of the civilians in the ability of UNAC to provide them physical protection and ensure no attacks take place against the IDPs. The priority now will be on safety and security.
Based on this situation, the FC tasked the Military COS to coordinate the MSOs to conduct a Mission Analysis to deal with the situation.
The FC would also like to be involved in critical stages of the analysis so that he/she can provide his/her directions and guidance along the way.
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Slide 24


Learning Activity 2 –
Mission Analysis
Requirement:
Based on the situation presented above, as MSOs in the FHQ, prepare the Mission Analysis briefing for the FC on the following key information:
• Identify and analyse the commander's intent and the military end-state
• Identify and analyse constraints and restraints
• Identify Mission essential, specific and implied tasks
• Conduct a threat and risk analysis
• Identify and analyse assumptions
• Prepare a draft of the mission statement
Time of the Mission Analysis Briefing: DD MM YYYY, HH MM hours (maximum 15 minutes).
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Lesson
3.5e

Course of Action Development

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5e explains Step 3 of the UN MDMP – Course of Action Development.

Relevance

COA development in the UN MDMP is a critical step that involves analysing and developing potential COAs to achieve mission objectives and resolve identified problems.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 90 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Steps of the UN MDMP	2 - 3
The Lesson	4 - 22
Output of the Step	23 - 24
Learning Activity	25 - 28

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5e explains Step 3 of the UN MDMP – Course of Action Development.

Slide 2



Note: This slide reminds participants of the step of the UN MDMP we are discussing.

Let's explore Step 3 of the UN MDMP – Course of Action Development - in more detail.

Slide 3



Key Message: Following the Mission Analysis, normally concluded by the Mission Analysis Briefing and having received the commander's approval of the proposed mission statement and the commander's guidance, HQ staff will develop different Courses of Action (COAs) to address the problem/situation.

Having thoroughly analysed the requirements of the mission, and after receiving command guidance and approval of the proposed mission statement, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must involve himself/herself in their development. His/her guidance and intent focus the staff's creativity to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His/her direct participation helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce).

Slide 4



Key Message: The purpose of COA Development is to develop two or more feasible COAs on the basis of deductions from the previous planning steps, considering new tasks or a changed situation. This step ends with a description of two or more possibilities of own actions (courses of action).

The COA development is a process that leads from very general deductions to more and more specific descriptions of own tasks. Suitable and proper tasks will be combined into an option. The required forces will be analysed for each option. By adding the forces to an option, it becomes a COA.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) COA development in the UN MDMP is a critical step that involves analysing and developing potential COAs to achieve mission objectives and resolve identified problems.

b) The process includes generating multiple options, evaluating their feasibility and effectiveness, and selecting the most suitable one for further planning and execution.

c) COA development allows military commanders and staff to assess the advantages, disadvantages, risks, and potential outcomes of each option, ensuring the best possible decision-making in achieving the mission.

d) It encourages creativity, open-mindedness, careful deliberation, and consideration of available resources and operational limitations. Ultimately, COA development plays a significant role in making informed decisions that align with mission objectives and increase the chances of mission success.

Slide 5



Key Message: Each COA must have the following elements:

- What: tasks to be executed.
- When: critical timing parameters.
- Where: locations where military effects will be achieved.
- How: the concept of operations and incorporating tasks.
- Why: the purpose of the mission.

The staff should develop at least two different COAs for each assigned task.

Generally, each COA will be depicted visually and in words, outlining the mission, the commander's intent, scheme of manoeuvre, purpose, method, and end state, as well as information requirements.

Each COA must then be considered from a threat perspective, and it is necessary to consider the impact of the COA on non-threat actors such as vulnerable civilian groups, local key leaders, and other important actors in the local environment.

Finally, every COA will be evaluated against a set of feasibility criteria. Feasible COAs will be taken to the COA comparison.

Slide 6



Key Message: The step COA Development consists of five sub-steps:

- Confirm the Centre of Gravity.
- Conduct critical capability analysis.
- Develop (confirm) Lines of Operation and decisive conditions.
- Develop detailed COAs.
  - Determination of tactical tasks.
  - Troops to Tasks Analysis.
  - Development of COA.
- Evaluate COAs.

Slide 7



Key Message: The COG for any force can be defined as the characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to engage in the operation.

Slide 8



Key Message: COG elements consist of:

- **Critical Capabilities** (a characteristic of a key element of a force that if destroyed or neutralised will significantly undermine operational capability).
- **Critical Requirements** (an essential condition, resource or means that is needed for a critical capability to be fully functional).
- **Critical Vulnerabilities** (an element of a critical requirement that is vulnerable or that can be made vulnerable).

While a COG can have several elements, there can be only one COG for each force. Understanding own and adversary's COG is critical to developing a successful plan.

☞ ***Note to instructor:***

- Examples:

a) **Critical Capabilities**: Air operations, force mobility and firepower.

b) **Critical Requirements**: Consent, Situation Awareness, freedom of action, robust ROE.

c) **Critical Vulnerabilities**: Limited forces, level of credibility.

Slide 9



Key Message: Directly targeting the adversary's COG may not always be the most effective approach to overcoming the adversary. The aim is to affect the adversary COG while avoiding their strengths and minimizing the risks to own forces. To do this effectively, the Critical Capabilities of both own and adversary forces must be analysed.

When conducting this analysis, it is important to remember that it is not simply a comparison of the two forces that is being conducted. The analysis must result in identifying critical capabilities of the adversary that are vulnerable and can therefore be targeted, and identifying critical capabilities of own force that are vulnerable and therefore need to be well defended/protected.

A simple comparison of forces for a peacekeeping operation will almost always show that the peacekeeping force has greater strength than the adversary, but such a simple comparison is dangerous because that strength advantage only matters if it is used to an advantage.

Slide 10



Key Message: A Line of Operation (LOO) is the linking of Decisive Conditions to achieve the required effect on the adversary's COG.

A LOO may be expressed functionally, such as a logistics LOO a humanitarian LOO, or environmentally LOO, or a military (land or maritime) LOO. The result of this step is that the operation will be broken down into distinguishable Lines of Operation with easily identifiable Decisive Points that must be achieved in order for the operation to progress.

☞ ***Note to instructor:***

a) As part of expression of the Commander's vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational situation at the start of an operation into a series of acceptable operational conditions the planners develop an operational design through establishing decisive conditions (DCs) along different lines of operation (LoOs), leading to the achievement of operational objectives and contributing to the achievement of the mission's objectives.

b) LOOs may be derived from and confirmed with the Mission's Military CONOPS.

Slide 11



Key Message: A Decisive Condition (DC) is the achievement of desired effects.

It may be a physical effect, such as securing a vital piece of local infrastructure or destroying a piece of adversary equipment, or it may be less tangible such as winning the support of the local population or the degradation of the adversary's will to fight.

A DC is decisive because the operation cannot progress further until it has been achieved. DCs should be described in terms of their effect (State/situation achieved), must be measurable and have a clearly articulated purpose.

Slide 12



Key Message: A military operation may include different lines of operation (LOOs) and Decisive Conditions (DC) as depicted in the diagram.

LOOs are the different approaches, or methods, employed to achieve the desired effect in a particular aspect of the operation. These LOOs can be expressed either in terms of functions (such as logistics, humanitarian, land, maritime, or media) or in terms of environments (such as urban, desert, or mountainous).

Each LOO within the diagram is associated with specific DCs. These DC represent the conditions that must be achieved for the operation to progress further. The DC are measurable and have a clearly articulated purpose, allowing for a clear evaluation of progress and success.

Slide 13



Key Message: For the development of detailed COAs, these three elements should be considered during the planning process. Let's explore each one of them.

Slide 14



Key Message: To develop options, a combination of tactical tasks for each identified area must be selected.

The key questions that must be addressed at this point are: "What must be done where?" and "Which unit will be able to conduct the task?" or "Is best suited to conduct the task?".

☞ ***Note to instructor:*** A list of the tasks of units deployed to UN PKMs can be found in the UN Units Manuals and the respective Mission-Specific Statement of Unit Requirements (SURs).

Slide 15



Key Message: In the Troops to Tasks Analysis, the number of forces required to carry out all selected tasks for each of the options will be calculated.

Because every peacekeeping mission is different, there are no standardised numbers for a tactical task. Therefore, the necessary troop strength must be calculated individually for each tactical task. At this point, the experience and imagination of the military planners are crucial.

The key question that must be addressed at this point is: "What formation in the given situation in the identified area is required to fulfil the task?"

Under normal circumstances, all options where the number of required forces exceeds the number of available forces within the mission or exceeds the number of mandated troops (as authorised by the UN Security Council Mandate) will be discarded.

Slide 16



Key Message: Subsequently, it needs to be determined which tasks have to be fulfilled in each sector and which forces are being assigned, including a sequence of deployment and engagement. This is the development of detailed Courses of Action.

Planning officers must now turn broad concepts into real options. This increase in detail is required for the COAs to be properly tested and for the commander to receive enough information to make a quality decision. This sub-step requires planning officers to develop each COA almost to the point of being able to write a CONOPS document for each one. Failing to develop each COA to this detail won't allow the COAs to be analysed well enough to result in the best COA being chosen by the commander.

To develop the COAs in enough detail, at a minimum, the following must be considered for each COA:

- Main effort.
- Supporting effort.
- Integration of different Lines of Operation.
- Command, control, and communications.
- Adversary threats, risks, and COA.

Slide 17



Key Message: The Main Effort establishes an activity, the successful accomplishment of which is decisive to the achievement of the mission. This is normally resourced to ensure the responsibility for its execution is assigned. The Scheme of Manoeuvre gives a general description of how the intent is to be achieved.

For each COA, the Scheme of Manoeuvre usually provides an understanding of the manner in which the mission would be accomplished by assigning roles to sub-units and other resources to be employed. Also, the Main Effort, End State, and Success Criteria have to be designated and well-defined.

Slide 18



Key Message: This is an example of a template for the development of a COA.

Slide 19

Example: Course of Action 1 (COA 1)



Intent: To restore peace and security in Carana through effective safeguarding of the United Nations demilitarised zone while dominating the Area of Operation to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

SOM: To divide the force into **three sectors**, secure the demilitarised zones with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and Obs Posts with **each sector maintaining a company size reserve** for employment under orders of Force HQ

ME: Monitoring the UN demilitarised zones and population centres in each Sector

End State: Complete cessation of hostilities in Carana with UNAC presence across the country

Success Criteria: Free movement of UNCT and civilians throughout Carana without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.

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Key Message: Example of the development of a COA presentation.

This COA seeks to decentralise the Force's enabling units to the various Sectors while maintaining a battlegroup size Force Mobile Reserve at Xalksa to be ready to reinforce any of the sectors.

The demilitarized zones will be monitored with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs.

Slide 20

Example: Course of Action 2 (COA 2)



Intent: To restore peace and security in Carana through effective safeguarding of the United Nations demilitarised zone while dominating the Area of Operation to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

SOM: To divide the forces into **two sectors**, secure the demilitarised zones with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and Obs Posts with **a strong Force Mobile Reserve of brigade group size.**

ME: Monitoring the UN demilitarised zones and conduct offensive actions against spoilers

End State: Complete cessation of hostilities in Carana with UNAC presence across the country

Success Criteria: Free movement of UNCT and locals throughout Carana without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.

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Key Message: Example of the development of a COA presentation.

This COA seeks to centralise the Force's enabling units at Xalksa with a strong Force Mobile Reserve ready to support any of the sectors while maintaining a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs to monitor the demilitarized zones.

Slide 21



Synchronisation Matrix

										ORIGINATOR: (HQ)			
										DTG:			
										REF:			
MSN			INTENT					INTENT SCHEMATIC					
			SOM										
			ME					END STATE					
TIME		H - 72	H - 48	H - 36	H - 24	H - 12	H HR	H + 12	H + 24	H + 36	H + 48	H + 72	REMARKS
CONFLICT PARTY 1 (ACTIONS)													
CONFLICT PARTY 2 (ACTIONS)													
POTENTIAL DB													
MANOEUVRE	SUB UNIT 1												
	SUB UNIT 2												
	SUB UNIT 3												
	MOBILE RES												
	RES SUB UNIT												
SP ARM	OS												
	ENGR												
	COMM ETC												
SYC SP	LOG												
	MED												
	ES												

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Key Message: A Synchronisation Matrix is an effective way to organise the details of each COA.

The synchronisation matrix lists the main events of each line of operation against each phase for both own force and adversary. This allows the commander to see what is supposed to occur and when. It also allows the Decisive Conditions (DCs) to be highlighted so the commander can focus his or her attention accordingly.

The lines of operation will differ for each operation, and only some of them will be the responsibility of the military force. However, coordinating all of them is necessary for the peacekeeping plan to be successful.

Slide 22



Key Message: In the end, each COA will be evaluated and has to meet the following requirements:

- Feasibility - Is it achievable within allocated resources?
- Acceptability - Is it within accepted doctrine, risk, costs, etc.
- Completeness - Does it answer the 5W questions?
- Exclusivity - Is it different from other COAs?
- Suitability - Will it result in mission/operation accomplishment?

All COAs, which meet all above listed requirements, will be compared in the following steps.

Slide 23



Key Message: This Step should be concluded by a COA Development Briefing with a description of two or more possibilities of own actions (courses of action). It is also an opportunity for MSOs to seek guidance before moving to the COA Comparison.

It is advisable to discuss the criteria (including measurement) as well as possible weighting factors used in the COA with FCOS/FC and to seek approval prior to the actual COA comparison.

Therefore, a sketch of each COA compromising the proposed intent, the task organisation and the tasks to the subordinates should be provided. Furthermore, the concept regarding logistics and command and control must be addressed.

Slide 24



Key Message: This slide provides an example of a COA Development Briefing Agenda.

Key points:

- **Introduction**: The briefing begins with an introduction, stating the purpose of the briefing and providing background information. It also includes a summary of the previous steps taken in the UN MDMP process, such as Mission Analysis, Course of Action Analysis, and Comparison.
- **Mission Statement**: The mission statement of the operation is restated, reinforcing the overall objective of the mission.
- **Commander's Intent**: The briefing includes a summary of the commander's intent for the operation, highlighting the desired end state and key objectives.
- **Evaluation Criteria**: The briefing presents the evaluation criteria used to assess potential COAs. These criteria may include feasibility, acceptability, completeness, exclusivity and sustainability.
- **Assumptions**: Key assumptions made during the COA development process are highlighted. These assumptions should be realistic and clearly defined.
- **Course of Action Overview**: A brief overview of the COAs evaluated during the COA analysis step is provided. This section outlines the number and types of COAs considered for the operation.

- **Recommended Course of Action**: The briefing clearly states the recommended COA for the operation. The reasons and justifications for selecting this particular COA over others are provided.
- **Detailed Description of Recommended COA**: A detailed explanation of the recommended COA is presented, including key tasks, sequencing, and resourcing requirements. This section outlines the operational concept of the proposed COA.
- **COA Sketch**: If applicable, a graphical representation or sketch is included to visualize the recommended COA and provide a clearer understanding of the operational concept.
- **Coordinating Instructions**: Specific instructions or guidance for subordinates in relation to the recommended COA are provided. This section addresses coordination requirements, timelines, and key decisions.
- **Resources Required**: The briefing lists and discusses the resources necessary to execute the recommended COA. This includes personnel, equipment, and logistical requirements.
- **Risk Assessment**: Potential risks associated with implementing the recommended COA are assessed and discussed. This section identifies risk mitigation measures and contingency plans.
- **Conclusion**: The briefing concludes by summarizing the key highlights and restating the recommended COA.
- **Way Forward**: The next steps in the decision-making process are outlined, including the timeline for further planning and execution activities.

Slide 25



Note to instructor:

Refer to the guidelines outlined in the "Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5 – UN MDMP" for further instructions.

Slide 26


Learning Activity 3:
COA Development
SCENARIO
At the end of the Mission Analysis briefing, the FC want the Staff to come up with COAs to deal with the situation.
The FC directs the COS and MSOs to reduce or eliminate identified risks, and particularly to reduce potential harm to civilians.
The FC wants MSOs to consider the development of protected areas, secure humanitarian access, etc.
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Slide 27


Learning Activity 3:
COA Development
SCENARIO
The FC further suggests that MSOs think about:
- COAs to reduce the likelihood of physical violence
- COAs to use resources in the most effective way and in support of synchronisation with other mission components
- Coordination with protection actors outside the mission (e.g., humanitarian actors, state authorities)
- Consultations with communities at risk are critical to ensure the COA is comprehensive and represents a thorough analysis of all relevant aspects, including their protection capabilities
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Slide 28


Learning Activity 3:
COA Development
Requirement:
Based on the situation presented above, as MSOs in the FHQ, develop three (03) COAs to deal with the current situation in the mission area, and prepare the COA Development briefing for COS.
In addition to the guidance provided by the FC above, key points to consider during the development of each COA:
Confirm the Centre of Gravity
Conduct critical capability analysis
Develop (confirm) Lines of Operation and decisive conditions
Develop detailed COAs:
Determination of tactical tasks
Troops to Tasks Analysis
Development of COA
Evaluate COAs
Time of the COA Development Briefing: DD MM YYYY, HH MM hours (maximum 15 minutes).
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Lesson
3.5f

Course of Action Analysis and Comparison

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5f explains Step 4 of the UN MDMP – Course of Action Analysis and Comparison.

Relevance

The purpose of the COA analysis and comparison is to determine the most suitable COA. This involves an analysis of each identified COA individually and then compare them against each other using approved criteria.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Steps of the UN MDMP	2 - 3
The Lesson	4 - 12
Output of the Step	13 - 15
Learning Activity	16 - 18

Slide 1



Key Message: Lesson 3.5f explains Step 4 of the UN MDMP – Course of Action Analysis and Comparison.

Slide 2



Note: This slide reminds participants of the step of the UN MDMP we are discussing.

Let's explore Step 4 of the UN MDMP – COA Analysis and Comparison - in more detail.

Slide 3



Key Message: In this step, all COAs developed in the previous step will be analysed and compared against each other using approved criteria.

Slide 4



Key Message: The purpose of the COA analysis and comparison is to determine the most suitable COA.

This involves an analysis of each identified COA individually and then compare them against each other using approved criteria.

The COA Analysis and Comparison should be done separately for each COA initially, using analytical methods/tools, and then presented to the commander as a comparison of the COAs.

Slide 5



Key Message: Several analytical frameworks/tools can be used for the Analysis and Comparison of the COAs, like a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats), a list of advantages/disadvantages of each COA or a desktop simulation.

It may also be useful to measure the COA against a set of weighted criteria such as surprise, flexibility, simplicity, security, force protection and POC. To be able to unbiased measure the COAs against each other, the weight of each of the criteria should be defined and approved by the Commander before the comparison of the COAs takes place.

The FHQ/SHQ staff may also consider the impact on UN principles such as the effect of a COA on the perception of the UN's impartiality, consent and the non-use of force, except in defence of the mandate, ROE, POC, etc.

Notes to instructor:

The COA Analysis and Comparison should be done separately for each COA initially, ideally by war-gaming, and then presented to the commander as a comparison of the COAs.

Slide 6



Key Message: This slide provides general Guidelines to MSOs for COA Analysis and Comparison.

- Remaining objective and impartial.
- Continuous verification of each COA's credibility.
- Avoid premature conclusions.
- Each COA must be tested against each Conflict Party's COA.

Slide 7



Key Message: For the analysis of the individual COA success criteria must be determined. These may be:

- To what extent does a COA produce the desired impacts/outcome?
- What implications/risks are of for each COA?
- What resources (troops, budget, sustainability, key capabilities, etc.) are required?
- What are possible negative/positive influences on other actors?

Slide 8



Key Message: The result of the individual COA analysis should be summarised graphically for reference, own understanding and briefing.

Slide 9



Key Message: On completion of the COA Analysis, the COAs are compared with each other, using the same criteria, to determine which COA is the most appropriate.

Based on approved criteria, scale for measurement and weighting factors the COA comparison will be conducted. The criteria (including measurement) as well as possible weighting factors used in the COA comparison should have been discussed with and approved by the FCOS/FC prior to the actual COA comparison. First, all the criteria have to be determined, measured and valued. If the use of weighting factors has been decided, the results must be multiplied with those factors.

Determining the appropriate criteria for the comparison is essential to the effectiveness of this method. Refer back to the Mission Analysis to help determine the criteria that best measure the likely success of each COA. The outcome of the comparison matrix and the analysis of the individual COAs supports the recommendation of a COA. Application of the comparison matrix and reliance purely on the mathematical calculation is not enough, the results must be derived, explained, and justified using the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

Notes to instructor:

a) Different examples of the COA comparison are provided in the following slides (Advantages and Disadvantages, matrix and the scale for measurement).
b) Although Course of Action Comparison is combined with the Course of Action Analysis, it is classified as a separate step by some military doctrines.

Slide 10



Key Message: This slide provides examples of different types of methods/tools for comparison of COAs.

Slide 11



Key Message: This is an example of a comparison of 3 different COAs, based on the analysis of their individual advantages and disadvantages.

From here, the COAs are compared with each other using the same criteria to determine the most appropriate COA.

Slide 12



Key Message: This slide provides an example of a comparison of 3 different COAs, using numerical score for each criterion approved by the Commander.

There are several ways a Decision Matrix can be constructed. The example in this slide simply assigns each criterion a numerical score. Other methods assign a positive or negative value to each criterion, and some will also assign a weight to each criterion because not all criteria will be as important as each other.

Planning officers can choose which method they use but must remain aware of the limitations of their chosen method. The Decision Matrix methodology works well but is not perfect. So, while a Decision Matrix will likely deduce the most appropriate COA, it still needs to be balanced with a subjective assessment and should not be relied upon as a conclusive selection.

Slide 13



Key Message: Military Staff Officers (MSOs) would upon completing the COA analysis, prepare a COA Decision Briefing for presentation to the FC/SC.

The purpose of a Decision Briefing is to obtain the commander's decision on a recommended COA.

Slide 14



Key Message: The decision briefing should include address the key aspects of the COA analysis and comparison, recommend the most suitable COA for the FC/SC approval, as well as seek the FCs'/SC's guidance for the order development.

MSOs will present the COAs where possible using graphics and sketches to justify their recommendations including draft Task Organisations (Task Orgs), the assumptions used, and make recommendations.

The commander may accept, modify, or even decline the COAs. The Commander then issues a decision and concept, which forms the basis of WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders, which is the next step of the UN MDMP.

Slide 15



Key Message: The decision briefing is intended to obtain an answer or a decision. It is the presentation of a staff officer's recommended solution resulting from analysis or study of a problem or problem area. Decision briefings vary as to formality and detail depending on the level of command and the decision maker's knowledge of the subject (the problem or problem area).

Slide 16



☞ ***Note to instructor***:

Refer to the guidelines outlined in the "Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5 – UN MDMP" for further instructions.

Slide 17


Learning Activity 4:
COA Analysis and Comparison
SCENARIO
The Chief of Staff (COS) was pleased with the results of our COA development briefing, but still had quite a few comments following our brief.
The COS wants all MSOs to work together and conduct the COA analysis and comparison of the three (03) developed COAs and suggest the most suitable COA to the FC in the next formal briefing.
The COS remind us to analyse each COA individually and compare them against each other, based on the analysis of their individual "advantages and disadvantages".
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Slide 18


Learning Activity 4:
COA Analysis and Comparison
Requirement
Based on the situation presented above, as a staff officer in the FHQ, conduct the COA analysis and comparison of the three (03) developed COAs, and prepare a formal COA Decision Brief.
Time of the COA Decision Briefing: DD MM YYYY, HH MM hours (maximum 15 minutes)
Obs.: The decision briefing should include an agenda, address the key aspects of the COA analysis and comparison, and recommend the most suitable COA for the FC approval.
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Lesson
3.5g

Decision and Order Development

Lesson at a Glance

Aim

Lesson 3.5g explains Step 5 of the UN MDMP – Decision and Order Development.

Relevance

At the end of the COA decision briefing, the Commander issues a decision and concept, which forms the basis for the development of the orders through WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD (or MCO or FRAGO) will then be produced.

Lesson Map

Recommended Lesson Duration: 45 minutes

2 - 3 minutes per slide

Structure	Slides
Lesson Cover	1
Steps of the UN MDMP	2 - 3
The Lesson	4 - 14
Output of the Step	15 - 16
Learning Activity	17 - 20

Slide 1

Key Message: Lesson 3.5g explains Step 5 of the UN MDMP – Decision and Order Development.

Slide 2



Note: This slide reminds participants of the step of the UN MDMP we are discussing.

Let's explore Step 5 of the UN MDMP – Decision and Order Development - in more detail.

Slide 3



Key Message: At the end of the COA decision briefing, the Commander issues a decision and concept, which forms the basis for the development of the orders through WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD (or MCO or FRAGO) will then be produced. The Chief of Staff will then apportion tasks to the staff for the further development of the selected COA – Synchronisation Matrix.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** Acronyms:

- Operations Order (OPORD)
- Military Coordination Order (MCO)
- Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)
- Warning Order (WARNORD)

Slide 4



Key Message: The COA comparison is presented to the Commander who, after being briefed on an overview of each COA, together with their relative strengths and weaknesses, likely reactions to the threats and any UN-specific criteria (ROE, UN principles, POC, etc.), makes an informed decision on which COA the Commander will choose.

The Comparison of the COAs should be concluded by a decision briefing to the FC for approval. The decision briefing should include an agenda, address the key aspects of the COA analysis and comparison, recommend the most suitable COA for the FC approval.

MSOs will present the COAs where possible using graphics and sketches to justify their recommendations including draft Task Organisations (Task Orgs), the assumptions used and make recommendations, as well as seek the FCs'/SC's guidance for the order development.

The Commander will take a decision and provide further guidance (the concept) for the Order Development.

☞ ***Notes to instructor:***

a) The commander may accept, modify, or even decline the COAs.
b) The Chief of Staff will then apportion tasks to the staff for the further development of the selected COA – Synchronisation Matrix.

Slide 5



Key Message: The most common orders produced by field HQs are presented in this slide.

There are different types of orders for different types of required actions, the most common orders produced by field HQs are:

- Operations Order (OPORD)
- Military Coordination Order (MCO)
- Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)
- Warning Order (WARNORD)

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For further information on different types of order, refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, First Edition, 2023, Chapter 5. Item 5.11.2.

Slide 6



Key Message: The primary role of the MSO in a Field HQ is to assist the Commander to plan the operations of and to exercise tactical control over deployed UN military units and personnel in accordance with the mission-mandated tasks.

To accomplish this, the Field HQ needs to communicate the FC's/SC's intent accurately and concisely. With orders and taskings, a higher command is giving subordinate units directives on what to do and to some extent - how to do it.

The subordinate units use reports to provide feedback but also to give the higher command the possibility to create a situational awareness of the situation in the area of responsibility of the unit, but also on the implementation of the given tasks. Orders are written after a UN Military Decision-Making Process (UNMDMP) has been conducted and typically require inputs of all staff functions, including the advisory functions. The issuing HQ is required to document the distribution and file incoming/outgoing orders.

As the formats and content of the orders vary over the missions, each mission is to provide their staff members with the mission-specific forms of the orders in their own SOPs.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For further information on different types of order, refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, First Edition, 2023, Chapter 5, Item 5.11.2.

Slide 7



Key Message: As previously discussed, at the end of the COA decision briefing, the Commander issues a decision and concept, which forms the basis for the development of the orders through WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD (or MCO or FRAGO) will then be produced.

All orders should include the following: Situation, Commander's Intent, Mission, Execution, Logistics and Command, Control and Communications Paragraphs.

An OPORD or a FRAGO is the result of the planning process. The OPORD or the FRAGO are not intended to be standalone documents and should be read in the context of the OPLAN, the Security Council Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other mission-related documents.

To this end, the OPORD or FRAGO should be written in a concise military language and should not attempt to replace other references, although it may be necessary to highlight the key points with broad military and security implications.

OPORD or FRAGO is approved and signed by the FC/SC.

Slide 8



Key Message: A Warning Order (WARNORD) is distributed to prepare the subordinated units for an upcoming task that will be directed by a FRAGO or OPORD.

The Warning Order is sent out on time to give subordinate commanders enough preparation time to develop their own warning and operations orders based on information contained within the WARNORD.

The Warning Order contains:

- A short summary of the general situation
- The (provisional) mission to be accomplished, including its purpose is stated
- The commander's intent, including (if available) the Concept of Operations, tasks of units, coordinating instructions
- Tactical movement and logistical movement constraints and logistics measures to be taken, and
- C2 guidance, relationships, code words and location of the (Fwd) CP/HQ.

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For further information on WARNORD, refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, First Edition, 2023, Chapter 5. Item 5.11.2.4.

Slide 9



Key Message: This is the general structure of a Warning Order (WARNORD).

Slide 10



Key Message: An Operation Order (OPORD) is an order, meant to direct subordinate units' activities with the conduct of military operations.

An OPORD describes the situation, the tasks of the unit and what supporting activities the unit will conduct in order to achieve their commander's desired end state.

OPORD are used to conduct operations and exercises involving subordinated units/HQs including Combat Support (e.g., Engineers, indirect fire) and Combat Service Support (Logistic) subunits. Operations Orders are used to change the main effort of subordinated units/HQs.

OPORD Standards contains:

- Task Organization which is concise and includes all elements participating in the operation to ensure unity of command
- The Situation paragraph is concise and complete and contain s information on threat actors, Friendly forces, and the civilian population (esp. vulnerable groups)
- The Mission paragraph is concise and complete and contains Essential tasks and On-order missions (if necessary)
- The Execution paragraph is concise and complete and contains Commander's intent, Concept of Operation, considerations on different operation elements (Manoeuvre, Fires, ISR, Engineering, STRATCOM/ Public Affairs, Military Police, CIMIC, Engagement), Tasks for the manoeuvre units, Tasks for Combat support and Combat service support (enabling) units and Co-ordinating instructions.
- The Service Support paragraph is concise and complete and contain the Support concept of how the operation will be logistically supported, medical support concept, including evacuation procedures and locations of ambulances/ helicopters and

casualty collection points, Movement instructions and priorities of support/traffic, Host nation and Mission Support

- The Command and Signal paragraph is concise and includes all locations of involved HQs/Command Posts, Operating instructions not specified in the SOP
- All essential elements of the operation as described in the main body of the OPORD like the battlespace (borders, coordination lines, timings, etc.), fires, HQs/Command Posts, phases are included in an operations overlay

☞***Note to instructor -*** For further information on OPORD, refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, First Edition, 2023, Chapter 5. Item 5.11.2.1.

Slide 11



Note: The next slide the continuation of the general structure of an Operation Order (OPORD).

Slide 12


Structure of the Operation Order
• Enablers.
• MLOs.
c. Operational Reporting.
d. Computer and Information Technology Services (CITS).
e. Signals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. XX XXX
Rank, Name
UNXXX Force Commander (date)
Annexes: (could include but are not limited to the examples below)
A. UNXXX Force DeploymentPlan
B. UNXXX Threat Assessment(UNCLASSIFIED
C. UNXXXStructure
D. UN-Civil/MilitaryCoordination
E. UNXXX Military Reports andReturns
F. UNXXX Concept of LogisticsSupport
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Slide 13



Key Message: A Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) is a form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

FRAGOs are used to task Routine Operations and are issued at the minimum weekly to order changes to existing Operations Orders (OPORD).

A SHQ or BHQ operates at the tactical level within its designated AOR, commanding and guiding subordinated UN InfBns and units. The main responsibilities of the SHQ/BHQ are to conduct AC2 and execute FHQ's OPORDs or FRAGOs in close cooperation with other mission components and partners in the sector, in accomplishment of the mission mandate.

FRAGOs include all five OPORD paragraph headings. After each heading, state either new information or "no change."

☞ ***Note to instructor -*** For further information on FRAGO, refer to the United Nations Deployed Military Field Headquarters Handbook, First Edition, 2023, Chapter 5, Item 5.11.2.3.

Slide 14



Note: This slide provides the general structure of a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO).

Slide 15



Key Message: The Comparison of the COAs should be concluded by a decision briefing to the FC for approval. The Commander will make a decision and provides further guidance (the concept), which forms the basis of WARNORDs to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD (or MCO or FRAGO) will then be produced.

All orders should include the following: Situation, Commander's Intent, Mission, Execution, Logistics, and Command, Control and Communications Paragraphs.

Slide 16



***Note to instructor**:*

Refer to the guidelines outlined in the "Facilitator Guidance for Conducting the Learning Activities of Lesson 3.5 – UN MDMP" for further instructions.

Slide 17

Learning Activity 5:
Decision and Order Development

SCENARIO

At the end of the Decision Briefing, the FC has approved the staff-recommended COA and reinforces his/her intent, UNAC end state, and the UNAC COG:

- **FC UNAC's intent** is to capitalise on the renewed goodwill of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He/she wishes to quickly establish contacts with all parties and factions involved and develop Sector and local-level cooperation based on consensus. The UNAC Forces have to create the conditions for the provision of Humanitarian relief and allow all of the UN and UN organisations to achieve their mission and democratise the Country. At the same time, our success in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure their support to us.

Slide 18


Learning Activity 5:
Decision and Order Development
SCENARIO
- UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.
- UNAC CoG. The legitimacy of the mission as evidenced by international support and the Mandate authorised by the Peace and Security Council.
The FC wants MSOs to prepare a WARNORD so that the three Sector Commanders can start planning their Operations.
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Slide 19


Learning Activity 5:
Decision and Order Development
Requirement
Based on the situation presented above, as MSOs in the FHQ, develop a draft WARNORD to Sectors Commanders for the upcoming UN military operations in Carana.
Prepare a 15-minute briefing presentation on the draft WARNORD and be prepared to discuss it during the plenary session.
Time of the WARNORD Briefing: DD MM YYYY, HH MM hours (maximum 15 minutes)
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Slide 20



Note: This is the summary of the Key Messages of the Lesson 3.5 (UN MDMP).

- The UN MDMP is a comprehensive process, in which planning officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander's guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planners' ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander's ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.
- MDMP relies on joint efforts of commanders and staff to seek optimal solutions in a dynamic environment
- The five steps of MDMP include: AOE; Mission Analysis; COA Development; COA Analysis and Comparison; Decision and Order Development
- It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make, and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.
- Principles of Planning called for the MDMP to be comprehensive, efficient, inclusive, informative, logical, transparent and integrated
- Throughout the UN MDMP process, a series of Warning Orders (WARNORD) are provided to the subordinate units to facilitate parallel planning and preparation. An OPORD/FRAGO/MCO is the final result of the planning process. These are not intended to be standalone documents and should be read in the context of the OPLAN, the Security Council Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other mission-related documents.

Annex: Suggested Training Schedule (Minimum Suggested Time)

Week 1

<table>
<tr><th>Time</th><th>Monday</th><th>Tuesday</th><th>Wednesday</th><th>Thursday</th><th>Friday</th></tr>
<tr><td>09:00 – 09:45</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.1
UN Secretariat Structure</td><td rowspan="2">Module 2
Lesson 2.1
International Law for MSOs in Field Missions</td><td>Module 3
Lesson 3.3
Crisis Management</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5c
Step 1 -AOE (Learning Activity)</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5d
Mission Analysis</td></tr>
<tr><td>09:50 – 10:35</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.2
DPPA</td><td>Module 3
Lesson 3.4
Operational Rhythm, Staff Work and Digital Tools</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">10:35 – 10:50 Coffee Break</td></tr>
<tr><td>10:50 – 11:35</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.3
DPO</td><td rowspan="2">Module 2
Lesson 2.2
Peace Operations-specific International Law</td><td>Module 3
Lesson 3.4
Operational Rhythm, Staff Work and Digital Tools</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5c
Step 1 -AOE (Learning Activity)</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5d
Step 2 -Mission Analysis
(Learning Activity)</td></tr>
<tr><td>11:40- 12:25</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.4
DOS</td><td>CARANA Country Study Briefing Presentation</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">12:30- 13:30 Lunch Break</td></tr>
<tr><td>13:30- 14:15</td><td rowspan="2">Module 1
Lesson 1.5
Integrated Mission Structures</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.1
UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence</td><td>Module 3
Lesson 3.5a
Planning in Peace Operations and IAP</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5c
Step 1 -AOE (Learning Activity)</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5d
Step 2 -Mission Analysis
(Learning Activity)</td></tr>
<tr><td>14:20- 15:05</td><td>Module 3
Lesson 3.5b
Overview of the UN MDMP</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">15:05- 15:20 Coffee Break</td></tr>
<tr><td>15:20- 16:05</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.6
Authority, Command and Control</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.2
UN Mission Support</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5c
Analysis of the Operational Environment</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5c
Step 1 -AOE (Learning Activity)</td><td rowspan="2">Module 3
Lesson 3.5e
Course of Action Development</td></tr>
<tr><td>16:10 – 16:55</td><td>Module 1
Lesson 1.7
Military Headquarters and Staff Functions</td></tr>
</table>

Week 2

Time	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
09:00 - 09:45	Module 3 Lesson 3.5e Step 3 - COA Development (Learning Activity)	Module 3 Lesson 3.5g Decision and Order Development	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise
09:50 – 10:35		Module 3 Lesson 3.5e Step 5 – Decision and Order Development (Learning Activity)			
10:35 – 10:50	Coffee Break				
10:50 – 11:35	Module 3 Lesson 3.5e Step 3 – COA Development (Learning Activity)	Module 3 Lesson 3.5e Step 5 – Decision and Order Development (Learning Activity)	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise
11:40- 12:25					
12:30- 13:30	Lunch Break				
13:30- 14:15	Module 3 Lesson 3.5f COA Analysis and Comparison	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise Briefing and Initial Guidance	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise
14:20- 15:05	Module 3 Lesson 3.5f Step 4 – COA Analysis and Comparison (Learning Activity)				
15:05- 15:20	Coffee Break				
15:20- 16:05	Module 3 Lesson 3.5f Step 4 – COA Analysis and Comparison (Learning Activity)	Set up of FHQ and SHQ	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise	CARANA Scenario-Based Exercise
16:10 – 16:55					

Note: The UNSO STM should be delivered after the participants have undertaken lessons of the CPTM.

END OF DOCUMENT